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THE CLUE TO HISTORY

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THE CLUE TO HISTORY

BY

JOHN MACMURRAY

Author of

Creative Society, etc.

STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT
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INTRODUCTION

I OFFER this book to the reader with some misgiving. I am aware that it is both hard to understand and easy to misunderstand. The misunderstanding to which it is liable belongs to its substance and could not be removed by any modification of its form. I have tried, throughout the book, to keep this difficulty present to the reader's mind. I should like to emphasize it at the beginning.

The main theme with which I am concerned is this. The traditional habits of life, upon which our civilization is based, give rise to habits of thought and reflection which prevent us from understanding Christianity. Yet Christianity is the motive force behind the development of our civilization. So long as we do not understand Christianity we cannot understand ourselves or what is happening to us. Yet, so long as we employ our traditional forms of reflection misunderstanding is unavoidable. What we call the Christian tradition is the product of our own ways of thinking. Christianity itself is the product of the Jewish mind, which is the reflective aspect of Jewish habits of life which are very different from ours. Europe is beginning to realize that its central problem is the Jewish problem. This new realization links up the crisis of our civilization with the understanding of Christianity.

The whole purpose of this book is to state and

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clarify and illustrate this thesis. The difficulty of doing so consists in the fact that I must employ habits of thought and expression which are inadequate to the task if I am to be understood at all. The very familiarity of the language of the Old and New Testaments is a drawback. Its meaning has already been transposed by the habits of mind which our civilization employs. Consequently, I have had to use our customary modes of thought to reveal their own inadequacy, and I must rely upon the willingness of the reader to make the same effort. If he will keep in mind that this alone is the main theme, and that everything else is intended to explain and illustrate it, the danger of misunderstanding will be greatly lessened.

I have used the traditional English text of the New Testament without any special regard to the conclusions of modern scholarship regarding the authenticity of the record. In particular, I have used the fourth Gospel in attempting to define the meaning of the teaching of Jesus. I do this not because I disagree with the results of critical examination, but because the determination of whether certain words were or were not spoken by Jesus is largely irrelevant to my purpose. If an understanding of Christianity depended upon our certainty that Jesus himself actually used these words and phrases, we should have to conclude that any understanding of Christianity must be highly speculative and problematical. I have tried to show that it depends rather upon our ability to define the intention which Jesus determined and created in his disciples. For this purpose it is of less importance to distinguish between what Jesus actually said and what his early disciples imputed to him. The danger that they misrepresented his meaning remains. But it would arise through the

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inadequacy of their understanding. Anything so unique and revolutionary as the intention of Jesus cannot be so completely falsified, by people who are living by it in a hostile world, that it does not reveal itself through their efforts to express it. Sometimes indeed the very inadequacy of their efforts to express what they are after helps rather than hinders our comprehension. I have tried to show that one of the main dangers which faced the early Church, in its efforts to interpret Jesus to the Gentile world, lay in the prevalence of Greek modes of thought. Indeed, it is still the influence of the Greek thought-forms in our own tradition that is one of the main obstacles in the way of understanding Christianity. It is generally recognized that the fourth Gospel shows the influence of the Greek philosophical ideas, and that so far as it may misrepresent the teaching of Jesus it is likely to be due to this Greek influence. It is easy to see that in certain respects this increases instead of decreasing the evidential value of the fourth Gospel. When we are concerned to discover the unique element in the teaching of Jesus by contrasting it with the essence of the Greek outlook, the appearance, in the fourth Gospel, of statements attributed to Jesus which embody an attitude of mind in stark opposition to the Greek attitude gains an added force.

I can only justify the effort that my book demands from the reader by my conviction that the future of Western civilization depends upon our making it. To understand Christianity we have to create in ourselves that religious comprehension of reality which is the historic achievement of the Hebrew race and which reached its mature expression in Jesus. Christianity is the driving force behind the progress of our civiliza-

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tion. To understand Christianity is to understand the crisis of civilization in which we are involved, and to see what we have to do. That what I have written is wholly inadequate to the urgency of our need I am well aware. But I may hope that my effort may help others to achieve success where I have failed.

JOHN MACMURRAY

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON

November 1st, 1938

CHAPTER I

THE AMBIGUITY OF CHRISTIANITY

It becomes increasingly difficult to discuss Christianity with any hope of mutual understanding. In England and America there is a growing conviction that in our time Christianity is incompatible with any participation in war. Yet the supreme head of the Roman Church has pronounced his blessing upon the rebel forces in Spain and recognized General Franco's Government as the legitimate Spanish Government, while the supreme head of the Chinese people, General Chiang Kai Shek, has commended Christianity to his people as a source of strength in their struggle for independence against the Japanese invaders. It seems clear that the General, the Pope and the Pacifists mean very different things by Christianity. There are throughout the world a large number of religious organizations which call themselves Christian Churches. Some of these look upon others as diabolical sources of evil and error. The term Christianity is widely used as a general name for these institutions taken together. On the other hand, we are accustomed to talk of a Christian act or a Christian character, and the term Christian does not then in any way refer to these institutions, and many of the acts of these institutions would hardly be described in this sense of the term as Christian. There are certain forms of social progress and

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social conduct, such as the care for the sick, the aged and the infirm, which have been universally recognized as expressions of the Christian spirit. These activities are being developed in Soviet Russia to an extent that no other country has ever attempted. Yet Soviet Russia repudiates Christianity and looks upon it as the enemy of human progress. When a general term has become the carrier of such confusion of meanings, it is best to avoid its use altogether. Where this is impossible, as it is in the case of Christianity, it is essential to attempt to define it in a way that will make it adequate to the purposes of human speech. Where a term refers to an ideal or to a system of beliefs, this is a relatively easy task. It is only necessary to say in what precise sense the word will be used for purposes of discussion. But where the term refers to an object or a fact, or to any element in the world or any character of the world, the task is not so easy. For in that case ambiguity can only be avoided if our conception of the reality to which the word refers is a true one.

Now, part of the ambiguity that has infected the word Christianity comes from its use as referring to certain ideas and beliefs. But part of it arises because there are in the world certain bodies, like the Christian Churches, and certain historical facts, like the life and teachings of Jesus, to which the term has an essential reference. Any use of the term which had no relation to these historical facts would be itself a source of confusion, and therefore both inappropriate and useless. If we are to mean something definite by Christianity, we must define it in a way that maintains the essential reference to the facts of history, and in particular to its historical source in the life of Jesus.

So much would be recognized by all the official

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guardians or exponents of the Christian religions. But difficulty would arise over the question, "What kind of relation must hold between anything properly called Christianity and the historical facts of its origin and development?" The all-pervading dualism of body and mind which affects the consciousness of the Western world occasions at once two different interpretations. As the founder of a religion, Jesus is the source of an historical process of which the history of the Christian Church is one result. From this point of view what is properly referred to as Christianity is all that is included in the actual history of the Churches and the religious movements which have their source in this historic development. On the other hand, Jesus can be looked on as the teacher who is the source of certain beliefs, doctrines and ideals of behaviour. From this point of view it might be maintained that no beliefs and no forms of behaviour which are not in harmony with the teachings of Jesus should be referred to as Christian, and the continuity demanded between the meaning of the term Christianity and the historical facts to which it refers would be one of consistency and truth. The practical importance of these two different ways of defining Christianity lies in the fact that the historical development of Churches or other institutions in no way guarantees that the original teaching of their founder, or even the original purpose of their foundation is retained. Historical continuity is no guarantee of spiritual continuity. Thus the situation has constantly arisen in the history of the Christian Church in which a sectarian movement has condemned and repudiated the Church from which it originates on the ground that its doctrine or its practice is inconsistent with the founder's teach-

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ing and mission. Indeed the actual division of Christianity into a set of Churches which are exclusive religious communities has its historical origin in the clash of these two views about the proper significance of the profession of Christianity. The question at issue is this: Is a man (or a body of men) Christian because he accepts and stands for the beliefs and ways of life that are embedded in the teaching of Jesus or because he participates in the religious activities which have an historic continuity with the foundation of the primitive Christian community by Jesus and his disciples?

The dualism which results in this dilemma is itself the expression of the failure of our Western minds to understand the nature of Christianity. But if for a moment we may speak in terms of it, it seems to me that historic continuity must take precedence in this debate. For religion is concerned with the reality of life, and not with ideas, except in so far as they embody themselves in life. And the reality of human life is history. It is what Jesus did to human history by his life and death rather than what he said about it that matters when we come to define Christianity. His work consists not in what he told men they ought to do but in what he did to men. Christianity is primarily the movement which Jesus founded rather than the doctrines that he taught, and one of the reasons why such controversy can arise over the interpretation of his teaching is that he was well aware of this, and behaved accordingly. It is in the world of life (which is the world of action) and not in the ideal world of thought that all real significance must be discovered. On this ground we are bound to decide that a man, or a body of men, is Christian to-day not primarily because

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they accept the views of Jesus but because they share and continue his act. And the claim to historic continuity is undoubtedly the proper claim.

But this does not mean that the continuity of ideas is unimportant. The controversy itself rests upon a misconception of the relation between life and thought. The real reason why it is the historic continuity in life that is important, rather than consistency of beliefs, is simply that thought and action are inseparable, and that ideas and doctrines are part of life; and teaching is a way of acting upon life for its transformation. It is one of the defining characteristics of human life that man acts by knowledge if he acts humanly. Thought is one of the determinants of human action and one of the forces that shape history. A claim to historic continuity in the religious field which did not include, as of its very essence, a claim to a spiritual continuity of idea and belief would be without significance. Such a continuity would be purely accidental, a matter of mere temporal sequence. It is an historic continuity of intention and purpose which is required to justify the claim. If, then, we are properly to discover whether an individual or an institution or a way of life can legitimately be described as Christian, we have to decide whether they are part of the historic continuity of purpose and intention first expressed in the life of Jesus and first defined by him in his teaching. The teaching of Jesus is important because it defines a purpose, not because it defines a set of ideas about the world, and not because it defines a way of life that men might live or "ought" to live. Thus neither the claim to share in a *de facto* historic continuity nor the claim to hold the same views and teach the same doctrines are sufficient—or even relevant—as a criterion.

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The only relevant claim is the claim to share the continuity of purpose and intention. And that is a claim to be acting deliberately, consciously and effectually for the realization, in human life, of certain ends. Such a claim can only be made good by demonstrating that the ends which are being pursued and the intentions which are being effected are the same ends and intentions for which Jesus lived. The effort to define Christianity, and to rescue the term from the chaos of ambiguity which now vitiates it, must take the form of an effort to determine what in fact was the deliberate purpose which Jesus determined for himself and his disciples, and which he sought by his own action to achieve.

This conclusion is so important that it must be underlined by noticing what it excludes. Human action is intentional activity. The activities of human beings, when they are not intentional, lack the essential mark of humanness. We recognize this in our feeling that a person is not responsible for what he has done unintentionally. Intentional activity, as the phrase suggests, is the unity of two moments, an ideal moment which we call an intention, and a material moment which we call an activity. These two moments must not be looked upon as two distinct things or events which are joined together. The intention is not the cause of the activity, or the activity the effect of the intention. An intentional activity is, in fact, a single unit of human behaviour. It is what we refer to as an action. But it has these two moments, or aspects, of thought and activity combined in it, and in reflection we can abstract the one from the other. It is also true, however, that we can separate them, though only by ceasing to act intentionally. We do this when we stop

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to think. In thinking our intention does not go so far as action. We remain, as it were, shut up in our own minds. So far as we live a life of reflection and contemplation, our life becomes a life in the mind, with knowledge or feeling as its end and aim. Now obviously this cannot mean that our material activities come to an end. It can only mean that our intentionality has been withdrawn from them, so that they go on, in some sense, "of themselves" as matters of habit and routine. When we turn from reflection to action, what happens is not that our minds become blank while our bodies exercise themselves. It is simply that the conscious intention which characterizes us as human beings is shifted to the outside world. Whereas in reflection we are engaged quite literally in changing our minds, in action we are engaged in changing the world. Action includes thought; it is not something which can be distinguished from thought. The life of reflection is not a different life from the life of action. It is a limitation of the life of action to one of its aspects. This is why we contrast ideas and real things. This is why ideas are true or real only through their reference to reality, and not in their own right. Reality is only to be found in action. Real things are the things we deal with in action, and therefore the whole life of thought has meaning only in reference to the full reality of intentional action upon the world which includes it. Now, it is possible for us to limit our intentional activity in this fashion to what we call the life of the mind. But we can only do so by refraining from carrying our intention beyond ideas into action, and by allowing action to be determined automatically. The life of action then ceases to be specifically human. This negation of action is under certain circumstances

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necessary and justifiable, but only so far as the withdrawal into the world of ideas is itself subordinated to an intention which looks beyond it to a return to intentional action. It is only when the world of thought is related to the world of action as means to end, and the intention in thought is to use its results in action that thought is significant. The reality of thought always consists in its reference beyond itself.

This explains the importance of distinguishing between an intention and an ideal. We have seen that we must define Christianity in terms of intention. This means that we must not define it in terms of an ideal. An ideal of life is precisely a conception which is not thought in terms of a practical intention. It is inherently reflective and contemplative in character. It appears, therefore, as an idea of how life *might* be lived or *ought* to be lived; as a standard by which actual life can be measured and either approved or condemned. In this way it is concerned with judgement, not with action. Or it is an imaginary picture of a better world which can be believed in and hoped for. In this case it is associated with a belief that there are forces working in the world which will, or may, produce it by transforming the world. But all this is independent of any purpose or intention informing and determining our practical activity. This does not mean that we may not try to realize our ideals. But it does mean that there is no inherent necessity compelling us to make the attempt. If we are to realize our ideals, we shall have to form an intention to act in a way that we believe will realize them. The ideal itself is not an intention. Otherwise it would be impossible to have an ideal which we did not attempt to realize but merely hoped to see realized. If an ideal were a purpose, it

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would be nonsense to say that I ought to try to live up to it. An intention is something that I am, *in fact*, trying to realize in action, not the conception of something that I might, or ought to, realize. It is only, therefore, by being kept out of action and in the limited field of ideas that an ideal can exist. If it becomes the conscious moment in human action, it is no longer an ideal but an intention, and must change and be modified by the action of which it is an integral component. It cannot remain as a changeless model or a blue print executed once for all to which one may turn back for guidance when the action seems to be missing fire. An ideal is an ideal precisely because it is separated from reality and contrasted with it. It is the idea of a better world which is *not* the world we live in. And because all ideas are derived from action by the limitation of intention, ideals are not primary. They are not eternal and immutable criteria which we must dutifully execute as copyists. They are abstracts from action that is over and done; deposits of past experience. The question about them is whether they are true and valid conceptions, and the answer is only to be found in the field of present and future action. Ideals consequently are not the test of action. Action is the test of ideals. If Christianity were an ideal of life it would have been obsolete long ago.

To define Christianity, then, is to define the historic continuity of an intention. The reason why our efforts to define it set us in conflict, is that we habitually separate the two elements which are united in an intention—the element of thought, or the mental element; and the material element, the element of physical activity. There arises in this way a dualism of theory and practice. Neither of these two elements can

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provide, by itself, a criterion of Christianity. We are not certified as Christians because our conception of life is the same as the conception of life which Jesus taught. Any conception stands over against a reality to which it refers and which it interprets. The only pertinent question about a conception is whether it is true; and on this question its history throws no light. Where the issue is an issue of theory and belief, the question of origins and therefore of historic continuity is irrelevant. That I hold the same beliefs that Jesus held may be an interesting fact, but it has no bearing on their truth, since if they are true they are true whoever holds them. I cannot legitimately claim that they are true because Jesus believed them. What I am concerned to convince myself and others of, is that Jesus believed them because they are true. Truth is eternal, and this dignified phrase means merely that truth is not a matter of history; that the process through which we came by our beliefs provides no guarantee of their validity. If I decided to mean by a Christian a man who held the same beliefs as Jesus, then I should have to count as a Christian any man who shared the same fundamental beliefs even if he were a Chinese sage who had never heard of Jesus and knew nothing of the history of the West. It seems to me that people who conceive Christianity as consisting in a certain body of beliefs which they refer, rightly or wrongly, to Jesus as its historical source, are really falling into a confusion. The two statements that these beliefs are true and that they were originally brought into the world by Jesus, run together in their minds, so that in an obscure and confused way, the fact that Jesus taught them seems to be the reason why they are true.

If, on the other hand, we concentrate upon the

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material side and so upon physical activities, the historic continuity of institutions offers itself as a criterion. There is a definite continuity of historical development which links the existing churches to an historical origin in the activity of Jesus. It is clearly distinguishable from other continuities in history, with which it is connected and with which it is often in conflict, which have a different origin. To be a member of one of these churches is, therefore, to have a part in the present in a continuity of human activity which has its actual starting-point in the life-work of Jesus. If this is accepted as a criterion, then Christianity is defined in terms of the continuity of the religious institutions of modern Europe with their historical origin. The difficulty, on this view, is that a *de facto* continuity of action does not in itself guarantee a continuity of purpose. "Think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father," said John the Baptist to the Pharisees and Sadducees who came to be baptized; "for I say unto you, that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham." And in the gospel of John it is recorded that Jesus said, "If ye were Abraham's children, ye would do the works of Abraham." These two statements put the whole point decisively in a nutshell, since it both denies that historic continuity in the historian's sense is a valid criterion, and at the same time asserts that the true criterion is to be found, for all that, in action, not in belief. "By their fruits ye shall know them."

The reason why neither the theoretical nor the practical element can furnish a criterion, is precisely that they are dissociated, and no attempt to combine them externally is of any avail. When they are dissociated they are opposite and in conflict, because each

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is conceived as complete in itself when it is, in fact, merely an aspect of the whole. The continuity with which we are concerned is the continuity of personal action. The characteristic of personal action is that it is the realization of an intention. It is activity informed and determined by a conscious purpose. It is possible only through a conception of the end to be achieved, although it is consistent with quite vague ideas of how the end must be achieved. Personal action, therefore, can maintain its historic continuity through quite radical changes both of theory and of practice. The effort to achieve an intention may, and often does, result in the discovery that the line of action chosen for its realization is actually the wrong one. In that case the continuity of the intention involves a break with the original direction of activity, sometimes a very radical break. Indeed, in such a crisis any persistence in the original continuity of activity would destroy the continuity of action. It is equally true that the experience of attempting to realize an intention can modify the ideal aspect of action. Of any large intention which we set out to realize, it is always true that our knowledge of the end at which we are aiming is vague and indefinite. It is only through the efforts that we make to realize it that we discover what it involves and learn gradually to make it definite and precise. If a man devotes his life to the cause of medical science, his intention is the cure of human disease; but his knowledge of human disease and of what is involved in curing it is certainly extremely vague. His efforts result in the transformation of his conceptions of disease as well as of his original theories of treatment. He may reach a point at which his conception of the nature of disease is revolutionized, so that it bears very little

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relation to his earlier theory. Even apart from such radical changes of belief, his conception of what curing human disease involves and what a healthy organism actually is, must inevitably undergo a great deal of modification in the course of his experience. It is quite clear that none of these changes in belief or theory involve any break in the continuity of his intention. If, however, at a particular point he found that a cherished medical theory stood in the way of his effecting the cure of disease, and for personal reasons preferred to maintain the theory and preserve the continuity and consistency of his beliefs, he would have broken the continuity of his intention. He would no longer be engaged in the attempt to cure disease. He would have sacrificed the continuity of intention to the continuity of belief. Equally if he found that his way of practising medicine was a bad one, and yet refused to change it because it would mean the loss of money or professional prestige, he would have sacrificed the continuity of intention to the continuity of his practice.

There is one other aspect of the question which must also be borne in mind. Intentional activity normally involves the limitation of attention. I mean that when we have determined our intention and begun to realize it, we have to concentrate our attention upon the particular stage of its realization with which we are momentarily occupied. Any long-range intention has to be realized in stages. Each of these stages is at once a partial realization of the intention and a means to its complete realization. When we have decided what the first stage towards the full realization is to be, we then have to concentrate our attention upon that stage, and forget, for the time being, the full intention to which it refers, and of which it forms part. There arises in

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this way a subordinate, immediate intention which defines the goal of our present action, and very often this intention may seem to conflict with the original intention within which it falls. In the present campaign in China, for example, the intention of the Chinese commander is to drive the Japanese out of the territory which they have occupied. The first stage in the realization of this intention is, however, to preserve the Chinese forces intact while they are being sufficiently organized and equipped. This, in turn, means that the commander has constantly to concentrate his attention upon withdrawing his troops from portions of Chinese territory not yet occupied by the Japanese, and allowing the Japanese to occupy them. Yet there is no contradiction. The action which involves withdrawing from Chinese territory has as its intention, in the long run, the reoccupation of the territory which is abandoned, and in the stress of the immediate crisis, it is almost necessary that the whole thought of the commander should be concentrated upon achieving a successful retreat.

This limitation of the intention must not be confused with an alteration of intention, since it does not involve a break in the continuity of intentional action. Where the limited intention takes a long time to realize, it is possible that the original intention may slip out of mind and be forgotten. The subordinate intention may come to occupy the mind to the exclusion of everything else. Yet even so continuity is not broken, so long as the subordinate intention is unrealized. It will only be broken if when the first stage has been completed another intention is formed which was not part of the original intention and which is not compatible with it. A large intention is always

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made up of a series of limited intentions which are not different intentions but merely different elements, aspects or stages of the governing intention. And where the achievement of the intention involves the co-operation of different agents, each of whom is concerned to achieve a different aspect of the general intention, it is quite possible that the concentration of attention which is inevitable in each of them may lead them to fail to recognize the underlying harmony of their separate efforts.

All these points have to be borne in mind when we seek to define Christianity. Christianity is only definable in terms of a continuity of intentional action through history. In attempting to use this clue we shall have to be on our guard against the tendency to split the unity of the criterion into a subjective and an objective part. We are not seeking to define on the one hand an intention and on the other hand a continuity of activity which is connected with it, but a continuity of activity informed by and directed towards a single end. We shall have to guard against the tendency to confuse changes in the subordinate intentions which govern stages of the continuity with changes of the defining intention itself. Above all, we shall have to remember that the disappearance from consciousness of the preoccupation with the ultimate goal may be only the expression of a concentration of attention upon an intermediate stage of the total process.

CHAPTER II

THE HEBREW CONSCIOUSNESS

CHRISTIANITY is essentially Jewish. This is the point from which we must start. The continuity of action can only be defined with relation to its starting-point. This is the fundamental difference between human action and all natural processes of development. The latter are teleological, and are defined by reference to the end of the process. Human action is not teleological, because it is intentional, and the observable activity is the realization of the intention in which it has its origin. Hence all analogies from the field of organic life, all ideas of growth, development and evolution are inadequate and misleading when applied to human action. Human actions do not grow, like a plant from a seed. They are done. They are not the gradual and inevitable unfolding of a principle which is contained in their starting-point, whether we know it or not. We do not have to wait till the end is reached to know what the intention was, and argue backwards to the starting-point in order to discover the meaning of the process. On the contrary, we judge from the conclusion of the activity whether the action has been successful or unsuccessful, right or wrong, and during the action we judge whether the steps we are taking are satisfactory or not, by our estimation of the likelihood of their achieving the end we have

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in view. We do not define the intention in terms of the end actually reached. Any attempt to define human behaviour in organic terms must always have the result of denying the reality of intention in favour of unconscious motives. The intentions have then to be explained away as rationalizations in consciousness of unconscious urges which actually determine the course of action. If Christianity were either a body of truth merely, or merely a process of religious development, the question of origins would be irrelevant for all practical purposes. As a body of doctrine the only relevant question would be whether it were true. As a process of development its nature would be more easily discoverable because more fully developed in the latest stage open to investigation. But because it is a continuity of action the question of its origin is decisive, since it is determined and can only be understood in the light of the intention which set it going and in terms of which alone it has a significant continuity.

Christianity is essentially Jewish. The intention which defines it has its source completely within the experience of the Hebrew people. The Old Testament, which is the first part of the Christian Scriptures, is the classical literature of the Jewish people. The New Testament is based upon it, was written mainly, if not entirely, by Jews, and its central figure is a Jew. The real continuity of the Old and New Testaments has never been seriously denied, and the first disputes in the primitive church turned on the question whether it was possible for a Gentile to join the Church without submitting to the rites demanded by the Jewish law.

The fact that Christianity is rooted in Jewish experience cannot be denied. But it is not so easy to determine the significance of this fact and its bearing

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upon the true nature of Christianity. We are indeed inclined to consider the Jewish origin of Christianity as merely a historical fact, without any special religious or spiritual significance, as if Christianity might have originated in Europe or elsewhere, though as a matter of fact it did not. It seems to me, however, that this tendency is merely an evidence of our failure to understand Christianity and indeed religion. It is because we are dualists by tradition and temperament that we tend to imagine that the spiritual aspect of reality is essentially "out of time" and so unrelated to the actual process of historical development. This is not the case. We have no difficulty in recognizing the significance of the origins of our culture and civilization in Greece and Rome. We recognize that to understand the modern world we must go back to its beginnings, and for this reason we stress the importance of a classical education. What we owe to the Greeks and what we owe to the Romans is freely acknowledged and indeed over-emphasized. But we find it difficult to talk in the same way of what we owe to the Jews. We admit this debt only on Sundays and in Church, and in our schools we have special "religious" classes if our Jewish heritage is to form part of our education. Yet the organization of the European economic system is deeply marked by the tradition of the Jewish Sabbath, to take one obvious example at random. The continuity of European civilization and culture with that of the ancient Hebrews, is at least as important as its continuity with that of the Greeks and the Romans. The fact that Christianity is Jewish means that Christianity is the form in which the influence of Jewish experience penetrated into Europe and became one of the major factors determining European history, civilization and culture. We

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have, therefore, two questions to ask. What is the unique contribution of the ancient Hebrews to human experience, and why is Western civilization so shy of it? The answer to both these questions is, I believe, that the Jews were and are religious, while we are not.

It would seem that whenever the European mind is faced with anything Jewish, there is called into play a strong emotional inhibition which upsets all our standards of rationality. The fact that it is "religious" presents an insuperable barrier to our normal habits of mind. We cannot apply our standards of literary appreciation to Jewish literature, nor of history to Jewish history, nor of philosophy to Jewish "prophecy". One might be inclined to suppose that the reason for this lies in the feeling of sacredness which Christianity has thrown over the Old Testament, if it were not for the fact that the anti-religious movements seem to feel the same inhibition. The modern European who rejects religion on scientific grounds is characteristically incapable of applying the objective standards of scientific judgement in the field of religion. He merely ignores it and tends to resent being reminded of it. Again, one might suppose that this was due to a reaction against his own religious upbringing. Even so, it would be evidence of an unconscious resistance to the recognition of an important field of actual fact which demands to be included in any truly scientific outlook. But if we turn to modern communism, which more than any other movement has made the effort to apply the standards of scientific objectivity to the study of social behaviour, we find the same unconscious resistance. It is a plain matter of historical fact that the social content of communist theory is derived from Christianity, through the philosopher

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Feuerbach's treatise on *The Essence of Christianity*, in particular. Yet there is a strong resistance in communism against recognizing this. It is conveniently repressed. But these are matters of detail. What is really surprising is that a body of theory which admits that the understanding of the social function of religion is of the first importance, and which demands that the nature of all social functions should be studied and determined historically, does not attempt to understand religion by an examination of the history of the Hebrew people. Instead, it accepts a purely speculative theory of religion which identifies it with otherworldliness and a belief in immortality—a theory which would be almost universally accepted by its religious opponents. Yet there is obvious empirical truth in the assertion that the ancient Hebrews present us with the only example in history of a specifically religious civilization, and there is no unambiguous trace in the whole of their classical literature of a belief in another world or in a life after death.

The reason for this curious inability to understand the Hebrew culture lies in the general habit of thought which characterizes Western civilization. It is so widespread, so deeply rooted and so universal that it can be appropriately designated the form of our consciousness. It is non-religious and, therefore, dualist, and because it is dualist and non-religious it is impersonal. To put it negatively, we are incapable (though not incurably so) of thinking religiously.

If, for the purposes of the present discussion, we adopt this terminology, we may say that there are three forms of consciousness to be distinguished. We may call them respectively the pragmatic, the contemplative and the religious. In the sphere of culture, the

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characteristic expression of the pragmatic consciousness is Science; of the contemplative consciousness, Art; and of the religious consciousness, Religion. It is, therefore, convenient at times to refer to the pragmatic consciousness as scientific, and to the contemplative consciousness as æsthetic. But in doing so we must not be misled by the terminology. The characteristic expression of a form of consciousness is not its only expression. The scientific consciousness produces both art and religion. But the art is not really æsthetic, and the religion is not truly religious. If we wish to grasp the character of these three forms of consciousness we can do so best by examining their historical expression. The pragmatic consciousness finds its clearest historical expression in Ancient Rome, the contemplative in Ancient Greece. The religious consciousness has its only effective historical expression in the Ancient Hebrews. The difference between the pragmatic and the contemplative consciousness is the difference between the Romans and the Greeks. That difference has been defined for us by scholars and historians again and again. The characteristic achievements of the Romans are technical achievements. They are feats of organization, administration and engineering. The Romans, we say, were an intensely practical people. This way of expressing it conveys a precise meaning. The habit of the Roman mind makes it see life in terms of practical problems to be solved, and it sets itself to the invention of solutions. When the Roman mind sets to work in the field of art, it reveals consciousness of its own inadequacy by imitating Greek models. It cannot find a spontaneous expression for itself in the artistic field. There are a few significant exceptions to this generalization. The art form which

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is characteristically Roman is satire. This is an exception which manifestly proves the rule. It is precisely because satire is a literary form with a consciously practical intention, that it is the creation of the practical mind, which is never quite happy in contemplation, unless the governing intention lies in the practical field. Another partial exception is the great poem of Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*. Yet this poem reveals a spontaneity which is markedly absent from most Roman literature precisely because it is a passionate exposition of scientific materialism. Of the other arts, the Romans excelled in architecture, and they excelled in this art mainly through their inventive genius. As for Roman religion, it is characteristically the worship of personified abstractions with a narrowly practical reference, and it faded out very early, partly by the substitution of forms of ethical philosophy, especially Stoicism, or through the importation of foreign religions from the East. The final stage of the development of Roman religion tells the same story. It is the deification of the Roman State, and of its chief officer, the Emperor.

The Greek habit of mind stands in strong contrast to the Roman. In the field of practical invention and construction it is notoriously inefficient. For it does not see life in terms of practical problems to be solved. Its spontaneity expresses itself in a continuous effort to perfect the expression of its traditional activities. Its values are ideal, not practical. In the practical field it is intensely conservative. The City-State itself is a primitive form, largely determined by the geographical character of the country. The Greek mind aims throughout at the perfect realization of the idea of social life which this small community enshrines, and equally it resists passionately the influences which

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would tend to destroy this form and substitute another. The Greeks characteristically retained the City-State form of social organization even under conditions which were entirely unsuited to it, and which led inevitably to economic and military collapse, as in their colonies in Sicily or Egypt or around the coasts of the Black Sea. The same characteristics are to be found in their architecture. The Greek temple is a traditional form, quite obviously derived from the earlier forms of building in wood, in which the pillars are tree trunks holding up wooden beams on which the roof is laid. The substitution of stone for wood is never allowed to determine a new form of building. In the practical field—the field where the pragmatic consciousness shows its spontaneity—the Greek architects remained wretchedly imitative and repetitive. But within this fixed form they worked towards an æsthetic perfection; towards the complete manifestation of the traditional Idea. In the Greek consciousness everywhere we find the same combination of an almost total lack of practical invention with a spontaneity of æsthetic expression which has, perhaps, never been equalled in history. It is quite clear that it is in the æsthetic field that the Greek consciousness is at home. When we say that the Ancient Greeks were a nation of artists, we all recognize that in a quite unimpeachable sense this is true. What Greece has given to the civilization of later days is primarily an æsthetic heritage, an æsthetic impulse and an æsthetic standard. Nor need we pause long to consider Greek religion. It is characteristically a product of art, idealizing and individualizing those characters of experience which appear in the activity of the pragmatic consciousness as abstractions of the moralist. Greek religion is myth and drama.

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I shall no doubt be reminded that the Greeks gave us much more than art. They gave us science and philosophy, and in these fields, which are surely the fields in which the pragmatic consciousness should express itself, the Greeks were supreme. To answer this objection fully would take too long and would lie outside the scope of this book. But one or two remarks may serve to define more clearly what the contemplative consciousness really is. In the first place, it is only through an ambiguity of words that we consider modern science to be continuous with Greek philosophy. Modern science rests upon the adoption of the experimental method in preference to all forms of reflective speculation. Greek theories, even when they coincide with some of the conclusions of modern science, rest upon æsthetic insight and are not the products of observation tested by experiment. In the modern sense, science is not science because its results are true, but because they are arrived at through the use of a certain technique. There is a reflective or contemplative element in all science, precisely because it aims at knowledge rather than at practical application. But this effort after knowledge which characterizes the contemplative form of consciousness, is not itself sufficient to define science. What science involves is some collaboration of the contemplative and the pragmatic consciousness, and we might express this by saying that science is necessarily the product of a mixed mode of consciousness. A purely contemplative form of consciousness cannot produce science, though it can and does seek knowledge for its own sake. Thus, the Greek consciousness, in the scientific field, produces forms of knowledge which are characteristically æsthetic. Its criteria of truth are the artists' criteria

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of coherent unity and significant form. Its theories represent the "visions" of individual thinkers each of whom sees the world differently from all the others. Of the great Greek thinkers, Aristotle has a much more empirical mind than Plato. On the reflective side he is more like a theoretical scientist than Plato is. But Plato's cosmology comes very much nearer, in its results, to the conclusions of modern scientific theory than Aristotle's. The great artist has often the power to arrive through intuition at a truth about the structure of the world, which science only discovers in its own slower but surer fashion later on. But this does not make it possible for the scientist to look to the artist for his conclusions nor even to accept them as scientific hypotheses.

It is not so easy to dispose of the claims of Greek philosophy, because to this day Western philosophy has remained within the form given to it by the Greeks, and what we say about the form of consciousness which expresses itself in Greek philosophy, will apply in essence to all subsequent philosophy. Philosophy is essentially a product of contemplation and reflection. It is not practical, but speculative. Its criteria of truth have, therefore, to be found within the mind, in the unity and coherence or the clarity and distinctness of ideas, and not in their reference to something in experience which lies beyond the reflective attitude. Such criteria are necessarily æsthetic in character. Any product of the human mind which is self-justifying, which has its value in itself, and not in its relation to the whole of that human experience of which it forms a fragment, possesses all the essential characters of a work of art, and it can be called true only in the sense in which a poem or a picture can be called true. The

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philosopher must recognize that something more is necessary, yet he cannot provide it. All attempts to provide an empirical justification for philosophical theories result in philosophical scepticism. In Greek philosophy the criteria and the forms of thought betray their æsthetic origin in the prominence of ideas such as those of harmony, balance, form and stability. The Socratic scepticism is the intuitive recognition of the inadequacy of the æsthetic consciousness to achieve the knowledge which it seeks; and Plato's attack upon Art is the artist-philosopher's discovery that to secure that knowledge he must destroy the impulse which governs the artist. It is for this reason that we must conclude that it is in the world of art that the Greek consciousness finds its natural expression, and that in seeking an ultimate reality, in seeking to achieve an all-inclusive vision, it succeeds only in raising questions which it cannot answer. A reality which is capable of including action is a reality which is incomplete. Since the contemplative consciousness demands completeness in its object, any picture it frames must be the representation of what is complete. Its picture of reality can only be achieved through the denial of the reality of action. For action demands incompleteness in the world.

This hurried glance at the formal characteristics of the habits of mind which express themselves in the Greek and the Roman worlds has been necessary to provide a contrast to the very different form of consciousness that expresses itself in Hebrew society. Neither the Greeks nor the Romans exhibit the characteristics of the religious mind. The Hebrews do, and it is only through this contrast that we are likely to discover the nature of a religious consciousness. It is by noting the peculiar differences which distinguish

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Hebrew culture and Hebrew civilization from our own, and from the Greek and Roman traditions which are combined in our own, that we can expect to realize what the religious form of consciousness involves. No other method is likely to be successful because the comprehension of any form of consciousness involves the production of that form of consciousness in ourselves. A man devoid of æsthetic sensibility can only discover the meaning of art by creating in himself the capacity which he lacks. His best hope of doing this is to compare his own attempts at painting with the works of the great artists. If we try to define religion reflectively, our non-religious habit of thought will necessarily reflect itself in the definition, in the same way that a definition of art produced by a person with no æsthetic sensibility will merely reveal that he has no notion of what art really is.

All primitive societies are religious. Religion is, indeed, the natural expression of primitive human consciousness. Historically, therefore, the different forms of consciousness that we have discussed are all derived from a religious form. They are, indeed, abstractions of the religious form, derived from it by a limitation of attention. This has the important corollary that the religious form of consciousness is the only complete form, and that in some sense it contains the others within itself. But in the process of cultural development the religious form of primitive consciousness is usually lost. In nearly all developed societies, religion has a decided atavistic flavour. It has not shared in the process of social development, but has remained stuck at an early stage of the society's history. Religious rites, religious formulæ, religious notions, and even religious dress, belong to a period of history which, in

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other phases of social life, has been left behind. The Hebrew culture of the Old Testament forms a remarkable exception to this general rule.¹ It resembles other human societies in the religious form of its primitive tribal life. It differs from them because it develops an elaborate civilization and culture without breaking loose from the religious form in which it originates. This is only possible through a *development* of religion, and the inner history of the Hebrew people is the history of the development of religion. We can understand the meaning of this by noticing that primitive society is religious in form precisely because the elements of culture which represent the origins of art, science, morality, law and politics, have no autonomy. They are contained in religion and remain aspects of it. The break with the religious form of consciousness which is almost universal, occurs when these aspects of social life, or some of them, assert their autonomy, so that religion itself becomes one aspect of culture which is contrasted with others. What is characteristic of the Hebrew people is that it achieved a development to a high level of civilization without this breaking up of the aspects of social life into autonomous, contrasted and competing fields of interest and effort. Art and science, politics, law, morality and philosophy, or rather what corresponds to these autonomous spheres of activity in other cultures, remain, as in primitive society, aspects of religion. Religion, thus, never becomes a particular sphere of human activity, but remains the synthesis of all. In consequence Jewish culture is *integral* in a sense that no other culture has been. One might tend to refer to the medieval culture of Europe as another case where all the departments of

¹ Cf. the replacement of the "tabernacle" by the temple.

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culture are synthesized in religion. The tendency to do so itself expresses the non-religious character of our habit of mind. It is only *ideally*, only where by culture one means the reflective aspect of human life, that it is possible to see Mediæval Europe as an integral culture. The dualism of our own thought makes us overlook the dualism of the Mediæval world in which the struggle between the temporal and the spiritual power defines a fundamental failure in integration. The Hebrew form of thought rebels against the very idea of a distinction between the secular and the religious aspects of life. It demands the synthesis of action and reflection.

This totalitarian character of the religious consciousness seems paradoxical to any other form of consciousness. The paradox can be stated in this form. If a society (or an individual) has a religion it is not religious. If it is religious it cannot have a religion. The reason is that to "have" a religion, religion must be conceived and experienced as a particular aspect of life which is contrasted with others which are not religious. The religious mode of consciousness is precisely a habit of mind which prevents such an atomizing of life. For any other form of consciousness religion is a particular and limited set of activities or a particular and distinguishable set of beliefs. But for the religious form of consciousness, religion is a way of living the whole of life, and consequently, as part of this, a way of thinking and understanding the world. Reflection is therefore always subordinate and contributory to action. In this sense the religious consciousness is primarily practical. It is not, however, pragmatic, for the simple reason that the pragmatic consciousness rests upon the distinction between action and reflection, and therefore makes

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reflection merely a means to practical ends. But the religious consciousness makes the life of reflection an essential element in action.

To understand this is to see that there is nothing paradoxical in the fact that the only religious culture that history has produced shows no need, in all its classical literature, of a doctrine of immortality or of a belief in another world. The belief in immortality and in another world expresses, when it is essential to any religion, an incapacity to think the world of common experience religiously. If the world is thought contemplatively or pragmatically, there is no room in it for the satisfaction of the religious impulse. The religious demands of human nature, and the religious assertions to which they give rise, require another world for their reference and for their realization. The achievement of the Hebrews lies in the fact that they retain, through the process of their development, the capacity to think *this* world religiously. In consequence, they feel no need to look beyond this world, for a meaning and a significance which is not contained, at least potentially, in it. This does not necessarily imply that a doctrine of immortality may not be true. It only demonstrates that it is not, in fact, essential to religion, and that the motives which in so many forms of religion bring the hope of immortality into the centre, and define religion in terms of it, arise from an incapacity to relate religion to men's experience of the common world. It signifies, not a belief in God, but an incapacity to believe in God and *this* world at the same time. It is easy to see that if this world is conceived in a way that excludes religion, God must be conceived as belonging to another world, and that the satisfaction of our religious nature must be conceived as postponed to another life. At any rate,

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it is patent, and must be of great significance for the understanding of religion, that there is hardly a trace in the Old Testament even of anything that could be construed as a hope of immortality, while the realization of the Kingdom of God in this world, and in a thoroughly "this-worldly" sense, is what is looked for in its place. Old Testament religion is clearly about this world, and about nothing else.

The loss of the primitive religious consciousness reveals itself in the appearance of dualism. It is the absence of contrast between this world and another world, between the spiritual and the material, between the ideal and the actual, which is characteristic of the Hebrew religious culture. The tendency to the appearance of dualism is not absent. The establishment of the kingship under Saul is an excellent example both of the tendency to split the world into an ecclesiastical and a secular aspect, and also of the resistance that this tendency met with from the Jewish consciousness. Indeed, the whole history of the Jews as described in the Old Testament, is the story of a continuous struggle to overcome the continuous tendency towards dualism. The Hebrew consciousness demands a theocracy, that is to say, an integral religious community. In spite of the pressure of social and economic conditions, it resists the tendency towards the establishment of class distinction. The elaborate precautions of the Jewish Law to prevent the enslavement of debtors or even the perpetuation of the debtor-creditor relation beyond the year of Jubilee, are in fact, provisions against the rise of an aristocracy of wealth. The main danger of dualism in Hebrew society arose in fact from the position of the priesthood, and it is in the resistance of the Hebrew consciousness to this tendency of a priest-

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hood to become a ruling class that the historical significance of the prophetic tradition is to be found. The prophets are the mouthpieces of the resistance to the privileged position of the priests. They may happen to be priests, but it is not as priests and not in virtue of any privileged position in the social order, that they say, "Thus saith the Lord". In Jewish civilization it is the prophet, who is without social authority, who is the inspired source of religious revelation. There is no priestly hierarchy which is the guardian and exponent of religion. The priesthood is an organization for the service of the cult, not the exponent of its meaning and significance. And it is the line of prophets who are responsible for the development of the religious culture of the Hebrews. The division of society into upper and lower classes is the social expression of dualism. If it is once accepted in society, dualism in consciousness must accompany it, and the maintenance of the integral religious consciousness becomes impossible. The effort of the Jewish Law to provide against the development of social dualism, shows that it is a mistake to think that the class-dualism in society is the ultimate cause of dualism in thought. It is the social acceptance of class distinction rather than the fact of its existence that make a dualist form of thought inevitable, and it is, therefore, possible to escape from the dualism in consciousness and to recover the religious form of consciousness even in a dualist social order, by rejecting the social dualism and working for its abolition.

The belief in God is not in itself a criterion of the religious consciousness. Atheism, at least on an extensive scale, is a highly abnormal phenomenon in history. But the form taken by the conception of God

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varies with the forms of social consciousness. What is characteristic of the Hebrew conception of God is that God is primarily a worker. In the dualist forms of consciousness, God always appears as an aristocrat. As Creator, Jehovah works for six days in the making of the world, and rests on the seventh. He constructs Adam out of the dust of the earth, like a potter. He puts the man he has fashioned into a garden to till it. Consequently, the relation between God and Man is the relation of fellow-workers. We find God walking in the Garden, calling for Adam to talk to him. Enoch, we are told, walked with God. Abraham was the friend of God. The fear of God develops as the result of sin. But the primary closeness of the relationship between God and the man whom he made in his own likeness, remains, and is constantly recovered, re-inforced, and deepened in the prophetic development. So, when Jesus asserts the fatherhood of God, and re-establishes the close relationship between God and man, that is the outstanding feature of his teaching about God, he is reasserting and deepening the traditional Hebrew conception, not breaking away from it. Nothing could express more succinctly the essence of the Hebrew conception of God in its full religious integrity, than the statement attributed to Jesus, "My father worketh hitherto, and I work."

There is an inherent connexion between a people's conception of God and their conception of man. In particular, the way they conceive the relation between God and man determines the way they conceive the relations between men in society. Hence, the Jewish Law is summed up, not by Jesus but by the Jewish lawyer quoting from the Old Testament, in the two commandments "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God"

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and "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself". The two commandments, says Jesus, are "like" one another, and on them hang all the law and the prophets. This dictates a society which is equalitarian and democratic, not in the merely mathematical sense to which the pragmatic consciousness tends, but in a deeper and more personal sense, which determines human relations in terms of the inner democracy and equality of friendship, not as an ideal but as a practice of social relation which is totally incompatible with class-distinction, either on an economic or on a caste basis. One of the most characteristic effects of the retention through their development of the religious consciousness, is that the Jews never lost the sense of family relationship as the basis of society. Nationality never became an alternative to community. They think of themselves as the Children of Israel. Here again the idea of brotherhood as the basis of society is not a unique Christian conception. In insisting upon it, Jesus was recalling his own people, like the prophets of the Old Testament, to the fundamental principles of their own cultural history.

The tendency to dualism, however, is not simply a natural defect of the human mind. It is the result of the recognition that all is not well with human society. This conception of man made by God in the image of God, as part of one creation upon which God the worker could look when it was complete, and see that it was good, is palpably at war with the facts of human experience. Man finds his life, in fact, a struggle against nature and against his fellows, as soon as the process of social development sets in. Completely primitive society, it seems, lives below the level of this struggle, yet contains within itself forces which drive

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it to a development in which struggle and conflict are inevitable, and soon become universal. The problem of evil emerges. The religious consciousness of community is faced with the impossibility of reconciling its idea with the facts. The idea can no longer be referred to the actual present experience. It can no longer effectively express and control actual conduct. It is at this point that dualism seems inevitable, as a distinction between an ideal world of what ought to be and a real and evil world of what is. If the religious consciousness is to be maintained through the process of development, the problem of evil must be solved in a practical fashion, which will allow the idea and the actuality to remain as parts of one world. Reality must include both, in fact and in consciousness.

The means by which the religious consciousness succeeds in escaping dualism is the doctrine of the Fall, with its corollary, the promise of salvation. The conception of a "Fall" is, perhaps, the major characteristic of any developed religious consciousness. Its importance lies in the fact that it enables men at once to recognize the problem of evil, the struggle between man's nature and the world, and at the same time to assert that the ideal world is the reality of the actual material world. It recognizes the estrangement between God and Man, but puts the responsibility for this estrangement upon Man. In other words, it thinks the human situation in relation to the world in terms of a relation between friends in which estrangement has broken the mutuality between them, by the fault of one of the parties, while the other remains willing and anxious for a restoration. All that is then needed for the solution of the problem of evil is a change of attitude, a repentance on the part of the other. The idea

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of man's moral responsibility for the evil in human life is the primary implication of the doctrine of the Fall. It carries the corollary that man by repentance can annul the evil.

But the doctrine of the Fall has another consequence. It not merely involves a sense of human responsibility for evil; it enables man to think the essential goodness of the world, including human life, in spite of the recognition of evil. The responsibility does not lie with God. His whole creation is good. Human nature as God created it is good, and the freedom of human nature which enables it to rebel is also good. This aspect of the doctrine has a corollary of great importance. It is that the actual behaviour of human beings is not an expression of their real nature. This prevents the development of what I have called the pragmatic way of thinking. It makes impossible the development of what we now call scientific sociology. It is the basis of all scientific method that the observation of the actual behaviour of entities can form the basis of an understanding of their essential nature. But the doctrine of the Fall involves the conclusion that man's actual behaviour provides no clue to his real nature, or at least that his real nature cannot be discovered through an induction based on observation of his actual ways of behaviour.

On the other hand, the doctrine of the Fall in itself does not prevent the development of the contemplative consciousness, in which the actual nature of human life in the world is treated as in some sense unreal, while the reality of experience is found in a world of thought. The contemplative consciousness will immediately discover that the doctrine of the Fall involves a contradiction between the assertion of the goodness of God and

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the actuality of evil. The responsibility for evil cannot be thrown upon man, since the responsibility for man falls upon God. But for the religious consciousness the doctrine of the Fall has as its corollary the doctrine of a redemption, not as an ideal possibility, not as a hope or aspiration, but as a necessary reconciliation of the contradiction. It saves the unity of the actual and the ideal, and so the integrity of consciousness and its world by becoming not idealist but prophetic. This means that the reconciliation of ideal and actual is projected into the future as an actual event in time. It would be a mistake to object that this prophecy of a future reconciliation is merely postulated *ad hoc* to solve an otherwise insoluble dilemma. It would be a mere postulate for the contemplative consciousness, for which, since it is reflective, time and therefore action, of which time is the form, are ultimately unreal. But the religious consciousness of the Hebrews conceives God as a worker, and, therefore, in terms of action. The religious idea of perfection is, therefore, not timeless. It does not believe in leisure as the goal of human life. God did not change his nature with the creation of the world, nor does God cease to be a worker because Man has rebelled against him. Hence the Fall of man merely describes the conditions under which God now works for the redemption of the world. And the inevitability of the redemption is an obvious corollary of the conception of God. The Fall of man becomes itself part of the process of the creation of the world, and history the process by which the intention of God for human life is being carried out. Where God is conceived as Agent the world is conceived as his act, and in that case (as we saw in the last chapter) the criterion of reality must be the continuity of inten-

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tion. And this intention becomes, with the Fall, the intention of reconciliation, and therefore can only be achieved through an operation upon the will of man. By thus doing justice both to the existence of evil and to the goodness of God and his creation, the Hebrew consciousness escapes from dualism and retains an integral consciousness of the world. This integrity is its complete rationality. It enables it to think the whole of experience (and not merely the whole of reflective experience) as a unity, and a necessary unity. But the necessity is no mechanical determinism, which could not even allow for the reality of growth. Neither is it a necessary process of natural development, which would not account for the reality of evil; but the necessity of a co-operation between man and God for the realization, in actuality, of the true nature of man. "My father worketh hitherto, and I work."

By escaping, in this fashion, the tendency to dualism, the history of the Hebrews becomes a history of the development of religion. In this historic process reflection remains integrated with social experience. The world which is thought religiously is the actual world of social history. This means that Jewish reflection thinks history as the act of God. Where our historians say, "Cæsar crossed the Rubicon", or "Nelson won the battle of Trafalgar", the Jewish historian says, "God brought his people up out of the Land of Egypt". This is no mere concession to religious prejudice, but the continuous form which all Hebrew reflection takes. It means that Hebrew thought is at once religious and empirical. It is religious in that it thinks history as the act of God. It is empirical in that it reflects upon history in order to discover the nature of God and the laws of divine agency. And since the intention of God

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is the realization of his purpose for his chosen people, this reflection is an effort to discover the true principles of social life. Social disaster or social failure is, therefore, always interpreted by Jewish thought as evidence of national sin, that is to say, of a national departure from the purpose of God for his people, and this failure is also interpreted as the act of God in history to bring his people back to the acceptance of his purpose. Throughout Jewish history, the development of culture is the result of a continuous reflection upon contemporary history in the light of past historical experience. It is not, as the non-religious mind is apt to think, a reflection upon specifically "religious" experiences. And, therefore, its result is a deepening understanding of the principles which govern social life, or to put precisely the same thing in another way, it results in a deepening of the consciousness of God's purpose in history. It is characteristic of the religious mode of consciousness that these two statements are precisely equivalent, because for it there is no possibility of distinguishing between the principles which actually determine social success or failure, and the divine law which reveals the will of God for his people. There is no secular law which could be contrasted with a divine law, nor is there any secular thought which could be in conflict with religious thought.

The main purpose of this comparison of the modes of consciousness that characterize Roman, Greek and Hebrew cultures has been to define concretely the nature of the religious consciousness. Negatively, we see that the religious mode reveals itself in the absence of dualism. Positively, it reveals itself in the integration of action and reflection. The conception of God is also the conception of the nature of society, and the experi-

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ence of society is itself the act of God. In this way, religious reflection becomes a continuous interpretation of history, and historic experience becomes a progressive revelation of the nature and purpose of God. This is not an accident of Jewish history. It is the necessary form of a religious consciousness. Religious reflection is necessarily an interpretation of history. In this connexion it is significant that some of the more advanced forms of modern theology show a tendency to insist that the Christian revelation offers no clue to the interpretation of history, and that attempts to interpret history can have no bearing upon religion, but should be left to the secular mind. This tendency in fact reveals that the mode of consciousness which these theologians express is itself not religious.

There is an instructive parallel to be drawn between the history of Greece and the history of the Jews. The dualism of the contemplative consciousness, by opposing reflection to practical life, compels the development of reflective culture to take the form of a continuous negation of practical experience. Thus Plato, himself richly endowed as an artist, is compelled to attack art, and has to describe the philosopher, who ought to be king, as sheltering behind a wall from the storm. In consequence, Greece developed a reflective consciousness at the expense of social development in the practical field, and when her social structure was overthrown by superior practical organization, her reflective development became a universal heritage for the reflective life of mankind in the future. But because in the Hebrew unity the integration of practice and reflection is maintained, the development of Hebrew culture is not a development of ideas, in which the implications of the primitive forms of Hebrew life are speculatively

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worked out. Instead, the history of the Jewish community itself becomes the working out of the implications of its social consciousness. The reflection of the prophets is itself a call to the Jewish people to return to the divine purpose which is embedded in their history, at a higher level of understanding. Consequently, it is not the ideas of reflection (as in the case of the Greeks) nor the practical institutions of social organization (as in the case of the Romans) that are universalized and scattered abroad throughout the world, but the Jewish people themselves.

CHAPTER III

THE WORK OF JESUS

THE MISSION TO THE JEWS

It was in Jesus that the development of Jewish culture was completed, and it was through Jesus that the whole development of Hebrew experience became a universal force in human history. Jesus is at once the culmination of Jewish prophecy and the source of Christianity. These are not two different aspects of the life of Jesus. They are the same thing referred backwards to the past and forwards into the future. The continuity between Christianity and the history of the Hebrews is unbroken. By completing the process of the prophetic development, Jesus released it from the limitations of its national reference and made it a movement for the salvation, not of the Jews, but of the world through the Jews. For this reason, it is essential to insist again that Christianity is Jewish, and that Jesus was a Jew. This has always been recognized in the theological tradition of the Christian Churches. Jesus is recognized as the Christ, the Jewish Messiah, who is the fulfilment of Hebrew prophecy. That he made, or at least suggested, this claim for himself is hardly open to doubt. There can be no doubt at all that the primitive Jewish Church accepted Jesus as the Messiah, and it was as the Messiah that he claimed their allegiance. To them his resurrection was the proof that he was the Messiah, in spite of his rejection by the priests and rulers. Historically,

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therefore, Christianity is bound up with the acceptance of Jesus as the Jewish Messiah, and this involves the belief that Jesus sums up and completes the process of Jewish history, and defines its meaning and direction with finality.

It is to this claim, in the first place, that we must seek to give a positive content. We must understand Jesus as the fully mature expression of the Jewish consciousness; as the final unfolding, in clear consciousness, of the implications of the Hebrew conception of the significance of social history. The main difficulty in doing this lies in the fact that our own consciousness is not religious in its structure, and that we therefore tend to interpret the teaching and the behaviour of Jesus in terms of *our* modes of thought rather than his. We have to remind ourselves that ideas and phrases change their significance if the mode of consciousness in which they are thought is changed. We tend to think about Jesus as if he were a European, and to ask questions which could only have a significance if he were. We may find ourselves asking, "Was Jesus a social reformer?" Such a question has a specific meaning only in a dualist mode of thought. It implies a contrast and a conflict between a spiritual world and a material world, and inevitably suggests that Jesus must have been *either* concerned with social organization *or* with religion. But we have seen that the main characteristic of the Jewish religious consciousness is that this distinction does not arise. It is an integral consciousness, for which social history is the content of religious experience, and social behaviour the criterion of religious reality. Jesus, like any of the Hebrew prophets, could not make a religious assertion without making a demand upon social behaviour. He could not frame

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a religious judgement without judging contemporary social life. And to say that Jesus was *both* concerned about men's spiritual life *and* about the conditions of their material life is to distinguish the two in a way that is only possible for a non-religious mind. For the religious consciousness a statement about society is a religious statement and a statement about God has an immediate and direct reference to society. This is the clue to any understanding of Jesus. He is not an idealist—for the same reason that he is not a materialist—because the distinction between the ideal and the material does not arise for him.

Jesus, then, like all the Hebrew prophets, discovers his message through reflection upon contemporary Hebrew life in the light of Hebrew history as recorded in the Old Testament scriptures, the classical literature of his people. His work as a prophet begins, like the work of all the prophets, in a judgement that the Jewish people have departed from the divine purpose, and a call for repentance and return. In other words, his teaching has its rise in a religious criticism of contemporary social life. It is a religious criticism not because it is a criticism of religion, but because it is a criticism of the condition and situation of the Jewish people in the light of a religious interpretation of their history. His first public act is to identify himself with the followers of John the Baptist in an act of national repentance and reaffirmation of faith in the coming of the kingdom. This is perfectly in line with the prophetic tradition. The conquest of the Jews by the Roman Empire, since it is the act of God in history, must be interpreted as punishment for national rejection of the law of God. The restoration of the people, and the fulfilment of the promises, demands a return,

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through repentance and a renewed acceptance of the divine law as the basis of national life, to God. This is the condition of the fulfilment of God's covenant with Abraham. If the Jewish people fulfil their side of the covenant, God will fulfil his. The immediate reference is necessarily to the release of the Jewish people from the Roman dominion. It was so interpreted by the people whom Jesus addressed. They sought, on one occasion, to take him by force and make him king. He was crucified by the Roman government as King of the Jews. That his own disciples took this view is certainly suggested by the statement at the beginning of the Acts of the Apostles that after his resurrection the assembled company put the question to him, "Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel?" This national reference to the action of Jesus is confirmed by the repeated assertion that his mission is to the Jews. The story of the Syrophenician woman, to whom he said "It is not meet to take the children's bread and to cast it unto the dogs", is one instance. He forbids his disciples to go to the Gentiles or the Samaritans, and sends them instead "to the lost sheep of the house of Israel". It is clear that Jesus conceived his task, as the prophets had conceived theirs, as being to recall the nation to their allegiance to God, and so into line with the divine purpose which was incarnate in their history.

The baptism of Jesus, through which he identified himself publicly with the call for a religious change in the national life, was followed by a period of solitary reflection. Jesus, we are told, "was led up of the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted of the devil". This period of reflection must have been concerned—as indeed the story of the temptation implies—with the implications of the step which he had taken and the

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determination of his own line of action in relation to it. The temptations themselves, whatever we make of them, are significant because of their underlying form. They are all temptations to adopt a dualistic attitude to the situation, and their resistance is the resistance to dualism which we have seen to be the secret of the integrity of the religious consciousness. The temptations to turn stones into bread and to cast himself down from the temple symbolize quite clearly, as parables, the temptation to distinguish between the actual given conditions, with the laws of nature which determine them, and a supernatural power, which would work by interference with them. The answers to these two temptations, "Man shall not live by bread alone but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God" and "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God", are both quotations from the Old Testament. Jesus is represented as determining his own attitude to life, and in particular his attitude to his own task in the contemporary situation, by reflection upon the religious principles contained in the past experience of Hebrew history. The answers symbolize a reaffirmation of God at work in history. The laws of nature are the laws of God. If the act of God forces him into the wilderness and keeps him there till he has come to his decision, then the absence of food in the wilderness, where he must stay, is part of the conditions which are necessary. To demand a change in the conditions is to quarrel with the structure of the world. To call in supernatural power to alter these conditions, is to demand for oneself a world other than the world which God has actually provided. To defy the structure of the world and then expect God to intervene by changing his own law of cause and effect, is to think of God as external

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to the world. Thus the refusal of these two temptations is the refusal of dualism. Positively, it is the acceptance of the actual contemporary conditions of life as the will of God. Its application to the problem which is occupying the mind of Jesus is straightforward. It means that the situation of the Jewish people under the yoke of Rome, with all the social, political and economic consequences that it involves, must be accepted as they are. It is the will of God that his chosen people should at this point of history find themselves a minor colony of the Roman Empire. Through this situation God's plan for his people, God's promise to restore his kingdom, is being fulfilled. His own task must begin by accepting the actual world, in its material and social structure, and accepting it religiously, as the act of God.

The third temptation is also a rejection of dualism, but no longer a reflective dualism. Jesus is now concerned with determining his own line of action in the actual situation. He has before his mind the power mechanism by which Rome has established her Empire. He might overcome it with its own weapons. It seems to me more than a surmise that Jesus did consider seriously at this time leading a popular revolt to free the Jewish people and re-establish the kingdom in its true pattern as a kingdom of God. Evidently he rejected it decisively before he began his public mission. He rejected it because it would have implied "worshipping the Devil". The Roman Empire was not the kingdom of God but its negation. The establishment of a Jewish Empire of the same type, by its destruction, would not be the establishment of the kingdom of God. To dream of using the Roman means for the destruction of Rome and then of building a kingdom of God in its place

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would involve a thorough-going dualism between means and end, which would destroy the integrity of the religious consciousness. It would involve a house of life divided against itself, and as Jesus said later, "If a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand." "Ye cannot serve God and Mammon." Such an effort would, in fact, stultify itself. The integrity of the religious attitude demands that life shall be all of one piece. Its integrity would be destroyed if one had to act upon a principle which negated the religious principle in order to reach the point at which the religious principle could be put into practice. The Roman world must be accepted and the actual conditions of life in the Roman Empire must be accepted, as established by the will of God. But the purpose of the Roman Empire, and the principle which it embodies, must not be accepted. The struggle between good and evil must not be accepted *as a dualism*, as a struggle between two worlds.

The result of this period of reflection was that Jesus came to a decision of which his public mission was the outcome. The decision was not merely an individual decision. It was a decision taken on behalf of the Jewish people in the circumstances of the time. It involved a reaffirmation of the fundamental principles embedded in Jewish history, and particularly in the law and the prophets. It involved, further, a deeper understanding of the significance of these principles in the effort to decide on a line of action for the Jewish people in the contemporary situation which would be compatible with the conception of God and Man embodied in the Hebrew culture. The character of this decision is seen in the fact that it defines Jesus' mission as a mission to his own people. His task is

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defined by this decision. He must lead his people to a fulfilment of their destiny by a return to the religious principles of national action which their historical experience has revealed and clarified, and so establish the conditions necessary for the fulfilment of the divine purpose through them.

In the teaching of Jesus two elements are customarily distinguished. The first is his exposition of the conception of human life in the world which is implied in the whole religious tradition of his people. The second is apocalyptic. It is concerned with the future, and is, therefore, prophetic in the narrow sense which we are apt to give to that word. It is the first of these elements which we usually refer to as the teaching of Jesus, and which we tend to conceive as the revelation of a new religious ethic. The apocalyptic element we find rather difficult and uncongenial, and we tend to treat it as much less important, and almost as a kind of excrescence which has no fundamental significance for our time. If we do try to take it seriously we tend to treat it as a spiritual symbolism.

The point which seems to me the essential one in this connexion is not that we must take the apocalyptic element in the teaching of Jesus seriously, as well as his moral and "religious" teaching, but that the fact that we find it difficult to relate the two aspects reveals the dualistic and non-religious character of our own minds. These two aspects are fundamentally one; and to understand Jesus, or indeed the religious mode of consciousness of which he is the supreme expression, is to realize their essential and necessary unity. Our own mode of thought belongs to the Græco-Roman tradition, and is at the moment idealist and contemplative. This shows itself in the dissociation of our

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reflection about the world and the significance of human life in it, from practical questions of social purpose and social action. The unity of reflection and action is lost. Hence in trying to understand the teaching of Jesus, we divide the theoretical element from the practical. This can be best realized in an example. When Jesus says, "Blessed are the meek for they shall inherit the earth," our tendency is to treat this as an assertion that humility is one of the supreme virtues, and we go on to point out how distinctive of the teaching of Jesus, when compared with the teaching of other moralists, is this stress upon humility as a virtue. A sermon on this text is almost inevitably a sermon on the virtue of humility. I find it difficult to imagine it as a sermon on how to inherit the earth. Indeed it is more likely to lead to a general injunction against the desire to be successful in the material field, and so to become a panegyric on those who turn from an interest in this world to a purely "spiritual" conception of goodness. It is this kind of treatment of the teaching of Jesus that gives point to the communist contention that religion is "opium for the people" and that it is used to persuade the poor and unfortunate classes to be content with their lot. Yet it is quite obvious that Jesus gave as his reason for believing in humility that it was an essential part of the means to ultimate material success. Nothing could be less characteristic of the mind of Jesus than the notion that virtue is its own reward. It is important to remember that what we are concerned with is the form of the teaching of Jesus rather than its content. He gives reasons why certain forms of behaviour are desirable, and this means that he thinks of these forms of behaviour not as virtues, not as ideals, but as means to an

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achievement. They are defined and valued in relation to an intention; and quite often the intention is what we would call a materialist one. Quite often it is what we would call a spiritual intention. Yet to ask whether Jesus was a materialist or an idealist, is just to misunderstand the form of his consciousness. He is not a dualist. The distinction that we make between the material life and the spiritual life could have no meaning for him. Because he is a religious thinker, the dualism is unthinkable. Thus Jesus can couple together, without any sense of incongruity, the two assertions "Blessed are the meek for they shall inherit the earth," and "Blessed are the pure in heart for they shall see God." Nor is this peculiar to Jesus. It is exactly what we would expect if we remember that Jesus was a Jew. We are quite familiar with the same inability to distinguish between spiritual and material values in the Old Testament. We tend to take it as a mark of religious immaturity from which Christianity freed the human spirit. If so, then Jesus is also religiously immature. That seems to me a palpably ridiculous conclusion. I prefer to conclude that it is the traditional mind of our Western civilization that is incapable of thinking religiously, and so realizing the integrity of life and the unity of the world.

However this may be, it is clear that the teaching of Jesus is directly related to the conception of the purpose of God in the history of his chosen people. The mistake that we are led into by the dualism of our thought, can be best seen in relation to the story of the temptation. Jesus had considered the question of establishing the kingdom of God by force, and had rejected it. He re-affirmed his decision in a way that recalls the story of the temptation on the night when

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he was arrested by the Temple police. When Peter wished to defend him by force, Jesus, we are told, said to him, "Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father and he shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels?" He reaffirmed it on another occasion by saying, "My kingdom is not of this world. If it were, then would my servants fight." We are apt to assume that what had happened was that Jesus had achieved the dualism of the material and the spiritual world, and so had resigned the Jewish conception of the establishment of the kingdom in this world. We imagine that he had adopted a "spiritual" conception of the purpose of God and concentrated upon the achievement of an inward morality which left this world to Cæsar; not merely for the moment, but in principle. In other words, we assume that Jesus broke loose from the Jewish tradition and became an idealist. For this there is no evidence whatever, and the whole of the "apocalyptic" element in Jesus' teaching proves conclusively that it cannot be true. What Jesus did decide was that the means of dispossessing Cæsar and establishing the kingdom of God in the place of the Roman Empire could not be found in armed revolt; and he decided this not in view of the strength of the Roman Empire, but as a matter of principle. And this principle, so far from being a new discovery of his own, was identical with the principle which had been expounded by the Old Testament prophets throughout Jewish history. It is *God's* intention which must be fulfilled. Its fulfilment is conditional upon the acceptance of the mode of social life and national action which God demands of his people. "My father worketh hitherto and I work." God is actually at work in contemporary history. The intention which is being

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realized is his intention. Success is only possible for man by co-operating with God for the achievement of God's intention. It is this attitude of mind that prevents the appearance of dualism. For the dualist consciousness the purposes and intentions to be achieved are human intentions and the problem is to persuade God to co-operate in their achievement. For the Jewish consciousness the intention of God is the establishment of God's kingdom on earth, and this is only possible through the overcoming of the opposition of man's will to God. The problem for man is to accept the divine purpose as his own and to comply with the conditions which make it possible to co-operate with God.

It follows from this that the teaching of Jesus represents his conviction about the means through which the establishment of the kingdom of God in the world is to be achieved. The apocalyptic element is the affirmation of the inevitability of its achievement. And the two elements are connected by a necessity of practical reason. The understanding which is exhibited is that the Kingdom must necessarily be established when certain conditions are fulfilled, and that these conditions themselves must inevitably be fulfilled, if not in one way, or at one time; then in another way and at another time. This necessity of interconnexion is not merely asserted; it is understood. It is not that if men will behave in a certain way then God will act. That would not be understanding, but blind faith. It is a religious understanding of the structure of reality which reveals the inevitable interconnexion between the elements of the process of history. The apocalyptic element in the teaching of Jesus is, indeed, the major premiss upon which the whole of the teaching of Jesus rests, and if this is not grasped then the teaching itself

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cannot be understood. In other words, the teaching of Jesus is his answer to the question, "How is the kingdom of God to be established in the world?" That it will be established is the primary postulate. To deny it would be to deny the existence of God. A creator who cannot achieve the intention of his creation is a contradiction in terms.

Because this postulate is the fundamental postulate of all Hebrew thought, and because the development of its implication through reflexion on Jewish history is the development of the Hebrew culture, it was impossible for Jesus to reaffirm it without reaffirming that the Jews are God's chosen people. For the religious consciousness this is not a boastful claim to superiority. It is a mere statement of historical fact. It is simply the statement that the Hebrew community is the only community in which an integral religious culture has been developed. If the world is thought religiously as the act of a working God, it follows at once that this historic peculiarity of Jewish history is fundamental to the whole process of the world. It means that it is through the Jewish people that the significance of the world has been and is being revealed. The co-operation which is necessary for the achievement of the process of reality requires for its completion that the purpose of God should be brought to consciousness in man. This revelation of God must be developed in human experience to the point at which its significance is understood. Only then can it be accepted by man as his own intention. This is the primary condition of human co-operation with God. As a matter of historic fact, this is the work of the Hebrew prophets, and it culminates in Jesus. We may, therefore, describe the teaching of Jesus as the complete unfolding of the

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implications of the Hebrew religious consciousness. This at least is the claim which is inherent in Christianity. Jesus was the man in whom the religious significance of the world was revealed in a definite and complete form. The definiteness and completeness mean that the religious consciousness has reached the point at which the universal significance of human history has become explicit in human consciousness. We might put this in a non-religious form by saying that Jesus discovered the significance of human life. In its religious form the assertion would be that Jesus became conscious of the intention of God in human history. Thus Jesus marks the point in history at which it becomes possible for man to adopt consciously as his own purpose the purpose which is already inherent in his own nature. The mission of Jesus to his own people is to reveal to them what has been implicit in their cultural history from the beginning, to declare to them what they are called to do and to demand their acceptance of the task and of its conditions.

THE DISCOVERY OF THE PERSONAL

The discovery which Jesus made was the discovery that human life is personal. This at least is the form of expression which brings our own way of thinking as near to the heart of the matter as we can get. But the statement is not self-explanatory. Personality is, perhaps, the conception which suffers most from any dualistic mode of thought. We are accustomed to use the term to denote that which is peculiar to a human individual in distinction from other human individuals, and which, therefore, constitutes his unique individual-

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ity. But properly speaking, personality is a term which denotes the general character which distinguishes human life from all other forms of life. To say that human life is personal is primarily to deny that human life is organic, or that it can be treated as differing from animal life only in degree and not in kind. It is to assert that the essence of human life is radically different from the essence of organic life, and that the relations which constitute the totality of human life are radically different from those which make a unity of the organic world. It is this essential character of human life, the thing that constitutes its humanness, that Jesus discovered. And what he discovered was already implicit in the Old Testament and had been coming nearer and nearer the threshold of consciousness throughout the process of Jewish development. In trying to understand it we must not forget that it is not merely a reflective generalization. The unity of action and reflection which characterizes religious thinking gives it a fuller meaning than its philosophical form suggests. It means also, "human life can only be lived personally".

Before we consider the way in which Jesus defines the nature of human life, it would be well to consider carefully the peculiar character of the discovery which Jesus made. His discovery is a contribution to human knowledge. But it is a contribution of a unique kind, and it results in a transformation of history. The reason for this is that it is, as it were, the self-discovery of Man. When anyone discovers the truth about himself, the discovery is more than an addition to his knowledge of the world. Because it is a self-realization it is necessarily a self-transformation. Our knowledge of ourselves is unique in character, in the first place, as

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knowledge. It does not require and it does not admit of proof, for it is not knowledge of something external to ourselves, and independent of us. Its truth is self-evident. It can be denied or rejected, but only by an act of will, and if we do reject it we put ourselves in the position of refusing to believe what we know to be true. And we do so because we refuse to accept the transformation of our behaviour which the recognition of the truth would involve. This is the significance of the statement in the Gospel of John, which reads, "*This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light because their deeds were evil.*" It is here that we uncover the root of the unity of thought and action. Self-discovery necessarily involves a choice in the field of action. If that choice involves a refusal to act in terms of the newly discovered truth, then it also involves a refusal to believe the truth, and that is only possible through an intellectual effort to deny it. A great deal of what passes for knowledge amongst us really consists of an elaborate, half-conscious effort to prove the falsity of what we know to be true. And the irrationality of this procedure has its source in the desire to escape from the practical consequences of admitting the truth.

But the discovery of Jesus is not merely the self-discovery of an individual. It is the self-discovery of his own essence as a human being, and, therefore, the discovery of the essence of humanity. (It is also for the religious consciousness a discovery of the nature of God. But that is a point with which we are not at the moment concerned.) Now this discovery of the essence of human life has the same unique characteristics as any other self-discovery. And it universalizes them. If a man realizes his own essence, he realizes the mean-

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ing of his own life. This involves a recognition of the intention which is embodied in his own nature—the end for which he was made, or in religious language, the purpose of God in his creation. But if it is his essence, not as an individual but as a human being, that he discovers, then he has discovered the significance of all human life, the intention which is embodied in the existence of human nature, the end for which Man was created or the purpose of God for Man. Now, it is the fundamental postulate of religious rationality that the purpose of God must inevitably be achieved. Thus, the discovery of the essence of humanity is the discovery, not merely of what human life ought to be, but of what human life will be when the work of God in history is complete. It is the discovery of what God is working at and will achieve in human history. It explains past history and it defines the end to which present history is in fact moving. Thus, by discovering, at the point where the development of Hebrew reflection completes itself, his own essence as a human being, Jesus discovered the intention of God for man, which is the end of the process of history, the kingdom of heaven which is to be established on earth.

Thus the discovery that Jesus made lifts human life on to a new plane of consciousness. The end of the process of history is known. But the achievement of that inevitable end depends upon its acceptance by Man. For a dualistic consciousness this seems to imply that the achievement of the end may be frustrated by the refusal of man to co-operate; but for a religious mode of thought, the conclusion is that man must and will co-operate, since the end must inevitably be achieved. Reality cannot frustrate itself. This does not dispose of the problem of evil, but it transforms

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the problem. If Man has discovered the intention which is involved in his own existence, he may refuse to adopt that intention as his own. He may avoid the light, knowing that it is there. But the consequence of this refusal is necessarily disastrous. It leaves Man not merely denying his own nature, and so divided against himself, but at heart conscious that he is doing so. If he refuses the intention which defines his own nature, and so refuses to be himself, he must necessarily define an intention for himself in opposition to his own nature. This process of self-frustration must inevitably prove self-destructive. It follows that wherever Man rejects the discovery of himself he will be committed to a line of action which is attempting to achieve what cannot be achieved. Every such effort will, in the course of its history, defeat itself. It will be impossible, beyond a certain point, to maintain the intention. Its impossibility will be revealed in the process of attempting to achieve it. This will force the adoption of another intention which will again destroy itself unless it is the intention which belongs to the reality of the human essence. In this way the discovery of Jesus defines the law of future history. We may say that in Jesus the Jewish religious consciousness has reached the point in its development at which the law of human history has been formulated and prediction, on a basis of knowledge, becomes possible.

But there is another unique characteristic which belongs to the self-discovery of the human essence. To discover one's own essential nature includes the discovery of what one really wants, and to discover the essence of humanity is to discover what all human beings really want. So the discovery that Jesus made does not merely determine what the intention of God

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for Man is, and what the fulfilment of the process of history will achieve. It also provides in the individual a sufficient motive for making that intention his own. Part of the transformation which self-discovery produces is a transformation of motives. The desire which belongs to the essence of human nature, is brought into human consciousness, where it remains as a conscious impulse to co-operate with God in the realization of his intention for Man. We can see the importance of this if we contrast it with the situation that faces our own dualistic morality. For us the discovery of the good is the discovery of what we *ought* to do. The problem that harasses us and perplexes our moralists is the fact that our impulses run counter to its achievement, and we can see no way by which a motive can be supplied for acting in the way that our knowledge of what we ought to do dictates. Pure reason, as some would have it, or moral intuition, as others say, or a supernatural revelation, as some theologically-minded thinkers prefer, shows us what the moral law is. But this moral law stands over against the system of our natural impulses, condemning them. On the other hand, the system of natural impulses provides the only motive force in us which can determine action. The final question is Kant's question, "How can pure reason become practical?" And in his lectures on Ethics, he adds, "If anyone could answer this question he would have discovered the philosopher's stone." For how can an idea, however true, provide itself with hands and feet? Or how can pure reason create a motive which will determine action in accordance with its own precepts? Yet this problem that haunts us is only the shadow cast by our dualistic mode of thinking. For the religious consciousness, which knows no dualism

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between a natural world of impulse and a supernatural world of ideals, it does not arise. It is in the unity of action and reflection that self-knowledge arises, and the discovery of what I really am is also the discovery of what I really want; of what in my essential nature I am after in living my own life in the world. It is thus the bringing into consciousness of the driving force of my own real nature which has hitherto worked in me unconsciously. Instead, therefore, of producing an opposition between knowledge and impulse, it is their unification at the level of full consciousness. It is not so much the discovery of the good by thought. It is the discovery by the self of its own reality, and its own reality is that of a finite agent, created by God to co-operate with God in the creation of the kingdom of God in the world. This important difference between religious and dualistic modes of thinking can be put more simply in another form. The modern dualistic Christian will agree that God has revealed his intention for Man in Jesus. If he is asked, "Why should I do the will of God? Why shouldn't I do as I please?" he will answer, "Because God commands it," or "Because it is right," or something of that sort. But he will not give the answer that the religious consciousness can give, "Because you want to. Because the real impulse of your nature, the real desire of your proper self, is precisely to fulfil the will of God. The will of God is not something other than, or opposed to, your real nature. It is your real nature. What you call 'doing as you please' is the product of your own ignorance of what you are really doing." So Jesus on the cross replies to the final rejection of his message by saying, "Father, forgive them; *for they know not what they do.*" Between these two types of answer there is a

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great gulf. Dualism involves the view that there is a fundamental disparity between desire and what is morally right. For the religious consciousness such a conclusion is simply the *reductio ad absurdum* of dualism. The world is one. Human nature is one. There can be no fundamental opposition between its parts. For the religious consciousness, the problem that arises is not "why do men not do what they ought to do?" but "why do men not do what they want to do? Why do we persist in refusing to be ourselves and fulfil our own nature, even when we recognize what it is?" To this question the religious consciousness gives the answer, "because we are afraid". Fear inhibits our natural impulse to be ourselves. Into the ramifications of this answer there is no need to go for our present purpose. We may simply note that this is the question that continually occupies the mind of Jesus and fills him with astonishment. "Why are ye so fearful?" he says. "How is it that ye have no faith?"

So far we have discussed the formal significance of Jesus' discovery that human life is personal. In that aspect it is the historic point at which man becomes conscious of his own nature, and so grasps the intention which can bring him into unity with the world if he adopts it as his own. He knows the end to which humanity moves and has a sufficient motive for pursuing that end. We have now to consider the way in which this discovery is defined by Jesus, and given a concrete meaning. Jesus defines the nature of human life both negatively and positively. Negatively he defines it by denying the validity of forms of human life which are not personal. He attacks those working conceptions of life which base it upon the organic

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relationships rather than the specifically human ones. We should not go far wrong if we said that Jesus' discovery that human life is personal is the discovery that human life is not organic in its essential character. The structure of human life is, of course, a structure of relationships between individuals. It is a great mistake to define the teaching of Jesus by saying that he revealed the absolute value of the individual. There is a sense in which this is true. But it is not a defining sense. It is rather a corollary which follows from his teaching than the central point of it. Individualism is bound up with dualism. It is only when we are in a reflective attitude that we withdraw into ourselves and are alone with ourselves. And when we define human nature in terms of its reflective moment, as the Greek tradition does, we define it as an isolated selfhood. But the religious consciousness defines in terms of the reality of action and so cannot be individualistic. For it the reality of life lies in community, and any religious statement about human life is a statement about human community. Jesus is concerned to distinguish between two types of relationship between individuals upon which human co-operation may be based. When therefore we say that Jesus denied that human life is organic, what we mean is that Jesus denied that human community can be based upon organic relations¹. In other words he denied that human community can be based upon blood-relationship. This implies an attack upon the family, upon race, upon nation, upon all the so-called "natural" relationships upon which the basis of *human* relationship is laid. He attacks the basis of society when he says, "Who are my brethren? Whosoever will of my Father which is in heaven"

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the idea that race can be the basis of human community when he answers the Pharisees who opposed him with the claim, "Abraham is our father," in the words, "If ye were Abraham's children, ye would do the works of Abraham." He attacks nationalism as a basis of human society when he says, "Many lepers were in Israel in the time of Eliseus the prophet; and none of them was cleansed, saving Naaman the Syrian." It was on the occasion when he said this in the synagogue of his home town that an abortive attempt was made to lynch him. This aspect of his teaching is summed up once and for all in the parable of the Good Samaritan, where the question "Who is my neighbour?" that is to say, the question "What are the limits of human community?" is answered in a way that denies that there is community between the Jew and his compatriots while asserting that there is community between the Jew and the Samaritan. The difference that is brought out in this way between the organic relations and the personal relations is that the first are matters of fact, while the second are matters of intention. The reason why the animal ties of blood-relation cannot form the basis of human community is that human community is a community of persons, and the unity of persons rests upon human purposes determining human conduct. Blood relationships are mere matters of fact which have no relation to that freedom of choice which is the defining characteristic of human life. A human unity unless its members make a group of human beings who have no blood-relation one another can be a human unity if we like it so. The presence or absence of blood-relation is, in principle, totally irrelevant.

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This is the negative aspect of Jesus' discovery that human life is personal. It is the discovery that human nature cannot be defined in terms of "natural" fact, but only in terms of intention. And this, for the religious consciousness, is equivalent to saying that human life cannot be lived on the basis of natural relationships but only in terms of a unity of purposes.

Jesus also defines the discovery positively by determining the structure of relationships between human beings which would constitute a human community or a community of persons. We can perhaps best start by considering the place that love occupies in his teaching, because it is here that the continuity of his thought with the development of Hebrew prophecy is most apparent. The summary of the Jewish law, in the form of the two great commandments, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy strength and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself", is not something new for which Jesus is responsible. It comes from the Old Testament. The development of the conception of God through the Old Testament is marked not so much by a gradual approach to the idea of a God of love—that is present from the beginning—as by the way in which the conception of God's love for people becomes more and more the decisive element in the conception of God and gradually eliminates elements which are incompatible with it, or interprets them in terms of it. As we have seen, the development of God and of man's relation to God, develops in Hebrew consciousness the true forms between men. It is quite natural that the two commandments on which "the prophets" Jesus should pr

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"The second is *like unto it*". Yet the Gospels represent Jesus as giving his disciples a *new* commandment to love one another. Here, as elsewhere, Jesus' discovery has a transforming effect upon what has gone before, even when it is most clearly continuous with it. Jesus himself, like all the great discoverers, is highly conscious of the revolutionary character of his teaching. The theme that runs through the Sermon on the Mount is evidence of this. "Ye have heard how it hath been said by them of old . . . But I say unto you . . ." In reasserting love as the basis of human relationship, Jesus brings into it the personal character which he has discovered as the essence of human life. "Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, love your enemies." Or again, "If ye love them that love you what reward have ye? Do not even the publicans the same?" The significant novelty in this teaching is again that it lifts human behaviour from the level of natural impulse to the level of deliberate intention. The response of like to like, which makes it natural for members of the same family, or the same nation, to love one another, must give place to a love which is the expression of a creative purpose. This does not mean, as the dualist tradition would have it, that Jesus is talking of a kind of love which is essentially different from natural love. He is merely transcending the limitations which restrict natural love to the sphere of a *de facto* reciprocity in order to reveal the essential humanness. It is natural fact that we tend to love those who love us, but this fact lacks the element of intentionality of the personal nature of human love. In other words, in fact, the basis of all

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human community. It is not the fact of common birth that makes the unity of the natural family. It is the natural love which tends to develop between members of the family because of their common experience and common interest. What Jesus does is to introduce the element of intention into this natural fact, and so to base the development of a really human community upon the *intention* to enter into community with one's fellows, because they are one's fellows. The intention to enter into community with others beyond the limits of the "natural community" is the basis for the enlargement of human community. If it is true that we tend to love those who love us then if we love our enemies that will tend to make our enemies love us. More prosaically, the basis of a free human community must be the intention to enter into community with others. It is in this way that love, which is in fact always the basis of whatever human community there is, is raised in Jesus to the level of intention, so that it becomes the motive force behind the intention to create the kingdom of heaven, the community of mankind.

The force of this conception will be missed if it is conceived as defining an ideal. The statement, "love your enemies" presupposes that true community does not yet exist and is a precept defining at once the character of a personal community and the direction of activity which intends to bring it into existence. Its justification is practical. It is the first condition of any practical effort to create a community where it does not yet exist. In this way it exhibits the characteristic unity of theory and practice which defines the religious mind. Because a personal community is, in fact, constituted by the mutual affection of its members, any effort to establish a personal community must start with

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the intention to establish mutual affection where it does not yet exist. To the question, "Why should I love people who don't love me?" Jesus answers, "Because that is the only way to establish a human relation between you and them." To the further question, "But why should I try to establish a human relation between myself and them?" Jesus' answer might be, "Because that is what God is doing in history, and therefore that is what you are made for, and that is what your human nature really wants."

This explains the change in Jesus' attitude to the problem of evil. He proposes to deal with evil by forgiving it. For religious thought evil is sin; that is to say, it is defined as an estrangement of man from God, which manifests itself in an estrangement of man from man. Thus, the existence of enmity between human beings is the essence of sin. It is a negation of community, and therefore the self-negation of human life, the denial by man of the intention of God which determines the course of human history. Thus Jesus says, "Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill, and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the Judgement: but I say unto you, That whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause, shall be in danger of the Judgement: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the Council: but whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire." The Epistle of John expresses the same thought by saying, "He that hateth his brother is a murderer." The meaning is clearly that hatred is the negation, *in intention*, of the existence of its object. Here also a dualist mode of thought is apt to be trapped into misunderstanding. In the integral consciousness feeling is motive. Action and thought

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can only be separated by turning the driving force of feeling away from action and concentrating it upon the life of ideas. Emotion then ceases to be motive, and becomes an end in itself, rather than an impulse to act. One of the distinctive characters of dualism is that it cannot think of emotions as themselves forces which determine action. It requires a different motive force which it calls Will. The religious consciousness has no need for the notion of will, because not being dualist it has no need to look for the peculiar force whose function is to overcome the dualism of thought and action. When Jesus says, "Love one another" he is not saying, "Cultivate certain emotional attitudes to one another." But neither is he saying, "Act deliberately as if you loved one another." For him, "Love is the fulfilling of the Law." This does not mean that the fulfilling of the Law is Love. It means rather, "Love is the way of behaving which is determined by affection."

Now if we think of the structural principles of a society which is created and maintained by mutual affection raised to the level of intention, we find that they are the principles of *equality* and *freedom*. In the form in which these ideas appear in European history they have been modified—or rather limited—by the dualism of European modes of life and thought. Yet they have their origin in the teaching of Jesus, especially if we consider them not as ideals of social organization but as the driving forces which have determined the social history of Europe. Indeed, the main evidence that Christianity is a real creative force in history is the pressure and the struggle to realize, by reform and revolution, a society based on the principles of freedom and equality. The inhibition which prevents us from seeing anything "religious" as a real

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element in history makes us seek the origin of these ideas in Ancient Greece. In fact, it is only the form in which they are thought and interpreted, which has its origin in the Greek culture. The pressure to realize a free society of equals on an ever-widening scale, which has moulded the history of progress, has its origin in the Jewish culture, and particularly in the completion of the development of Hebrew culture by Jesus. And the full meaning of these principles is only to be discovered in the teaching of the New Testament. The Gospel of John attributes directly to Jesus the statement, "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." Anyone who was ignorant of the origin of this quotation might easily ascribe it to Plato or to some other Greek thinker. Indeed, it might quite well be used by an enthusiastic Hellenist to express what he takes to be the essence of the Greek outlook on life. This would be a complete illusion. Not merely did none of the Greek writers say this, but it expresses an attitude of mind which is totally different from the Greek attitude. In Plato we find a clear consciousness that there is an antagonism between the search for truth and the demand for freedom. Truth is the ideal of the contemplative life; freedom, of the practical. If democracy has its way with its demand for freedom and equality, that will be an end of the true form of human life which has the contemplation of the good as its final goal. Democracy puts Socrates to death. Thus it seems to the Greek mind that there is a dilemma which faces human society. If it seeks to realize the ideal of culture through the knowledge of truth, it must give up the idea of freedom and equality in society, and aim at creating a highly disciplined and hierarchical society, in which the good life can only be achieved by a select

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few. If it aims at freedom and equality, it will merely produce anarchy and tyranny. This is an attitude of mind with which we are familiar to-day, the attitude of mind which the majority of educated people in Western Europe reveal when they discuss Russia or communism; and it is very much bound up, as Karl Marx saw, with the class structure of our society. Plato, after all, was an aristocrat. Socrates, on the other hand, was not, and he was, unlike Plato, a man of a religious type. It is therefore significant that Socrates was driven into scepticism, and the recognition that his own wisdom consisted in knowing that he knew nothing. One of the remarkable differences between the Jewish culture and the Greek culture is that the Jew can think of the relation of truth and freedom, as the Greek cannot, as a relation between means and end. Because there is no dualism for him between theory and practice, he thinks of theory as determining practice, and so concludes that false belief must beget bondage in action, and truth freedom. "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free," is really a generalization of the commonplace that if you misunderstand the situation in which you are acting, you will not achieve what you are trying to achieve. Action is frustrated by error, and the frustration of action is the absence of freedom. Freedom is, after all, the ability to realize your intention.

If we bear in mind that for the religious consciousness practice is primary and knowledge at once a part of it and that which raises it to the level of intention and personality, then we can realize quite easily why the principle of love as the basis of human community expresses itself in the principles of equality and freedom, and at the same time discover the real mean-

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ing of these principles. Freedom means absence of restraint, and the presence of restraint comes with the recognition that one is prevented from doing what one intends. Now, Jesus' discovery is that human life is intentional, and that there is an intention which expresses the real nature of persons. We saw that the adoption of any other intention than the one which is the essence of personal nature must result in frustration. It puts us in the position of trying to achieve something that is contrary to the nature of reality and which is, therefore, impossible of achievement. We shall necessarily, then, discover in the process of living by it, that we cannot do what we intend. This is the discovery that we are not free. Freedom, in its full sense, can only be achieved when our intention is in harmony with the nature of the reality of which we form a part; that is to say, when our will and God's will coincide. But there is another aspect of the question. Our own nature can only be defined or expressed in our relations to one another. The primary condition which must be fulfilled if we are not to be frustrated, is that the relations which bind us together into community, and which form the basis of the possibility of human co-operation, should be right. Thus the root of frustration and unfreedom in human life is the existence of enmity and estrangement between us. If the relations between individuals in any community are not harmonious, then its members must be frustrated. They cannot realize their intentions. They cannot be free. The crux of the problem of freedom is the overcoming of estrangement and hostility in the relations of persons, always provided that we do not interpret this in a dualist way to mean merely getting rid of certain feelings. It is the actual motives determining

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behaviour which are referred to by terms like "enmity" or "hostility". Where feelings do not flow out into action they are literally of no consequence, except that such a state of affairs is a symptom of bondage. The notion of freedom as the result of the teaching of Jesus is the key to the writings of St. Paul, in which the contrast between the freedom of the Gospel and the bondage of the Law continually finds expression, and there also we find it connected with the idea of truth. He says, for example, in writing to the Christian community in Galatia, "O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you that ye should not obey the truth? . . . Stand fast, therefore, in the liberty where-with Christ hath made us free and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage." Thus, for Paul, the hallmark of Christian community is its freedom from bondage to rules and regulations, and the true human community is the free community. So on the question of keeping Sabbaths he says, "One man esteemeth one day above another: another esteemeth every day alike. Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind. He that regardeth the day, regardeth it unto the Lord; and he that regardeth not the day, to the Lord he doth not regard it." Here the freedom of the Gospel expresses itself in the demand for individual variety in social behaviour, and against the effort to stereotype even the forms of religious observance in the community. Paul even goes to the length of asserting the principle of anarchism, "all things are lawful unto me"; though he goes on to qualify it by adding that all things are not expedient. And his principle of expediency is in terms of the intention of community. "If meat make my brother to offend I shall eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend."

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The principle of equality is equally a corollary of Jesus' conception of human life as personal. He expresses it over and over again in parable and symbol as well as in statement. "Whosoever of you will be the chiefest, shall be servant of all." As a symbol of this, just before his death, he performed the menial task of washing his disciples' feet, and then impressed it on them as a principle of human relationship. "I have given you an example." What is expressed in this fashion is not at all the virtue of service as the basis of honour. It is not that a person who is prepared to undertake distasteful duties for the sake of others is deserving of special praise and consideration. It is rather that the natural principle of equality in human relationship requires that the claim to greatness should be compensated by the performance of menial tasks in order to prevent a distinction arising between two types or classes of people in the community. It can only be understood in the light of the continuous effort of the Hebrew consciousness to prevent the appearance of dualism in society.

The term "equality", even more than the term "freedom", carries in our own thought too limited a sense fully to represent its meaning in the religious mode of experience. For us it has too mathematical or too external a significance. It is neither a material nor an ideal equality that is properly referred to, but a personal equality which combines both. In particular, it is not the negation of difference. It is precisely the recognition of difference and variety amongst individuals that gives meaning to the assertion of equality. The statement that all men are equal means that any claim that one man or one class or type of man is superior or inferior to another is, *as a matter of fact*,

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quite untrue. The reason why it is untrue is that it makes a human relationship—a man to man relationship—impossible. The meaning of such a claim can only be seen in action. It is a claim to subordinate another person to yourself, to use him as a means to your ends, without allowing him equally to use you for his ends. It is to claim that your needs and your desires take precedence of his. And why not? Because the world is not built that way. Because, if you act upon this principle, you frustrate your own purpose as well as his. Whether he accepts his subordination or not, the result is ultimately the same. You set up a relation between you which involves a struggle of interests. If he accepts the idea of dependence on you, and you accept your superiority (i.e. his service), you become in fact dependent upon him. Masters must always depend on their servants. An upper class must always depend on its working class. A wife who is subordinated to her husband is always mistress of the situation. In a capitalist economy the capitalists, in D. H. Lawrence's phrase, are "so helpless unless worked for". Thus the denial of equality is inherently self-negating. It can only be maintained by the delusion which sets theory against practice. To secure the acceptance of the idea that you are the superior, you must in practice become the dependant. And the development of the situation must sooner or later unmask the contradiction. From this situation there is no escape except through the acceptance of equality. Without this recognition the "superior" remains unfree, because his life must be determined, and perverted by the necessity of maintaining his superiority. He is permanently on the defensive, engaged in a hopeless struggle "to keep up appearances". He can be successful only so long as

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he can make the "inferior" believe that it is worth his while to serve him. There again the contradiction lurks. The claim to superiority is the claim that my interests are more important for you than your own. Yet I can only secure your service of my interests by persuading you that it is your interests that are being served by your subordination, that it is worth your while to serve me. And that is a practical recognition of the superiority of *your* interests.

But, it will be objected, there may surely be a situation in which it is equally to the interests of both parties to maintain the relation of master and servant. Undoubtedly. But what becomes then of the claim to superiority? In such a situation both parties are equally important, and there is no basis for any claim to superiority. This is the critical case for our understanding of the religious concept of personal equality. It by no means implies the rejection of a subordination of functions, which is based upon the variety of human capacities. That would be absurd. Co-operation involves organization, and organization must be based on a differentiation of functions. There must be authority and obedience to authority. Some must be in the position of planning and giving orders: others must execute the plan loyally. But all co-operation is for a particular purpose, and the differentiation of functions is relative to this purpose. The subordination of one man to another in such a case does not involve any personal inequality. The manager of the factory has authority over the workers for the purpose of securing the necessary co-operation between different tasks. It does not follow that the manager has any authority as a human being over the workers except for the purpose of this co-operation. If the factory takes fire, and

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the junior clerk is the head of the local fire brigade then the positions are reversed. For the purpose of putting out the fire the junior clerk has authority over the manager and the manager must loyally obey his orders. The superiority of function for a particular purpose only becomes a denial of human equality if it is transferred to the personal field. If the manager feels, for example, that because he is a manager he cannot allow his daughter to marry the junior clerk; or that it would not do to send his children to the same school as the clerk's, he will then be basing a claim to human superiority upon his function. It is *this* that is absurd.

Does not this then justify capitalism as an economic system? Is it not false to claim that the distinction between masters and workers is a denial of human equality? The answer is that it neither justifies nor condemns any economic system as such. It condemns the whole idea of *caste*—of a ruling *class* and a working *class*, of an aristocratic class and a class of commoners. This does not depend upon the economic system as such, but upon transferring functional distinctions which are relative to economic purposes into the personal field. But it does also provide a basis of judgement for the economic system itself. We saw that where a co-operation involving subordination is in fact equally in the interest of both parties it does not involve in itself a denial of human equality. It follows that any economic system—feudal, capitalist or any other—can be justified under one condition—that it actually does work in the interests of all concerned better than any other that is possible. It is on this principle, for example, that Karl Marx maintained that capitalism was justifiable up to a point. But from the mature

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religious standpoint, as we find it in the teaching of Jesus, we must add something more. The judgement on human activity must be passed at the human level, which is the level of intention. It is not the fact of equality so much as the intention of equality which matters. The denial of equality is in fact the refusal of equality—the effort to establish or maintain superiority over other people. The religious judgement of an economic system is a judgement of the society whose structure of co-operation it defines. If the society intends equality among its members the fact that circumstances or their stage of development prevents them from achieving it cannot be counted against them. But the same economic system becomes the touchstone of the intention of equality so soon as a resistance appears to change it in the direction of greater economic equality. For the resistance is the expression of a will to refuse equality.

The nature of equality as a structural principle of society is more directly revealed in the central field of direct personal relationship. In our own society the relation of wife to husband is not, in fact, one of equality. The social and economic structure forces the wife into a position of subordination. But a husband and wife may still intend equality between them, and devise means for compensating the inequality which they cannot escape. They may also accept the inequality and use the economic dependence or the economic superiority as a weapon against the other. In that case they deny equality—and frustrate their relationship. The teacher has an authority over his pupils. If he uses this to secure their acceptance of his point of view he denies equality. If he uses it to develop their capacity to judge for themselves and so to disagree

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with him intelligently he acts in a way that intends equality. Similarly in the relation of parent and child, in which inequality is most personal and most inherent, it is the intention of equality which determines the character of the relationship. The mother who seeks to keep her child young and dependent upon her denies equality and frustrates the relationship. The child must then fight the mother for his freedom and independence or he can never grow up.

It is in this full sense that the principle of equality appears in the teaching of Jesus as one of the structural principles of human relationship. It is not an ideal, nor is it a mere fact. It is a principle of human action. The modern psychological diagnosis of the "inferiority complex" comes near to discovering one important aspect of it. The psycho-analyst finds that the power motive is always a compensation for a sense of inferiority. But Jesus, it seems to me, saw not merely this, but also that it proved conclusively the natural equality of men. The fact that a feeling of inferiority issues in a demand for the recognition of superiority can only mean that equality is the *truth*. The claim to superiority is in fact a confession of weakness. The claim to a superiority of power is only reasonable if I am less able to defend myself. The claim to special privilege and special service can only be made good by pleading special weakness and special helplessness. It is the weak, the sick, the very young, and the very old on whose behalf a proper claim for privileged treatment can be made. The healthy man who feels he has a right to be waited upon and served by others is a hypochondriac. A society which denies equality is suffering from a general neurosis.

It was this principle that Jesus chose to impress

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with special emphasis upon his disciples on the night on which he was betrayed. The form in which he did it is important. "*Ye call me Master and Lord,*" he said, "*and ye say well, for so I am. If I then, your Lord and Master, have washed your feet; ye also ought to wash one another's feet.*" Thus he emphasizes the difference of ability and position between himself and his disciples in order to deny that any claim to privileged treatment can be grounded upon it. Functional authority does not argue personal superiority. So on another occasion he said to his disciples, "Be not ye called Rabbi; for one is your Master, even Christ, and all ye are brethren. And call no man father upon earth, for one is your Father, which is in heaven. Neither be ye called masters: for one is your Master, even Christ. But he that is greatest among you shall be your servant."

These two principles, of freedom and equality, describe the intentional structure of a truly human society. They are immediate corollaries of the fundamental law—that love is the only possible basis of human unity. "Henceforth I call you not servants, for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth: but I have called you friends, for all things that I have heard of my Father I have made known unto you." Now freedom and equality are the principles which constitute the personal relation of friendship. Any relation in which one party acts as the superior and the other as the inferior is not a friendship: nor is a relation in which one party is free and the other bound to obedience. This does not mean that in friendship there *should be* freedom and equality, but that there necessarily is. It is precisely the freedom and equality which constitute it a personal relation of friendship instead of a func-

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tional relation of master and servant. Thus in general any society of men which is not based on freedom and equality is not a human community. It is a functional organization for a specific purpose which denies the nature of human relationship; and must therefore frustrate itself and in the long run destroy itself.

Equally important is the ground on which Jesus here bases his distinction between the Master-Servant relation and the relation of friends. It is the sharing of knowledge between them. In the former the master keeps his own counsel, the servants execute his orders. It is not necessary for them to understand the reasons for his decisions. "Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and die" defines the Master-Servant relation, and Aristotle explicitly defends slavery on the ground that there is a class of men who are "natural slaves" because they are incapable by nature of thinking things out for themselves, though they are capable of carrying out a rational decision come to by the "natural masters". In the human relation of equals co-operation is possible only when all pool their knowledge and so understand what they are doing in common and why they are doing it. Friends take counsel together and share in the decision. Nor is it proper to say that this is the better way to conduct a group-life. It is the *only* way in which a human community of action is possible at all. For common action depends upon common *intention*. Where the masters keep their own counsel the intention remains exclusively theirs. It is not enough, therefore, that the leader should *persuade* his followers to act as he wills. He must teach them to understand his purpose, and wait until they have made his intention their own. They are his disciples, not his servants. He is their teacher, and until they are

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able to understand his meaning they are unable to share in his action.

Up to this point we have been concerned with the aspect of the teaching of Jesus usually referred to—quite improperly—as his “ethic”. It is in fact the expression of his realization of the nature of human existence. Human life is personal; and since personal life is communal, this means that its constitutive relations are personal, and not organic. The form of human society is determined by the intentions of its members, not by natural facts such as blood-relationship which are not intended by them but merely happen to them. Man lives by intention; that is his nature. Yet his intentions are continually frustrated. This must mean that he intends wrongly. His salvation can lie only in discovering and willing that intention which is inherent in his own nature, as part of the world, and which therefore brings him into harmony with the reality in which he has his being. Only such an intention can be realized. Any other will necessarily lead to frustration, because it is an attempt to live against the structure of the world; and, since he is part of the world, in defiance of his own nature. Yet he can only make this intention his own if he knows what it is. An unconscious intention is a meaningless phrase. It is the knowledge of the truth that sets men free. The process of life, bringing the experience of failure, frustration, and bondage, is itself the means whereby the truth is discovered. On the other hand, men resist the discovery of the truth through fear of the demands it makes on them. They prefer the established modes of life, in spite of their experience that they lead to disaster. They will not come to the light lest their deeds should be reproved. Refusing to

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acknowledge that they are wrong, they seek a scapegoat to blame and punish for the miseries which are the result of their own folly. They turn to self-justification and self-defence and in this effort to save their lives they lose them. The only way out is to reverse this whole attitude, to repent, and change their intention. They must drop their claims to superiority—which are merely self-defence and self-justification—and accept equality. They must forgive instead of judging and punishing. They must negate the negation of community in their ways of behaviour and live by the intention of community which defines their own human nature. They must intend love, equality and freedom as the structural principles of their practical relations with one another. If they will only accept their own reality and live by it they will find that the kingdom of heaven has come on earth.

THE PROPHETIC UNDERSTANDING

If we call this the “ethic” of Jesus, we shall then find that we must make a transition to an “apocalyptic” element in his teaching which stands in strong contrast to it. But this contrast of “ethic” and “apocalyptic” is itself the expression of a dualistic apprehension, and examination of it provides perhaps the clearest and simplest means of discovering the significance of the distinction between the form of religious thought and of dualistic thought. I should beg of my readers therefore to concentrate their attention on this issue, which alone seems to me to be of prime importance; because the failure to grasp it makes any understanding of Jesus or of Christianity impossible. If we can see why the division of the teaching

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of Jesus into an "ethical" part and an "apocalyptic" part transposes the content of the teaching into a mode of apprehension which reverses its meaning and turns it into its own opposite we shall have discovered the key to the whole mystery in which European religion has wrapped itself.

What, then, is the basis of this distinction between "ethic" and "apocalyptic"? It is quite clearly the dualism between the "spiritual" and the "material", which is the basic form of any non-religious mode of apprehension. The "ethic" is spiritual. It sets before us an *ideal* of human conduct. It reveals how we *ought* to behave. It provides us with a *theory* of the good life. The "apocalyptic" on the other hand, is about this world, and what will happen to it in the end. It prophesies a catastrophic exercise of power which will destroy the wicked and reward the righteous and establish by force the kingdom of God upon earth. This at once introduces difficulties. The "spiritual" character of the "ethic" has vanished, and its place is taken by a vision of ultimate violence which is its opposite. The God of love in the ideal world becomes a God of vengeance and terror in the material world. The apocalyptic is the negation of the ethic. The ethic is the repudiation of the apocalyptic. The apocalyptic represents the kingdom as coming precisely in the way that the ethic teaches that it cannot come. It shows God acting in a way that repudiates the nature assigned to him in the "ethic". It is no wonder that those of us who accept the teaching of Jesus as the revelation of the divine character and of the ideal of conduct for man find ourselves constrained to gloss over or explain away the other aspect of the teaching ascribed to Jesus in the Gospels. Moreover, if we ask ourselves how

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Jesus was able to know the future, and produce this picture of the consummation of the world, we are at a loss. At best he seems to be endowed with a kind of clairvoyance—a supernatural power to foretell the future, which has no foothold in experience and proceeds by no logical process.

Now in contrasting the dualistic modes of thought with the religious mode we noticed that dualism always has the effect of turning theory and practice, the reflective and the active aspects of experience, the spiritual and the natural worlds into opposition to one another. It is therefore no matter of surprise to find that a dualistic interpretation of the mind of Jesus creates an opposition between the “ethic” and the “apocalyptic”. It is exactly what we should expect. It proves merely that the form of our understanding is faulty and incapable of understanding life integrally. And we think life dualistically because we do not *live* it integrally. We have *two* lives in *two* worlds; a spiritual life and a material life, which are in opposition. Since our way of reflecting is itself part of our way of living, it necessarily reflects the dualistic form of our way of life. Because our living is not religious our thinking cannot be. We can escape from this conflict in our thought only by intending an integrity of life which is only possible through the destruction of the class structure of our society. But we can achieve an understanding of the religious thought of Jesus provided that we *intend* the disappearance of dualism in practice; if we will the end of our claims to superiority and the achievement of equality and freedom. This is the meaning of the statement that “If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine.”

How then can we think together the “ethic” and

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the "apocalyptic" of Jesus' teaching? Surely by thinking them *together* and not separately. So long as we insist on contrasting them, and setting them over against one another as "ethic" and "apocalyptic", they must remain contradictory. It is by contrasting them that we disunite them. We have to begin by dropping the distinction, so that there is neither "ethic" nor "apocalyptic", but only a single integrity of understanding.

There is one limited field of knowledge in which we can find a clue to the integrity we are seeking, and that is in modern science. This is no accident. Science, in its own field, is the product of Christianity, and its most adequate expression so far. This assertion does not, of course, apply to what is called "the scientific view of the world" which is one of the crudest expressions of dualism. This world-view, however, is not in any sense science. It is a speculative metaphysic supposed to be warranted by some of the findings of modern science, repudiated by numbers of first-class scientists, and mainly held, for emotional reasons, by people who would be entirely out of place in a laboratory, and quite unable to pass the simplest of scientific examinations. Science itself, in its own specific fields of research, employs a method of understanding which restores the broken integrity of theory and practice. It is experimental. Theory remains hypothesis in isolation, and its validity can only be admitted when it has been experimentally verified. An experiment is an action, and the scientist's criterion of true theory is that it makes successful action possible. In other words it enables him to predict what will be the result if he acts in a certain way; if, for example, he mixes two liquids and heats the mixture to a certain temperature. A

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law of physics is in itself a purely mental or "spiritual" thing—a mathematical formula. For pure mathematics it is interesting as a type of formula which can be classified with other formulae having the same or a similar form, and can be manipulated in various ways by purely mental processes so that it changes into other "equivalent" forms. For the physicist, however, it is an instrument for predicting what will happen in the material world; and for the technician it is a means of making things happen in the material world, an instrument for the realization of intentions. The secret of science is precisely this unification of mental and material things, this fusion of theory and practice, in experiment. Yet, if the two elements are separated and considered in themselves there is no conceivable connexion between them. Every wireless transmission is an experiment verifying certain mathematical equations. Yet a purely mathematical examination of the equations on the one hand, and the most careful observation of the processes of the transmission on the other will fail to show any connexion between them.

Now the relation between the "ethic" and the "apocalyptic" in the teaching of Jesus is the same as the relation between theory and prediction in science. The one is the basis of the other, and the truth of the ethic is manifested, and can only be manifested, in the realization of the prediction which it makes possible, which, in fact, is its *meaning*. Thus, if the "apocalyptic" is false, the "ethic" is untrue; for the happening of what is predicted is the verification of the theory contained in the "ethic". But if the two are separated and examined by themselves in isolation no relation between them can be observed.

Now to call one element "the ethic" and the other

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"the apocalyptic" is precisely to separate them in this way. What is called the "ethic" of Jesus is, in fact, his anthropology. It is his formulation of the principles governing the behaviour of personal life. The "apocalyptic" is simply the prediction about the future development of personal life in the world which follows from these principles. I do not, of course, mean to suggest that Jesus was a scientist. The anthropology is a religious anthropology and the prediction is a religious prediction—it is, that is to say, prophecy. What I do suggest is that the form of relation between the theoretical understanding and the prediction that follows from it is the same in science and in the religious teaching of Jesus; and that therefore neither can be understood unless the relation between them is understood.

To call any doctrine "ethical" is to assert that it consists of statements about value and not about fact; that it is concerned not with what is, but with what ought to be. If we call the teaching of Jesus an ethic we imply that Jesus was a moralist, concerned to determine the nature of the good life—which is not the life that men actually live—and to determine the rules by which men ought to act. We imply that his effort was to construct an "ideal" of life, by which actual life is condemned, and which perhaps, others might use as a pattern; which they should try to "live up to". Anyone who thinks like this ought to read the Gospels, and attend to the form of Jesus' teaching, for it is certainly not the form that moralists employ. Jesus speaks usually in the indicative mood, not in the imperative. The term "ought" and its equivalents scarcely occur in his teaching. We can, of course, substitute for such a statement as "He that saveth his life shall lose it",

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the statement "Self-sacrifice is a virtue", or "One ought not to try to save one's life", and imagine that we are saying the same thing in other words. In fact, by giving the assertion an ethical form, we have changed its reference and turned it into its contradictory. What Jesus said was that the intention of saving one's life is self-frustrating and therefore stupid. It is an attempt to achieve the impossible. So far from implying that it is good to lose your life, he implies the precise opposite. He assumes, as axiomatic, that to lose one's life is sheer waste, and offers that as a pragmatic reason for not trying to save it. It is a fuller and richer version of what all students of ethics know as "the paradox of Hedonism"—that the way to get happiness is to forget it and aim at something else.

But it is not merely the absence of the ethical form, with its characteristic words and phrases, that is noteworthy in Jesus' teaching. There is evidence of a deliberate avoidance of it. There are occasions recorded upon which Jesus was invited to enunciate ethical principles, and we find that he does not respond. What an opportunity for an ethical teacher is given by the urgent question of the rich young ruler, or the lawyer; "What must I do to inherit eternal life?" Yet Jesus, on both occasions, refuses to take it. In both cases he turns the question back on the inquirer by referring him to the law. And when that turns out to be unsatisfactory, he says in the one case "Sell all thou hast, and give to the poor, and come and follow me", while in the other he tells the story of the Good Samaritan and invites the lawyer to pass his own judgement on it. When invited to settle an issue involving a moral question between two brothers, he replies angrily, "Who made me a judge or a divider?" When asked

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to discuss the moral problem of the relation of sin and suffering—"Who did sin, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?"—his reply carries an undertone of exasperation at the stupidity the question betrays. Indeed, one of his rare categorical imperatives is directed against the habit of which all ethical teaching, in our sense, is the elaboration. "Judge not, that ye be not judged." It is the blindness and foolishness of men, rather than their wickedness, which surprises him. The Pharisees are "blind guides of the blind". They can read the signs of the sky but not the signs of the times. "Art thou a master of Israel," he says to Nicodemus, "and knowest not these things?" To his disciples he says, "How is it that ye do not understand?" To the crowds who listen to his parables, "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear." His own crucifixion is for himself not a crowning example of immorality, but of ignorance. "Father, forgive them," he says, "for they know not what they do."

It is an integral understanding of life that Jesus wishes, then, to impart; not an ethic which is an understanding of what life is not but ought to be. His disciples rightly described it as a "gospel"—as good news about the coming of the kingdom—"glad tidings of great joy which shall be to all people". An ethic, whatever it may be, whether law to be obeyed or ideal to be followed, is certainly not news, nor is it about what shall be. Paul, for all his occasional lapses into the vein of the moralist (they are far less frequent than is generally supposed), is quite clear that the gospel stands in strong contrast to the law,—that is to say the *moral* law,—because it does away with the principle of judgement by a standard of goodness, which must

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result in condemnation and punishment. That is why for Paul Jesus is the beginning of a new order of things, a new creation. "If any man be in Christ he is a new creature; old things are passed away; behold! all things are become new." And the old order is—the world of the moral law.

What then of the "apocalyptic"? Notice first that what we refer to in this way is the gospel of Jesus, not what we refer to as his "ethical" teaching. It is the "good news" about the coming kingdom, the prophecy of what shall be. But notice also that what we usually mean by an "apocalypse" forms no part of the teaching of Jesus, any more than what we usually mean by an "ethic". In the Apocalypse of St. John the Divine—curiously referred to as *the* book of Revelation, we have a good example of apocalyptic literature. It is a mystical vision, described in highly symbolic language, of future events—a kind of metaphorical writing of future history before it happens. There is nothing like this in the records of Jesus' teaching. If Jesus is not a moralist, neither is he a mystic. There is nothing of the inspired visionary about him. He remains always objectively rational. He has a great capacity for imagery and metaphor, but he never indulges in fantasy for its own sake. It is always under control, an instrument in the service of a clear purpose. His parables of the kingdom are not concerned to describe the kingdom, but to exhibit the principles which must govern its realization. His vision of the last judgement is so clearly an illustration of practical principles that it is customarily referred to as the *parable* of the sheep and the goats, and treated as part of the "ethic"; although in doing so we are inclined to overlook the fact that it is "nations" which are represented as assembled for judgement. Even

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when he is reported as describing the conditions which will arise in the process of the coming of the kingdom, the description is characteristically general—"Nation shall rise against nation"—and the intention is practical, to enable his followers to interpret history correctly. "But when these things begin to come to pass, lift up your heads; for your redemption draweth nigh." In other words, to take the collapse of a civilization as proof that things are going badly is to misunderstand the process of history. It is a sign that things are going according to schedule. Just so, the fact that the thunderclap is heard after the lightning flash is seen does not show that these are two independent events, but exhibits the principle of their unity in terms of the difference of the velocities of light and sound.

If then we are to understand the teaching of Jesus we must rid our minds of the habit of dualism, and learn to think the world, as he thought it, religiously; as an integral whole in which the contrast of spirit and matter, and all the contrasts to which this gives rise, are overcome. The proof of our success will be that both ethic and apocalyptic will disappear, and in their place we shall find a single unity of religious understanding with a prediction of the future course of history as an inherent and necessary part of it. We shall discover, as in all real understanding, an insight which is also foresight.

THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

For Jesus, as for every religious thinker, the reality of experience is Action, and therefore the world is conceived as an Act. God is the ultimate agent, and the

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world is his creation. But the creation of the world "in the beginning", is not the end of God's creative action. God is no First Cause or Prime Mover. History is the continued act of God, and it is in his working in history that God is known. God is known as a worker, in the work; and his work is history. The knowledge of God and the knowledge of history are inseparably bound up.

This may seem strange to us, or even impossible, unless we remember that we conceive history as a process of events, and not as a continuous action. For us history *happens*; it is not done. This, indeed, is the source of intellectual atheism, as well as of psychological "behaviourism" and moral scepticism. If the world is a process of events then there is no room in it for action. If everything *happens*, nothing can be *done*. Either "God" is just a name for the process of history, or else God is outside the world; so that if he does anything to it, it can only be by an arbitrary interference with the natural process of the world. "Arbitrary" in this sense only means "irrational", "magical", "inconceivable", or "impossible". Dualism is, in fact, the denial of action; indeed it is merely the reflective expression of the refusal of action. We all know how frequently the statement "I cannot do it" is a way of saying "I refuse to do it". This is because action is, in fact, the embodiment of thought in material change, the unity of body and spirit. The assertion of a dualism of mind and matter is therefore a denial of the possibility of action. To think history in terms of dualism is to think it as pure happening, and not as action. At the roots of this lies the desire to deny responsibility, and so to escape responsibility.

Now since action is the realization of intention, to

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think history as the action of God is to think of it as the realization of the intention of God. Since God is Absolute it is nonsensical to think that his intention in history will not be realized. For this reason any statement of what the intention of God is in history is also a statement of what *will in fact be realized* in the future. Thus the spiritual understanding of the will of God for man (which is what we represent as an "ethic") is *ipso facto* an understanding of what will happen to man in the future—our "apocalyptic". The two are one and the same, necessarily. But what is wanting to complete the picture of religious knowledge is the connecting link between these two—the understanding of *how* the intention of God in history is being realized. Until we know this we cannot partake intelligently in its realization. At the most we could allow God to use us, without understanding what was happening to us. The master-servant relation would be the only possible one. But that would mean that we did not ourselves act and could not ourselves be responsible agents. The attitude of complete submission to orders which it is not for us to understand is an effort to will away our own wills, not an effort to bring them into harmony with the will of God. It is indeed a subtle way of refusing to accept the will of God by which we are *persons*.

Here lies the crux of the whole matter. History is the action of God. But it is also the action of men. "My Father worketh hitherto, *and* I work." History has to be thought both as the act of God in the world, and as the act of Man in the world. Now an act is the realization of intention. The intentions of men are manifold. The problem for thought is to think the manifold realizations of human intentions as the

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realization of the one intention of the supreme and universal Agent. And this has to be accomplished in terms of the facts of history, without special selection—objectively. In particular it must not be done by ignoring the existence of evil intentions. The intentions of man not only do not coincide with the intention of God, but are often in active opposition to it.

The principle through which Jesus achieves this unification is fundamentally simple, though its applications and expressions are manifold. It is that human intentions which are opposed to the intention of God for man are necessarily self-frustrating. When men set out to realize an intention which is contrary to the divine intention, they do not achieve it. They achieve something that they did not intend. If the intention is the opposite of the divine intention, then they necessarily achieve, not what they intended, but its opposite. This principle is not an "act of faith"; it is a discovery of reason. Its necessity is a logical necessity. There is no need for an "intervention" of God to frustrate the purposes of men who are in opposition to him, since they cannot be in opposition to him without being in opposition to themselves. They themselves are, after all, God's act, and his intention is embodied in their nature. To act in defiance of the will of God is to intend the impossible. The resulting action cannot then achieve what we intend. It will be a failure, from our point of view. But that does not mean that we have achieved nothing. On the contrary, we have achieved something which we did not intend. The situation we have produced is not determined by our intention. It is determined by the nature of reality, by the nature of our own reality, which we are negating, as much as by the nature of the reality on which we act.

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And what is Reality but that which operates by the intention of God. Thus, whether our intention conforms to the purpose of God or opposes it, we cannot *achieve* anything but the purpose of God.

This is, as it were, Jesus' solution of the problem of Free Will and Determinism. I say "as it were" because the problem, as we know it, is the result of dualist modes of thought. But its full force will be lost if we forget that for Jesus the purpose of God is the creation of Man, as a personal community of free and equal persons. What is thus necessitated is human freedom, or the realization by Man of his true nature in the world. There are limits to the length that men can go on frustrating their own nature. There is a point at which a false purpose *must* be given up, because the impossibility of achieving it reveals itself and destroys the motive for persisting in it. Self-negation is only possible through self-assertion. Even the most self-frustrating and unreal of intentions must have its roots in the positive reality of our own nature. In the end the negation must negate itself. Push fear as a motive far enough and it becomes the courage of despair. The effort of man to reject the truth and to escape from himself can only have the effect of establishing the truth and throwing man back upon himself. There is no antinomy between freedom and necessity, because what is necessitated is freedom.

Where, it may be asked, does Jesus say anything like this? He does not, of course, say it in this intellectual, analytical fashion which is characteristic of our dualist tradition. I have thrown it into this form because his own way of saying it depends for understanding upon our ability to use our own mode of apprehension to get beyond it. But if we will only

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stop trying to translate the sayings of Jesus into "ethical" injunctions and see them as statements about the nature of the personal world in which we live we shall find that this is one of his most constant themes. "They that take the sword shall perish with the sword," is an excellent example. The ethical idealist, by reformulating it to read, "The use of violence is immoral," completely destroys its plain meaning. I should myself translate it into our current mode of thought in the form, "The will to power is self-defeating." I suspect, however, that the ethical pacifist would still maintain that the two statements have the same meaning. "The will to power is self-defeating" surely means that we ought not to use violence to secure our ends. This is not so. The two statements are practical contradictories. The ethical form implies that we "ought" to suppress our tendencies to impose our will by force. But I cannot do this without accepting the will to power in myself, and seeking to nullify its effects. Even if we succeed in achieving a full psychological repression of the will to power, so that it disappears from our consciousness, we have not got rid of it; we have merely achieved a self-deception. The repressed will to power is still self-defeating. If we act on the ethical maxim we merely turn the will to power against itself. It is not the use of power to achieve our ends that is self-defeating but our will to power. It is only by using power that any end can be achieved. The will to power is the intention to use power as a means to achieving power. It is power that is intended, not the end; and since power is the conception of means, it cannot be an end. This is why the will to power is necessarily self-defeating. It is self-contradictory. We parade the means as the end in order to

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avoid having any end in consciousness; in order to achieve the means of doing something without knowing what it is that we mean to do. When the will to power finds itself frustrated in its efforts to achieve superiority over other people it turns inwards and tries to achieve superiority over itself. "Self-control" becomes its ideal, and the effort to achieve it is the effort to achieve self-frustration. It demands a self divided against itself, negating itself. This reminds us of another formulation of the central principle by Jesus: "If a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand." We might call this the Law of Contradiction in the field of action, of which the logical Law of Contradiction is the reflection in the field of thought.

This seems to me to be the fatal error in moral pacifism. It confuses the will to power with the use of power. In refusing to use power it refuses to act. But this is not possible for an agent except by acting against action, and so attempting to destroy himself by defying his own nature. He may indeed succeed in destroying himself; but in doing so he destroys finally the motive which drove him to self-destruction. The hallmark of the will to power is its inversion of means and end. Power is by definition that which is always means and never end. To make power an end is simply to refuse to use power as a means—to refuse to look beyond the means to an end which determines its use. We can then dress up this refusal to accept our own nature as responsible agents in high-sounding religious or ethical terminology. We can pretend to the humble position of servants of a divine purpose which is too deep for our limited understanding. We may profess belief in a mysterious power working for righteousness which will take care of the future without any help

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from us; or, more prosaically, we may assert that if we all pursue our own immediate interest intelligently, then the greatest good of the greatest number will be the result—by what magic we do not inquire. Yet all this is merely the effort to escape responsibility. It is moral cowardice masquerading as “faith”.

“They that take the sword shall perish with the sword.” “Whosoever will save his life shall lose it.” These two statements have an identical meaning, and it is a plain meaning. We are workers as God is a worker. This is our nature as human beings. The worker *spends* his life in creation by realizing his intentions in the world. This spending of our life is our life. We have no other. If then we refuse to be workers; if, instead, we insist on *saving* our lives, on being worked for—whether by others or by God—we negate our own nature and lose our own lives. Everything we do with this end in view will be a failure. What we achieve will not be *our* achievement for it will not have realized *our* intention. If our end is to save and not to spend our lives, then when we come to die, as we must, we shall find that we have never lived. The purpose which has animated our lives has defeated itself. What has been accomplished by our lives has not been *our* deed.

It is the stupidity of this process of self-stultification which Jesus recognizes and condemns—the folly of the man who built his house on sand, refusing to look to the obvious consequences of his behaviour; the folly of the virgins who ignored the consequences of not taking oil for their lamps; the folly of the man who said, “Soul, thou hast much goods laid up for many years. Take thine ease.” To him the voice said, “Thou fool! this night thy soul shall be required of thee.” And it is

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worth noting, in this connexion, the remark of St. Paul to the Galatians, "Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap," which expresses another aspect of the same law. Men destroy themselves by their refusal to live by their own nature. They will not be themselves, so they destroy themselves. "This is the condemnation, that light is come, and men prefer darkness." They turn from understanding and cling to mystery. They reject knowledge and put their trust in what they call "faith". For what Jesus meant by faith was the courage that acts by understanding and so overcomes all obstacles. "Why are ye so fearful?" he says. "How is it that ye have no faith?" But our dualism makes of faith its opposite—an irrational assertion of something that we do not understand; a will to believe in mystery which is in itself the manifestation of fear.

This then is the principle by which Jesus understands the nature of human freedom and its relation to the intention of God in history, which is the nature of reality. God acts in history as Creator of Man. The intention of this creation is known—a universal community of persons, with freedom and equality as its structural principles of relationship. Clearly such a relation is not possible unless *Man* wills it, because the structure of human relationship is the expression of human intentions. If God is to create a free and equal humanity, then Man must intend a free and equal humanity. God's action in history must then be the creation in Man of the effective intention to realize universal freedom and equality; and since God cannot fail to realize his own intention, this will to community is necessitated. But if man is to be free to will freedom, he must be free to reject it. How then can it be neces-

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sary for man to accept freedom as his own intention? This is the crux of the problem.

The answer which is embodied in the teaching of Jesus is that man's rejection of freedom is necessarily self-frustrating. In rejecting freedom man rejects himself, and negates himself. The rejection sets him in opposition to reality and isolates him from reality. But this cannot change his nature. He is a part of reality and he must act as a person, deliberately. What follows? He becomes a divided being, a house divided against itself. He has taken the sword. He has built his house on sand. He tries to be above reality, and sinks below it. He seeks to be master and achieves his own slavery. He exalts himself and is abased. He justifies himself and in the act condemns himself. Trying to save his life, he loses it. In a word, by rejecting freedom and equality as the basis of human relationship, man commits himself to dualism. And dualism means the war in Man's soul, a perpetual civil war within himself, within his societies, which frustrates all his intentions and destroys him.

But, it may be asked, may not this rejection go on for ever, and result in the final destruction of man by man? No. This is impossible. The negative will can never destroy the positive will, since it is sustained by the positive. The will to community is the real will of Man; its rejection is unreal. It is only by simulating the real will that the unreal can operate at all. The negation is necessarily limited, or it would result in immediate suicide. It is true—and highly significant—that men can and do commit suicide. It is equally significant that the proportion of men who do so is small, and can be predicted statistically within a small margin of error, for any society. Suicide is abnormal.

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It cannot become the rule. But suicide is an individual act, in the strictest sense of the term; while man is social. The governing factor is the social dualism, and it is in social action that the impossibility of man's self-destruction shows itself most evidently. In society the refusal of freedom can only take the form of a denial of equality, and the establishing of class-distinction. The whole of a society may desire to escape from the responsibility of work; but not the whole of society can succeed in escaping. The majority of the members of any society must be a working class. There is a limit to the size of the leisured class, and the limit tends to decrease as the struggle to achieve power progresses. That the claim to service and superiority by which an upper class lives is self-defeating we have seen. We must now notice that it cannot result in the destruction of society. For, though the working class cannot be dispensed with, the leisured class can. It is, from the point of view of society as a whole, pointless and superfluous. Moreover its own demand for superiority must produce, in those it treats as inferiors, the demand for freedom and equality; and so it negates itself by achieving what it denies—the intention of God as a human intention. To exist at all, the “superior” class must maintain the *unity* of the society it rules (or imagines it rules) while denying the basis of unity, which is equality and freedom. This it cannot *really* do. It can only achieve it *apparently* by a process of deception; either deceiving itself in the process of deceiving the people, or more dangerously, when self-deception is no longer possible, by deliberately deceiving the people. In either case the result must sooner or later unmask the deceit, through the inevitable frustration which dogs the footsteps of any attempt to

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act contrary to the nature of things. The "upper" class, which is the negative, can only frustrate itself. It cannot frustrate humanity. This, indeed, is what is recognized in the penetrating assertion of Karl Marx that democracy is the essence and truth of *every* form of political constitution; and it is implicit in ordinary democratic phraseology. Do we not contrast in the political field, the rulers with the *people*; and in the economic field, masters with *men*?

The immediate application of this principle for Jesus is to the position of the Jewish people in the Roman Empire. It is indeed this historic situation which has finally revealed to Jesus himself the full scope of God's purpose for man; and the discovery itself is the solution of the problem which the situation presents. It was in Adam, not in Abraham, that Man fell; and the intention of God is the salvation not of Israel, but of Man. The call of Abraham and God's covenant with Abraham are bound up with the prophetic promise, "In thee shall *all families of the earth* be blessed." The whole world is to be redeemed through the Jews. Their history is the story of the revelation of the intention of God and the laws of his action in human history. With the completion of this revelation comes the call to the Jewish people to accept the will of God as their own, and to act as the "light to lighten the nations". What did this mean in the contemporary situation for Jesus and his people? It meant, in the first place, that they should not take up arms against Rome. "They that take the sword shall perish with the sword." The Jews, placed by God in the Roman world, as a small province of the pagan empire, must renounce the will to power, and with it all their dreams of national exclusiveness and imperialism.

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Their own salvation lies through the salvation of the world. The meek shall inherit the earth—not imperial Rome, which will lose its life in the effort to defend it. Does this mean that they must accept the Roman Empire and help to maintain it? On the contrary. The principle on which the Roman Empire is based is the negation of the will of God for man. The fact of the Roman power they must accept, for the moment, since it is the will of God for the moment. But they must negate the intention of the Roman Empire. In this world of the Roman dominion they must live for the kingdom which is not of this world, and yet is already there as the reality of human life and realized in the hearts of those who will make it their own. “Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s.” That is the principle on which the Jews should act. In that way they would remain co-workers with God in history. Cæsarism with its will to power must destroy itself; yet in destroying itself it will achieve, against its own will, the purpose of God—a universal community embracing the world, based on equality and freedom. And this—which Rome would achieve in spite of itself—would be the realization of the Jewish intention, immanent in the Roman Empire. So the meek should inherit the earth.

This, it seems, is the real substance of what is called the “apocalyptic” element in the teaching of Jesus. There seems to me to be very little ground for thinking that Jesus expected in the near future a catastrophic intervention by God, of a miraculous kind, by which the kingdom of heaven would be established. That the early church misunderstood him in this way is possible, though not, I think, proven. That Jesus thought so

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himself is a view that runs directly counter to the whole tenor of his life and teaching. In particular, it presupposes a dualistic view of the world; and, as we have seen, the characteristic of the religious mind in general, and of the mind of Jesus in particular, is its repudiation of dualism. On the other hand, it is easy to understand how a dualistic interpretation of the teaching of Jesus must tend to such a conclusion; so that the fact that our own dualistic theology has come largely to accept this view of Jesus' attitude to the future need not surprise us.

There is more to be said for the view that Jesus expected the internal disruption of the Roman Empire to happen much more quickly than it did; and that he expected that the self-destruction of Rome would lead to the final establishment of a universal society based on equality and freedom. Yet there is direct evidence that he would have considered such a judgement as at best only probable, and not certain. His principle of interpretation does not demand such a speedy resolution of the problem of human self-realization. It does demand that the self-frustration of Rome should result in the establishment of a form of society which is, relatively to the Roman Empire, more human, and less thoroughly opposed to the intention of God. In other words, as we shall see in a moment, the idea of progress is implicit in Jesus' principle of interpretation. But it is plain that Jesus concerned himself greatly with the question of time, and recognized the importance, in action, of considering *when* to act, and *when* to expect the realization of his purposes. "My time is not yet come" is a familiar and characteristic statement of his. But with regard to the coming of the kingdom he continually emphasizes the impossibility of prediction.

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"Watch," he says, "for ye know neither the day nor the hour wherein the Son of man cometh." And when asked point-blank, "When shall these things be?" he replies, "Of that day and hour knoweth no man; no, not the angels of heaven, but my Father only." In the face of such explicit repudiation of any capacity to predict how long the process of the establishment of the kingdom would take it seems to me quite unreasonable to suppose that Jesus believed it would necessarily be in the near future. He may have hoped this; he may have thought it probable. He must have desired it. But I do not see how he could so far have forgotten his own central position as to assert it. His grasp of the laws of action is too sure for that. He possesses in too full a measure that sanity of outlook which refuses to allow hope to pose as knowledge or desire to outrun judgement.

There are two ideas which express part of the driving force of Christianity in the history of Europe, and which have their origin in the teaching of Jesus, which belong to the "apocalyptic" aspect of his teaching in the same way as the ideas of love, freedom and equality belong to the "ethic". They are the ideas of "common humanity" and of "progress". The direction of effort in European history which these ideas represent has its origin in the life and teaching of Jesus.

The idea of a common humanity is implicit in the Jewish consciousness. It is significant that the Hebrew Scriptures begin with the creation of man, and carefully trace the genealogy of their own patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob backwards to Adam, the father of the whole human race. This in itself places the history of their own people in a universal setting, and already implies that "God has made of one blood all nations

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of men". Perhaps even more interesting in this connexion is the story of the tower of Babel. This myth shows the Hebrew mind taking for granted the primordial unity of mankind and demanding an explanation of the diversity of peoples and languages. It is the differences that separate mankind into hostile groups of people who cannot understand one another that seems to need explaining; and characteristically the explanation is in terms of a rebellion against God—an intention of man's to make himself superior to the judgement of God. The diversity of peoples is, then, a punishment for sin; and this implies that the redemption from sin must restore the broken unity and recreate mankind as a single community.

In asserting common humanity as the only true basis of human society, Jesus is again making clear and explicit what is implicit in the consciousness of his own people. He recalls to his contemporaries instances from their own history in which Jewish prophets were sent on missions of healing to Gentiles, in order to vindicate his own call to the Jewish people to accept its mission to the whole of mankind. In teaching "the brotherhood of Man" Jesus is not offering something new. The brotherhood of man is the teaching of the first two chapters of the book of Genesis. What is new in the teaching of Jesus is again that he lifts the fact of human brotherhood to the level of intention. That all men are of one blood as the children of Adam is mere fact. What matters is the restoration of this unity of fact at the level of personality, as matter of intention. St. Paul puts this neatly by saying, "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." It is the resurrection of the original community of mankind that is the work of Jesus. The separation of peoples,

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with its nationalism, racial exclusiveness and claims of superiority is an expression of the refusal of man to will his own nature. It makes no difference to the *fact* that mankind is a unity. The existing diversity of exclusive groups exhibits man's estrangement from himself, his denial of the truth about himself. To accept the truth is to intend the unity of mankind and so to re-establish it as the expression of a human will which has become reconciled to the will of God; it is to make this the goal of human activity. For the religious consciousness, with its unity of theory and practice, the assertion of such a truth is a call to action. Jesus' proclamation of the community of mankind is primarily a call to his own people to accept as their mission, for which in the purpose of God their whole history had been a preparation, the task of breaking down the exclusive nationalism and racialism of the world, and becoming the means of the unification of mankind. It is this that St. Paul expresses when he says that in Christ "there is neither Greek nor Jew, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free".

The idea of progress is perhaps even more characteristically Christian than the other ideas we have traced to their origin in the teaching of Jesus, which gives its mature expression to the Jewish mind. We should note in the first place that the notion of progress is totally foreign to the Greek mind and to the Roman. For both, the ideal of life is stability and permanence, and the idea of perfection is inseparable from the idea of changelessness. The major premiss of all Greek thought may be put in the form "The Good is that which does not change". The world is infected with unreality and evil *because* it is in process of change. "Becoming" is the *opposite* of "being" and "being"

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is reality. For the Greek thinkers, therefore, the very idea of change is excluded from the essence of the divine; and the life of God is a life of eternally changeless contemplation of the eternally changeless. In this we see the apotheosis of leisure—the ideal of aristocracy. God is the opposite of a worker. The dualism of theory and practice rejects practice and idealizes the theoretical life. To this ideal human life can only approximate even at its best. The element of evil in the world, which frustrates all efforts to achieve complete stability, makes it impossible even for the most fortunate and gifted of aristocrats to escape from the necessities of the practical life. The social meaning of this ideal finds its classical expression in the *Republic* of Plato. In that fairest and falsest of all Utopias we have a record of the most uncompromising effort to imagine a perfect society on the assumption that perfection means changelessness. Plato sees the vision of the perfect corporative state, hierarchically organized under the absolute dictatorship of the perfect philosopher, supported by a military caste trained to obedience, courage and self-sacrifice on behalf of the State. The unquestioning loyalty of the military caste is assured by a long process of education designed to produce and select men and women in whom the very impulse to change their minds or their habits has been eliminated, and who have proved their capacity to “hold fast the true opinion” which they have been taught, under all temptations. The family has disappeared, because it will generate lesser loyalties and so lead to disruption and change. Novelty in ideas, in songs, in games, in religion is ruthlessly excluded. There is no place for the artist at all in this perfect city, because the artist is the seeker after what is new,

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the enemy of the eternal changelessness of truth. The working population, which must, alas, form the basis of the most leisure-loving society, is to be won over to an acceptance of its lot by bribery and propaganda. The accumulation of wealth is to be theirs alone. The upper classes are to live hard and communally. And the rulers will tell the "noble falsehoods" which will convince the workers that their greatest good lies in accepting the functions assigned to them by the wisdom of the rulers.

Plato himself is sceptical of the possibility of realizing such a community in the actual world. He sees two great obstacles. The first is that only his ideal philosopher could establish and rule it; yet the philosopher could only be prevailed upon to bear rule under constraint. For ruling is a practical task, and the dualism between theory and practice is at its maximum in Plato's ideal man. The philosopher who alone could rule, must desire above all things the life of pure contemplation. In other words the ideal is in its very nature antagonistic to the necessities of the practical life. It is only realizable in *another* world—the world of Ideas. In the second place, even if by some miracle such a society could be established in the world, it would fall a prey to the processes of change, and deteriorate from generation to generation. Indeed Plato describes in detail how this necessity of degeneration will operate, producing in turn four forms of society, each worse than its predecessor, of which the second last is democracy and the last the dissolution of democracy in tyranny.

We can see, then, how impossible it is for the Greek dualism, with its idealization of reflection, even to think the idea of progress. A form of consciousness

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which equates change with evil or unreality is debarred from considering the possibility of a process of change which is in principle a change for the better. The pragmatic attitude of the Roman mind, which throws the emphasis on the other side of the dualism, is, however, in no better case. It is indeed concentrated on practice, and this concentration involves it in a process of expanding activity. Its special ability lies in the solution of practical problems as they arise, and the successful solution of one problem merely provides another of a wider scope to solve. But since it is a dualistic consciousness, it is cut off from the determination of human ends to be realized in action. Its action is, as it were, driven from behind, not drawn forwards by the vision of a future good to be achieved. The Roman mode of consciousness tends to despise reflection as the Greek tends to despise practice. Consequently its ends are negative. It can intend the maintenance and the extension of power; but the use of power for positive, creative human ends lies beyond its scope. At the most it can aim at the negative goal of keeping the peace. All this is summed up in the well-known lines of Virgil:

*Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.
Hae tibi erunt artes, pacisque imponere morem
Parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.*

This practical ideal of imposing peace by force and maintaining peace by tolerance to those who submit means, of course, the maintaining of "superiority" against the threat of a rebellion of "inferiors". It is the perfect expression of the will to power of a dualist society. And there is in it no room for the idea of

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progress, which would involve spending power for the achievement of human ends.

The contrast between the Greek and Roman social achievements is a contrast of opposites at the same level. Both are dualist societies, subject to the opposition of spiritual and material ideals. The Greek sacrifices the material to the spiritual; the Roman sacrifices the spiritual to the material. In the social field this means that the Greek clings to the natural community of which the family is the type, in which the bonds of unity are spiritual bonds, based upon personal intercourse and direct co-operation. But he can only achieve this in a very small community which defends itself against the rest of mankind by an intense exclusiveness and conservatism. He has to sacrifice universality to emotional unity. The Roman, on the other hand, sacrifices inner unity to universality, and achieves an empire based upon the external pressure of law and administration, backed by force. Each is destroyed by what it has excluded—the Greek world by its incapacity to combine into a larger national group; the Roman by the lack of cultural cohesion.

Over against both stands the inherent purpose of the Hebrew mind—the effort to achieve a universal family, which becomes fully explicit in Jesus. It is precisely the absence of dualism in the Hebrew mind which necessitates the unity of the two elements which Greece and Rome separate—the universal empire which is not a family and the family society of the City-State which cannot become universal. And in this Jewish conception of the universal family there is immanent the notion of progress. For it starts from the existence of the small family group, which is the basic form of human society, and conceives the extension of this type

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of unity until it embraces all mankind. Between these extreme limits there must be stages in the process of extension, each of which will mark a step forward towards the ultimate goal. This conception, however, is not enough to constitute the full idea of progress. For that it is necessary that the achievement of the universal family should be the intention of action. One makes progress towards the realization of an intention, and not otherwise. Now we have seen that the creation of the universal family of mankind is for Jesus the intention of God's action in history, and that its achievement depends upon its becoming the intention of man in history. It is only from this standpoint, only therefore from the Jewish or religious standpoint, that the course of human history can be seen as a *progress* towards a goal. It is only in action that there can be progress, and the measure of progress is the intention of action. Therefore the idea of human progress is only possible if human history is conceived as a single action which is realizing an intention. And to think history as an action is to think a universal agent—that is to say, God—whose act history is, and whose intention determines the course of history. The reconciliation of man with God is possible only through the discovery and the adoption by man of God's intention. Those who so become co-workers with God can then see history as the realization of a human intention, and themselves as making progress towards its realization. Thus it is clear that the idea of progress can have no other origin than the Jewish one, and that it is an essentially Christian conception which can have no rational basis save in a religious consciousness of the world. A dualistic consciousness is debarred by its very nature from conceiving progress as a general

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idea applicable to history as a whole.

To avoid misunderstanding of this important issue it is necessary to point out that it is a complete confusion to identify progress and evolution, as the idealism of the last century has done. Evolution is a natural process of development. It is an extension of the principle of growth beyond the life of the individual so that it includes the succession of generations. Now growth is not action; it is not something we do, but something that happens to us. In other words it is unintentional. Jesus himself draws attention to this characteristic of natural development when he asks, "Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature?" Progress, on the contrary, depends upon taking thought. It is a characteristic of intentional activity which is successful in moving towards a determined goal. Moreover, evolution is a process of differentiation and complication. It results in the differentiation of species from a primitive simple organism. True, it maintains a functional unity of relationship between the types which it differentiates; but it is a unity which is displayed just as well in the relation of the lion and the lamb, or in the parasite and its victim as in any of the pleasanter forms of organic co-operation. Progress, on the other hand, involves an intentional co-operation of different individuals for the achievement of a common end. It achieves unity by overcoming differences, and harmony by resolving discords. An evolution of humanity would involve a differentiation of human groups and an increasing complexity in their structure. But it would be just as fully exhibited in the complication and intensification of struggle and warfare between them as in the establishment of an effective League of Nations. More so,

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indeed, since the establishment of a League of Nations could only be the result of an intentional and deliberate effort.

The confusion of the idea of progress with the idea of evolutionary development is characteristic of the failure of our contemporary modes of thought to escape from dualism. When progress is thought as an ideal good which is being produced by the process of history it ceases to be an intention in action. The process itself, being separated from our own intentionality, seems to us to be independent of ourselves and to have nothing to do with human action. It seems to happen to us, and not through us, just as the growth of our bodies does. That we think of progress at all shows the extent of the influence of Christianity upon us. That we think it as a natural process of evolution shows how far we still are from any adequate comprehension of Christianity.

With this recognition of the source of the conception of progress in the teaching of Jesus, our present purpose is completed. The content of the conception, with its combination of steady growth, the intermixture and resistance of evil, and the elimination of evil by crisis, is clearly and familiarly stated in such parables as those of the Sower, of the Mustard-seed and of the Wheat and Tares. Our effort has been directed towards clarifying the intention which defines Christianity as a continuous act in history; and the crux of that effort is the discovery of the intention which defines the action of Jesus upon the world, of which Christianity is the continuation. The main obstacle we have had to overcome is the dualism of our own social tradition and the consequent dualism of our own traditional modes of thought. Our success, both

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in exposition and in understanding must be measured by the extent to which we have escaped from this dualistic attitude to the world. It would be idle to hope that we have escaped entirely from our own dualism. It is too deeply ingrained in our modes of expression as well as in our habits of behaviour. But we can hope that we have succeeded to the point of understanding, in general terms, what a satisfactory understanding of Christianity must involve.

We have seen how Jesus completes the process of Hebrew reflection upon history, which is the cultural aspect of Hebrew society. As a religious reflection it aims at discovering the intention of God by understanding its own historic experience as the act of God. "Why has God done this to his people?" is the universal form of the prophetic question. And the universal answer is, "Because of sin; because the purpose of the people has diverged¹ from the purpose of God." Because this Hebrew reflection is religious, it never can aim at knowledge for its own sake; but only for the sake of action. The prophetic insight is always a call to return to the will of God. It defines the true intention for the people and demands its acceptance and the repentance or rethinking which is a condition of its acceptance.

The gradual deepening of the Hebrew insight into the nature of history as the act of God found its complete expression in Jesus. This expression is complete, not in the sense that there is nothing to add to it—Jesus himself repudiated this notion—but in the sense that it has reached the stage at which the question, "What is the intention of God in history?" can at last be answered with complete universality and objectivity. Jesus has discovered the structural law of the

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action of reality in human experience. He has brought into human consciousness, in the form of rational knowledge, the real nature of human life, and the law of its relation to the nature of reality as a whole. The result of this is that it is now possible for men to adopt as their own intention, universally, the intention of God for man, and to seek to realize it. Further, since the intention of God for man is necessarily man's *real* intention—the intention which expresses his real nature as part of the world—its acceptance unifies human action and integrates human nature. Its rejection, on the other hand, sets man in opposition to himself, and leads to self-destruction; and this resistance itself bears witness to the truth and necessitates the victory of the truth.

But again we must remind ourselves that the "revelation of God in Christ" is not the expression of dualist reflection, seeking knowledge for its own sake. It is the inner or reflective aspect of a deliberate action upon the world of his own time. Jesus sees these general principles, as we should call them, embodied in the situation in which he and his people find themselves. In the Roman Empire he sees the act of God creating a universal community and inserting the Jewish people like a leaven into it. What is being accomplished in this way is not the intention of the Romans; but the Roman will to imperialism works, according to the law of self-negation, for the achievement of its opposite. If, then, the Jewish people will accept their historic position in the Roman Empire, and in that position will act in the line of the true intention of God, intending a universal community of mankind based on love, freedom and equality, and negating in action the imperial claim to superiority and rulership, then of

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necessity the Roman will to power will destroy itself, and the community which has remained faithful to the real intention of history will fall heir to the universal society which the act of Rome has produced, and will transform it into the kingdom of heaven. The leaven will leaven the whole lump. The meek will inherit the earth.

And if the Jews refuse to accept the mission and reject it and him, what then? The intention of God will still fulfil itself. The law of self-negation will work in the Jewish nation. The Jews will be driven into rebellion against Rome and they will be destroyed. As it becomes clear that he will be rejected by his own people this note becomes prominent in the teaching of Jesus. The most poignant expression of it is perhaps his lament over Jerusalem, which ends, "Behold your house is left unto you desolate." But there remains the little band of his disciples who have accepted him. They become the bearers of the intention to establish the kingdom—"the true Israel" as St. Paul phrases it—the salt of the earth; the city set on the hill which cannot be hid. Those chosen ones—his *ecclesia* or "church"—will remain in the Roman Empire, and will emerge victorious. They will be rejected, persecuted and hunted down, yet "the gates of Hell shall not prevail" against them.

Looking back upon this proclamation from the vantage-point of our own time we can see with what a clear insight Jesus foresaw the destruction and scattering of his own people, the persecution of his disciples—the Christians—by the Roman Empire, their multiplication in numbers in spite of persecution, the failure of every effort to stamp them out, the ultimate dissolution of the Roman Empire by its own inherent contra-

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diction, and the creation of Mediæval Christendom upon its ruins by the Christian Church.

There is no need to object that Mediæval Christendom was, after all, no kingdom of heaven, and that in its turn it was destroyed by its own inherent dualism. That is true, but irrelevant. It is a matter of "times and seasons", and no man can say *when* the kingdom will come. To take this as proving that Jesus was mistaken in thinking that the self-destruction of the Roman Empire would be immediately followed by the final realization of the kingdom of heaven on earth is to be deceived by our own dualism, which seeks knowledge of the future for its own sake. The principle which Jesus has discovered is applicable to all situations, as a principle of interpretation for the guidance of action. It has no valid religious meaning except in application; and it can only be applied in the field of action, which is the present. Jesus applied it to the world of his time and so defined a direction of action for his own disciples which carried as far as the solution of the problem offered by what he called "this world"—the world of the Imperium Romanum. The world which followed it, and which would be built by his disciples, might be the final realization of the true human society. If not, it would be a stage in the progress of humanity towards it. If it were not the true kingdom, then the same principles would apply to the interpretation of that world and would guide his followers in their action within it for the fulfilment of another stage of progress. But to look beyond the contemporary world and the solution of the problem of action it contained would not merely have been impossible for Jesus. It would have been the negation of his own meaning. It would have been to desert the

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empiricism of the religious consciousness, to separate theory and practice, and launch into empty speculation for the satisfaction of idle curiosity. It would have been to cease to be a prophet and to become a clairvoyant.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROGRESS OF EUROPE

THE ROMAN EMPIRE

THERE is clearly a very great difference between Christianity as we have now defined it, and Christianity as exemplified by the various Christian Churches of Europe—at least since Christianity was adopted as the official religion of the Roman Empire. If our interpretation of the mind and intention of Jesus is correct, even in general principle, then European religion has transformed Christianity into something very unlike itself. On the other hand, there must be *some* relation between Christianity and the various religions of Europe, and it is essential to attempt to understand how this change has been brought about. It is to this task that we must now address ourselves.

The general principle of the transformation we have already discovered; since we found that in order to understand Christianity we had to make the difficult effort to escape from the effects of the transformation upon ourselves. The transformation is the result of thinking Christianity in dualistic terms. European society has been a dualistic society, with the distinction of upper and lower classes embodied in its accepted structure. Consequently the mode of European consciousness has been dualist, and its efforts to under-

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stand and adapt Christianity to its traditional forms of life have involved a dualistic interpretation. This is our clue to the understanding of European progress, provided that we ourselves have escaped sufficiently from the dualism to use it properly. We shall misuse it if we forget that Christianity is the act of Jesus upon the world, and that the substance of Christianity remains embodied in the life of Europe whatever interpretation we give it. Christianity remains itself, as the intention to realize the universal community which is the reality of human life. That intention, which comes from the Hebrew culture, is embedded like leaven in the races of Europe, and works as a ferment in them. It is untrue to claim that any or all of our European religions *are* Christianity. But it is equally untrue to claim that they are something quite other than Christianity. After all, Europe did take its religion from the Jews. Christianity did destroy the older religions of pagan Europe. If European society has yet maintained its dualism of social structure and of conscious reflection, it has maintained it by an effort of resistance to the pressure of Christianity which has entered into it, and which it can neither eject nor absorb. Nothing else can possibly explain the continuity of European history through the succession of social upheavals and revolutions which mark the stages of its progress. Christianity created the unity of Europe and has maintained its unity through a process of development and expansion which has now enveloped the whole world.

After the death of Jesus, the small body of disciples who remained faithful to his intention and who proceeded to carry on his mission was a Jewish group, and the tendency to look upon itself as a Jewish sect was the cause of the earliest debates in the Christian com-

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munity. But this reactionary tendency was quickly overcome, and the true understanding of their mission prevailed. The missionary journeys of St. Paul had the effect of making the new movement in fact, as well as in intention, international. It cannot have been long before the non-Jewish Christians in the Roman Empire outnumbered the Jewish Christians. It would seem that St. Paul deliberately aimed at establishing a Christian community in Rome itself, at the centre of the Empire, and the character and the length of his *Epistle to the Romans* bears witness to the importance which this church had in his eyes, at the strategic centre of the Roman world. Yet it is in this epistle that he rejects most eloquently any tendency to belittle the importance of the Jewish origin of the gospel and of the continuity of the Hebrew culture with the new Christian movement. For some time, no doubt, the primacy of the mother church in Jerusalem was recognized; but the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus in A.D. 70 must have put an end to any lingering tendency to look upon Palestine as the natural home of Christians and Jews alike. Half a century after the death of Jesus Christianity was already a scattered community of men and women mainly from the lower classes, permeating the Roman Empire, predominantly non-Jewish, recognizing no barriers of nationality, race or class, waiting for the destruction of the Roman Empire and the establishing of the kingdom of heaven in its place, and seeking meanwhile to live communally in accordance with the principles of the kingdom as Jesus had expounded them. The first stage of the permeation of Europe by Christianity had begun, with Rome as its centre.

But if Christianity was in this fashion cut off from

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its home in Palestine, so were the Jews. Even earlier the process had begun which was to scatter the Jews throughout the Roman Empire and the Western world which continues the Roman Empire. The difference lies in the fact that the Jewish permeation of Europe was an unwilling one. The Jewish rejection of Christianity was a rejection of their own reality, and brought into play, as Jesus had foreseen, the law of self-frustration. Their determination to maintain an exclusive nationalism, and to sustain their own will to power, achieved its opposite. They refused to accept the call to become, of their own intention, immanent in the world as the true community—the nucleus of the kingdom of heaven. As a result, their refusal achieved, in spite of themselves, the immanence it rejected. Thus the Hebrew culture was brought into the substance of European life in a double form. It appears as two communities, neither of which is a society in the accepted European sense, because in neither case is the unity maintained by material forces. Both the Christian Church and the Jews are religious unities, *in* the European world but not *of* it, which cannot be assimilated to the structure of European society, and which are driven, whether by their own intention or against it, towards the universalizing of the type of humanity they represent; towards the destruction of the form of human life in which they are immanent. Yet the Christian community is the result of the acceptance by Gentiles of the inner significance of the Hebrew culture, and the Jewish community is the result of its rejection by the Hebrews themselves. What the two communities have in common—a principle of human unity which transcends the unity-principle of the general society in which they are embedded—sets them

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in opposition to the world of which they form a part. Within that common principle they stand in dialectical opposition to one another, negating one another. Both are immanent in Europe while transcending it. The "problem" of Christianity and the "problem" of the Jews are thus fundamentally the same problem, and neither can be solved except in the solution of the general problem of human community.

The persecution of Christians and, to a lesser extent, of Jews by the Romans can only be explained on the assumption that this difference was felt as a threat to the existence of the Empire. For in matters of religion it was the continuous policy of the Roman Empire to manifest as complete a tolerance as was compatible with the security of the state. Rome welcomed, in the imperial city, all the religions of the Empire, and was moved to regulation of their practices only in cases such as those connected with some of the orgiastic Eastern cults which became a public scandal. But in Christianity and in Jewish religion there was nothing which could produce an affront to public morals, rather the contrary. Yet it was precisely in respect of Christians and Jews that the Roman policy of tolerance broke down. It is significant that the persecution of the Christians was specially severe under the Emperor Marcus Aurelius—who was both an able ruler and a sincere moralist. In Aurelius we see Stoicism and Christianity in conflict, and the universality of the Stoic social ethic finding in Christianity a universalism which was a threat to its own. The accusation of disloyalty to the Empire had a real basis in fact. That the Christians were plotting for the overthrow of the Empire was, of course, untrue; but that they looked for the destruction of the Empire, and that the form of life

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they demanded was incompatible with the structure of the Empire, was undeniable. The spread of Christianity among the working class of the Roman world must certainly destroy the basis of Roman supremacy. And the most sensitive of the Roman Emperors recognized that either Rome must eradicate Christianity or Christianity would destroy Rome.

Yet in destroying the Roman Empire Christianity saved the Roman achievement. It is only if we identify Rome with the ruling class in the Roman Empire that we can say that Christianity destroyed Rome. The real achievement of Rome—which was not the actual intention of the ruling class—was carried over into Mediæval Europe, and this achievement was the act of the Christian Church. But in the process official Christianity fell a prey to dualism, by becoming first the official religion of the Roman Empire and subsequently the religion of European Christendom. It is important for us to gain some general understanding of this process; and for this purpose we must consider the two major factors in it, one of which is practical, and the other theoretical. The practical factor is the process which ended with the acceptance of power by the Christian Church as the “religion” of the Roman Empire. The theoretical is the Stoic transformation of Christian doctrine.

There exists, of necessity, in any dualist society, a negative identification of Christianity with the common people against the ruling class. The ideas of equality, freedom and common humanity, which we have traced to their source in the teaching of Jesus, indicate how inherent is democracy in Christianity. The real substance of any form of human society is to be found in the working people. The “superiority”

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of the ruling class is purely formal. But since the will to power in society embodies itself in the ruling class; since to maintain the form of dualist society is to maintain the privileged position of the ruling class, Christianity is always necessarily in opposition to the ruling class in any dualist society. For the defining intention of Christianity is consciously set against the will to power and against any form of dualism in society. On the other hand, the tension of classes which is inherent in the form of dualist society sets the common people in opposition to the ruling class, not necessarily, or even naturally, by the will of the common people. It is the self-negation of the will to power which forces the common people, in the long run, into active struggle against the ruling class; and such struggles, apart from the enlightenment which Christianity brings, are blind struggles, which both parties would wish to avoid, and of which the natural end is the self-destruction of the society in which they occur. Where the blind lead the blind, *both* fall into the ditch. It is not until the coming of Christianity into the Gentile world that these struggles lead to progress. It is, in fact, Christianity which saves the substance of societies which destroy themselves by dualism, and carries it over into the society which follows it in a higher form. The history of Europe is a continuity of progress and not a mere succession of unrelated societies precisely because the Christian intention of creating a universal community of equality and freedom is embodied in its substance.

But the struggle into which a working class is forced by the development of dualism may itself be dominated by the will to power. This is not "natural". The common people tend to claim, not superiority but equality; not power but freedom. Yet apart from the

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understanding of the real nature of personal reality, which is embedded in the Jewish influence, these struggles result, when they are successful, not in the achievement of freedom and equality, but in the destruction of the old dualism and the substitution of a new one. The struggle for power breaks out again within the ranks of the victorious popular forces. The new form of society so established involves more freedom and more equality in proportion to the extent to which the Christian intention and the Christian understanding has already transformed the mind and will of the people.

It is for these reasons that we must say that Christianity is always *negatively* identified with the common people in their struggle. Christianity, like the common people, is always in opposition to the ruling class. The cause of freedom and equality is always the Christian cause. The denial of the claim to superiority is of the essence of Christianity, and in society the claim to superiority is embodied in the existence of a "ruling class". Here again we must beware of our own dualism, or we shall take the claim to superiority as something merely theoretical. The real claim to superiority lies in the form of action; it is the practical intention to impose or maintain the social superiority of a class which constitutes the claim, not any theoretical assertion of superiority. There is thus no contradiction in the fact that Jesus maintains the equality of all persons or the brotherhood of man, and yet denounces and attacks the rich, the rulers and the Pharisees in such a scathing way, in the name of the poor and the oppressed. One cannot believe in equality without intending it in practice; and one cannot intend it without coming into open conflict with those who

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deny it and resist its achievement.

Yet where the will to superiority and the will to power make themselves felt in the struggle of a subject class or a subject people against their "superiors" Christianity must equally be opposed to that. Jesus offered himself to the common people as their leader against the oppressors. Yet he opposed the will to power in the people which would have taken him by force and made him king. He refused to accept the popular will to power directed against Rome. He would not be the leader of a rebellion of the Jewish people against the Empire. That indeed would have been to play the game of the Jewish ruling class that had accepted power from the Romans. It was not, as we have seen, that Jesus objected in principle to the use of power. He was quite prepared to whip the money-changers out of the temple. It was to the end to which power would have been directed that he objected. And his objection was not that it would have been an "evil" thing to do, in the sense of a dualist ethic; but that it would have defeated its own end. Its wrongness would have been its stupidity.

This has an immediate bearing upon what happened to Christianity in the Roman Empire. It was amongst the common people of the Empire, including the slave population, that Christianity spread. This was inevitable, because the Christian community offered a fellowship in which equality and freedom and humanity were actually achieved; in which distinctions of status and class and race were overcome. And it was a fellowship which was in principle opposed to the domination of the ruling class, as was manifestly declared in the persecution to which the rulers subjected it. The Christian community was the natural

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focus of all the suppressed human craving for a real human life. As the internal contradictions of the Roman will to power developed themselves through the long process of the decline of the Empire, the capacity of the ruling class to rule weakened, and the strength of the common people grew. The focus of the popular opposition lay in Christianity even although Christianity was a religious and not a merely political force. In the end the Roman Empire sought to save itself by an alliance with Christianity, which the Christian Church accepted. As a political expedient this bears a considerable resemblance to the adoption of a "National Socialism" by a ruling class in our own time. It is the attempt to save the form of a dualist society by a formal identification of the ruling class with the popular opposition to it; an effort to snatch victory out of defeat. But it involves a shift of power in society which is not a real transference of power to the people, and yet is only possible because it pretends to be precisely this. It was made possible because already the organization of the Church had developed dualist tendencies. It was possible for the rulers of the Empire to make an alliance with the rulers of the Church, an alliance between the "representatives" of the imperial power and the "representatives" of the spiritual power. This alliance involved the acceptance by the organized Church of the practical dualism which Jesus had repudiated, and Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire. This premature political triumph of Christianity did not mean the acceptance of the intention of Christianity by the Roman Empire, but the maintenance of the Roman power against the threat to its continued existence which Christianity contained within it. Consequently,

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from the side of the Church, it meant the achievement of a continuity of institutional development at the expense of negating its own significance. The Church denied the Christian intention by yielding to the will to power. The alliance could not prevent the fall of the Empire; it could only intensify the internal struggle which was destroying it and hasten the end. For instead of one will to power in the Empire there were now two, and their alliance could only conceal, it could not annul, the incompatibility between them. The alliance with official Christianity sealed the fate of the Roman Empire, and at the same time it created the new dualism of the spiritual and the temporal power which gives its form to Mediæval society.

We must next turn our attention to the theoretical side of the process by which Christianity fell a victim to dualism. We have represented the practical aspect of the process as the result of the acceptance of Christianity by Rome, and seen that it involved equally the acceptance of Rome by Christianity. This, of course, is only symbolically true. The step by which the Church became the official religion of the Empire was only the final and decisive step in a process which had been going on for a long time within the Church itself. In the same fashion we can represent the reflective side of the process by considering the production of a Christian theology as an officially accepted rule of faith, without going into the long process by which this was eventually achieved. On the practical side Christianity became dualist by accepting the Roman structure of law, organization and administration as the guarantee of the unity of the Church. On the theoretical side it fell into dualism by the acceptance of the thought-forms of Greek philosophy. In doing so it

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produced what is still known as Theology. Not merely the name but the very conception of theology is Greek. It is in fact the substantial title of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, the term metaphysics merely denoting the position of the book in the collected works of Aristotle as "following the Physics". The production of Theology is, in reality, the substitution of philosophy for prophecy, as the reflective moment in experience; and the difference between the two lies in the fact that in philosophy reflection is dissociated from action and becomes an end in itself. This, as we have seen, is the essence of the Greek form of dualism—the defining character of that mode of consciousness that we have called "contemplative".

Now the motive which sustains this mode of consciousness is the desire for the contemplative life—the life of leisure. But the material necessities of life forbid this and peremptorily drag men out of contemplation into action for their satisfaction. The problem of the contemplative man—or of the leisured class in society—is therefore to escape from the necessities of the practical life or to find some way of doing without work. This involves a tension and conflict between the "spiritual" and the "material" aspects of life, or between the body with its material demands which can only be satisfied by work, and the mind and its purely non-material, spiritual or contemplative intentions. Thus the body becomes the source of evil, the "tomb" of the soul, and the life of the spirit belongs to another world from which the soul is separated by its confinement in the body, and to which it can only find its way by being released from the body. In this way is generated the otherworldly consciousness, with its corollary of the immortality of the soul—a very

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different conception from the Christian idea of the resurrection of the body. The contemplative dualism expresses a hatred of the body and a desire to be rid of the body and the necessity of action it represents, in order to live a purely "spiritual" life. And since as a matter of fact action is the reality of human life, the contemplative ideal represents the desire to escape from real life into the life of imagination; to substitute ideas for realities as the objectives of human life, to be a contemplative, a looker-on and not a doer. It is significant that it is with this type of life that Jesus' parable of the man who built his house upon sand is concerned. It is directed explicitly to the man who *knows* without *doing*.

The purely spiritual life is necessarily an ideal, because it cannot under any circumstances be achieved, in "this" life, at least. Only an approximation is possible through the construction of a society in which a few choice spirits are set free from work at the expense of a working population which exists in order to maintain them in their leisure. The ideal man is necessarily the philosopher—"the contemplator", as Plato calls him, "of all time and all existence". But the fate that awaits dualism cannot be escaped. The dualism reappears within the life of knowledge as an opposition and conflict between the knowledge of existence and the knowledge of action. Philosophy divides into theoretical and practical. The unity of reflection and action which is expressed in prophecy is split up into two irreconcilable parts, ethics and cosmology. Now for a theist, since God is necessarily the Absolute Reality, cosmology and theology are the same. A true cosmology will be a theology. God, as the ultimate reality, will be the ultimate object of know-

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ledge, and the knowledge of reality will be the knowledge of God.

But the "God" who becomes in this way the supreme object of contemplation cannot himself be an agent, or else he cannot be good. If the ideal life is the life of contemplation, then the Divine life must be the absolute and eternal realization of this ideal. God must be the complete aristocrat, who expresses in his existence the complete escape from action. (For though it is untrue that man makes God in his own image, it is true that man imagines God as his own ideal.) God is then pure Spirit—the opposite and the antagonist of Matter; his activity is a purely spiritual activity. Then who or what is responsible for the material world? There are two cogent reasons why the answer must not be "God", a metaphysical one and an ethical one. If God is the Creator of the world, God is a doer whose activity is a material activity. If matter is evil, then to make God responsible for the material world is to make him the author of evil.

This dilemma of cosmology must have the effect of producing its own opposite—a pure materialism. For the dualism shuts God out of the material world, and the "theology" can only produce a theory of a purely "spiritual" world. We require a knowledge of *this* world, to which, indeed, by bodily necessity we belong. Thus dualism enters metaphysics and produces two opposing cosmologies—an ideal cosmology and a material cosmology—a theory of the "real" world and a theory of the "ideal" world. Idealism and Materialism are fundamentally contradictory, yet they necessitate one another, and the one is the shadow of the other. For they express the two sides of a humanity that is in contradiction with itself.

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The ethic which accompanies such a "theology" is equally involved in self-contradiction. For the ideal of the contemplative life expresses the desire to escape from action, and implies that ideally all action is bad. Consequently the contemplative consciousness does not wish to act, and at the most can only wish to understand action, not to do it. The question, "What ought I to *do*?" does not really arise, except by the compulsion of fate, and if it does the logical answer must be "Nothing". But no human being can seriously give such an answer. It would be a *reductio ad absurdum*. Dualism would cancel itself out if it were as objective as this. Instead it must answer, "Make the life of the body a means to the life of the mind. Keep the intention of action concentrated upon the ideal world. Let matter be subservient to spirit."

Now, in the first place, the form of ethics is itself a product of dualism. It is an attempt to "know" action, and it produces a *theory* of action. It aims therefore at a conception of "the Good". It produces an *ideal* of the good life. This ideal exists only in the mind. Yet the forces which determine human action do not determine this good life, and the motive forces which would determine the realization of this good life in action are wanting. There is thus a necessary opposition between the good life and the actual life. As St. Paul puts it, "The good that I would, I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do." Because action is material, and matter is the principle which is opposed to the good, the good life cannot be actual, and the actual life cannot be good. Ethics as the reflective knowledge of the good is purely ideal.

This ideal science of action is then not about real

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action at all. The knowledge it gives is not knowledge of how we actually behave. It is a theory of "ideal" action in an "ideal" world. It demands for its complement a theory of action which is a science of actual human behaviour, as it actually takes place. But this other knowledge of action will have nothing to do with good or evil, since they are "ideal". It must be an empirical science, for which action is so much observed fact and concerning which the only questions are questions of the causality which determines action. The result of the contemplative attitude to life is thus to produce a dual conception of conduct—an ethic which can set a standard of good, but which cannot explain how action in terms of it is possible; and as its necessary counterpart a deterministic psychology of behaviour which can explain how action is possible, but can find no room for any distinction between good and evil. Those two theories of action are contradictory, yet the one necessitates the other. In the field of ethics as in the field of cosmology the dualism of the form of life is reflected as an antinomy from which there is no escape. In both cases the reason for this is the same. The intention which produces the ethic or the cosmology is self-negating.

For the same reason ethic and cosmology are in contradiction with one another. For the Reality which is defined in the Cosmology is the ideal world of the contemplative consciousness—a world, that is to say, which could be the timeless object of contemplation. In such a world there would be no room for action. It would be a world of pure existence; a world which is always itself, eternally perfect and complete. The "goodness" of such a world is an æsthetic goodness. It consists in its timeless perfection and completeness in

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itself. In such a world there can be no action; since action in it would be an effort to change it, and any change would be evil which would destroy its perfection. Ethics, on the other hand, produces a theory of ideal action which would be good. Thus ethics and cosmology are in radical contradiction; the one demanding a world from which all action is excluded because action itself is evil; the other demanding a world of action which would be purely good. If ethics is possible cosmology must be false. If cosmology is true ethics must be impossible. Yet the ethics and the cosmology necessitate one another; and both have this in common, that they deny the substance of action, which is the realization of a spiritual intention in the material world. Both are theoretical, and intend only knowledge, not action.

So much for the form of ethics and the contradictions it contains. The substantial content of ethics also shows the effects of the dualism which produces it. The goodness or badness of action must be purely spiritual. They cannot be material. "Ethical" goodness must have no reference to practical success. It must reside in some inner quality or experience or effect or state of mind. It may be pleasure which is the criterion of good conduct, or virtue, or happiness, or knowledge or simply the good will itself. Yet all these different and competing conceptions of the good have one thing in common. They find the good in some attitude or state of mind, and not in the realization of an intention in the external world. They are indifferent to the success or failure of the action itself except in so far as it affects or issues from a mental condition. Even those forms of ethics which most strenuously assert that what makes an action good is the end actually achieved in action,

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are found to mean by the "end" something subjective like pleasure or knowledge or character, and never some change in the material world. Consequently they give rise to opposing theories which consider only the efficiency of action in "getting things done", but which can only do so by rejecting all ethical criteria in favour of a pure pragmatism. "Nothing is either good or bad but thinking makes it so." Ethical scepticism is the shadow and complement of ethical idealism.

Christian theology is the product, in the first instance, of an alliance in the theoretical field of Christian experience and Stoic philosophy. It has often been asserted that Stoicism was the mediating factor between Christianity and European thought; that the Stoic philosophy was a half-way house to Christianity, and paved the way for the acceptance of Christianity. Yet the opposite is the truth. Stoicism was the means by which Christianity was corrupted in Europe and side-tracked into dualism. For Stoicism is the most extreme and uncompromising form of dualistic morality, and Christianity is the uncompromising enemy of dualism. The great Stoic Emperor, doing his duty by persecuting the Christians, is the historic symbol of the true relation between Stoicism and Christianity.

Stoicism is at once the outcome and the contradiction of Greek philosophy. It represents the point at which the development of the inner contradiction of the contemplative ideal has produced its opposite. The problem of action has become central and ethics has become the centre of philosophy. So long as the City-State remained intact tradition could determine action and the contemplative life could be sustained. But when the storm broke over Greece in the conquests of

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Macedon, the foundations of sand collapsed. The Macedonian Empire was the bridge between the Greek world and the Roman; and Stoicism was its great contribution to the Roman Empire. It provided the theoretical basis for the practical activities of the Roman Empire, which the purely pragmatic consciousness of the Romans could not itself create. It became eventually for the ruling class of the Roman Empire the substitute for religion. Thus the alliance between Christian reflection and Stoic philosophy which gave rise to Christian theology is merely the reflective aspect of the alliance between Roman organization and the organization of the Church, by which Christianity became the religion of the Roman Empire.

In Stoicism the contemplative mode of consciousness is driven back upon itself, and the dualism therefore appears not in the world, but within man himself. It appears as the struggle between reason and the passions. So long as the aristocracy of the City-State is supported as a ruling class by the working population, contemplation of the world can be its ideal, and metaphysics its product. But when that social basis is gone, the contemplative individual is thrown back upon himself. He is no longer carried by the labours of others. The social structure no longer runs itself with a minimum of attention, by habit and tradition. If he is to remain a superior individual the function of ruling must become constructive. He must act, and his action must be positive; for he must construct a new form of social life in a changing world. He must *use* his knowledge for practical ends. Yet this is precisely what the contemplative consciousness negates. Its ideal is leisure for reflection. Yet it is under the necessity of action. Against his will action has become

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the reality of life for the contemplative; yet the rejection of action remains his ideal. Stoicism is the effort to resolve this dilemma by a supreme effort to rise *in spirit* above the necessity of action, while accepting action as necessary in fact. It proposes to act without intending action, without determining objective ends. It intends the negation of intention. In this, we may note in passing, it is the prototype of modern ethical pacifism. When it is thus thrust into action, the Greek mind discovers the idea of Will. The conception of will does not appear in classical Greek philosophy, even in ethics. Conduct is determined by impulse—rational conduct by impulse enlightened by the process of deliberation. There is no deliberation about ends, Aristotle maintains, only about means. Our ends are inherent in that organization of our impulses which we call character. But this is only possible where the forms of social life are fixed by tradition and maintained by habit. When the Greek mind is forced to attempt to live in a world in the making, it is impossible for it any longer to hold to such a position. For the organization of impulses is a social organization; and with the breakdown of the traditional organization of society the impulses are themselves disorganized. They can only be organized deliberately by determining a rational end for co-operative action to create a new form of society. But only a religious consciousness can do this, because the condition of it is the disappearance of dualism and the unification of theory and practice, of spirit and matter. If the contemplative ideal is to be maintained, action must be accepted *without being desired*, and the source of action must be found not in the impulses, but in reason itself; not in the natural tendencies to action but in the capacity for contem-

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plation. Pure reason must negate itself and become practical. The practical nature of man must not be allowed to be the source of action. "Will" is this source of action which is not impulse and is opposed to impulse. This is the origin both of the idea of will and of the Stoic dualism of reason and the passions.

The Stoic philosophy is a nest of contradictions, as any answer to the question "How can I act without acting?" must be. But the idea of the Will is not in itself contradictory; it is only incompatible with dualism, and it is the effort to conceive Will without letting go of dualism that produces the contradiction. The conception of Will is in fact the conception of man as an agent, and this is precisely the religious conception of man. But Stoicism, as an expression of contemplative dualism, makes reflection and not action the essence of human nature, and therefore sets action against itself. The Stoic will is a will which is divided against itself and which intends its own negation. It is the self-frustrating will. Will, in its true sense, is the unity of impulse and reason. The Stoic will is in opposition to impulse and identified with Reason. This seems more self-contradictory than it really is. For within limits man has the capacity to negate himself and so to frustrate himself. We can act for the suppression of action. But beyond certain limits such action is suicidal; and it is significant that Stoicism justifies suicide if the self-negation which it imposes becomes in practice intolerable.

The Stoic ethic, therefore, rests on the commands "Will whatever happens" and "Live according to Nature". The first of these maxims aims at maintaining that state of spiritual aloofness and "disinterested-

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ness" in action which is the Stoic ideal. It demands that a man should act without being spiritually involved in the action. It counsels an attitude of "detachment" in which the self seeks to achieve certain ends, without *desiring* the ends it seeks. In such a form of action, if it were completely possible, we should be totally indifferent to the success or failure of our practical efforts. We should "do our duty because it is our duty, not to satisfy our inclination." This involves the suppression of all desire except the desire to be rid of desire; except the negative impulse to be purely rational and so not personally involved in the action that we perform. To will whatever happens is clearly to will nothing, but merely to acquiesce in the practical necessity of action which is imposed upon us by life. To act we must have an end, but Stoicism wishes to adopt ends without willing them. This makes action possible without involving frustration of the self if the action is unsuccessful. It is in this sense that Stoicism succeeds in conceiving the possibility of acting without *really* acting; of being involved in action as a matter of fact while remaining contemplative in intention.

The other maxim, "Live according to Nature", provides a metaphysical basis for this ethic of self-negation. The world is informed by a Divine Reason which determines whatever happens. Human reason is a spark of this divine reason, and it is in virtue of this that we are human, and superior to the beasts of the field. Our own reason enables us to recognize that the order of Nature—whatever happens—is determined by reason, and that whatever happens is right. Therefore the good man will conform to the divine reason and "will whatever happens". Now the reli-

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gious mind will say something very like this; but it will conclude that conformity to the will of God makes us co-workers with God in his creative and redemptive purpose. But the function of this metaphysic in Stoicism is precisely the reverse. Since God wills everything that happens, we must will nothing. Since God determines everything, we must determine nothing, except our own compliance with the will of God, which means the suppression of our own inclinations.

But this maxim has another function. It enables Stoicism to find in the actual world certain natural ends of action which can be adopted as its own ends. They are the rational necessities of human life—health, wealth, peace, law and order, the harmonies and graces of social intercourse. These are “rational” ends, dictated by the nature of the world, not by human desire. They can be aimed at—but without emotion, which would involve an identification of the self with the action in which it is involved. Thus to live according to nature means, for the Stoic, to live in defiance of his own nature, so far at least as it is inherently practical. It provides the appearance of action without its reality. It rationalizes the desire to escape from responsibility by representing it as the will to be entirely subservient to the divine will. It seeks superiority by submission. It is the ethic of the will to power in its negative phase, when it is turned inward upon itself. It was precisely for this reason that Stoicism became the philosophy of the Roman Empire. It is the contradictory and therefore the complement of the pragmatic consciousness of the Romans. The difference between the Greek and the Roman is the difference between the two sides of the same dualism—of theory and practice. The two sides of the dualism necessitate

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one another, because the reality of human life is their unity. So long as the practical functions of life are determined by habit and tradition, a society is not compelled to solve practical problems and the will to superiority can express itself in the rejection of action in favour of contemplation. But when this is no longer possible the will to superiority must become positive. Superiority has to be asserted and maintained by effort. And the will to superiority is the will to power. The same effect will be produced if the Roman pragmatic attitude to life is forced into reflection, which is produced if the Greek contemplative attitude is forced into action. Stoicism is a product of the Greek mind; but it functions as the reflective expression of the Roman mind. The reflective ideal is the same in both cases. It is expressed in modern language as "doing one's duty for its own sake." But when taken in relation to life as a whole this ideal can function in two ways. It can be the ideal of the soldier or the administrator serving his country or the ideal of the moralist seeking his own perfection in virtue. In the first case Stoicism functions as the reflective aspect of a practical consciousness; in the second as the practical aspect of a reflective consciousness.

It was as the reflective aspect of the Roman consciousness that Stoicism became the basis of "Christian" theology. The emergence of "theology" proves that the Christian Church had fallen a victim to dualism, and become conformed to "the fashion of this world". The fact that it was the Stoic philosophy which provided the chief intellectual instrument for the construction of theology shows that the practical moment in dualism is dominant, and that the theology is primarily a means of organization and administra-

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tion. Its underlying intention is to "keep the peace" by imposing a law of thought by which "heresy" can be judged, condemned and effectually dealt with by the ruling class of the Church. It codifies the law of the spiritual world, as a practical instrument of administration and government of the Church, just as the great Stoic jurists codified the law of nations as the instrument for the administration of the Empire. The Stoic mind, with its personal detachment in the practical field, is the mind of the good administrator, of the effective bureaucrat, of the efficient civil servant. It accepts the existing order and concentrates on the practical problem of making it work.

MEDIÆVAL CHRISTENDOM

In Mediæval Europe we see the final result of this amalgamation of the Christian Church and the Roman Empire. The new unity of Europe has been built by the Christian Church out of the ruins of the old Empire. It is a society at a higher stage of progress than Rome could ever have achieved. It is the first achievement of the Jewish religious consciousness in the field which Jesus defined for it—the creation of a universal community—and which the Jews themselves rejected. This new world has been rightly called Christendom. Men have instinctively realized that Mediæval Society was the creation of Christianity. The level of freedom, equality and humanity which forms its basis is of an immensely higher order than Rome ever achieved. The prophecy of Jesus was fulfilled, and his understanding of the law of action in history was overwhelmingly verified in the creation of Christendom by his disciples.

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The Roman will to power destroyed itself. The meek inherited the earth. For the first time in human history a human society was constructed by men on a basis which was not a basis of blood and soil; which did not rest upon organic impulse, but was the fruit of a religious belief in the spiritual brotherhood of man. The universality of the Roman Empire happened as a by-product of activities which had another objective. Mediæval Christendom was intentionally and deliberately planned by men in whom the Christian understanding of life was active. The greatness of this first Christian achievement must not be minimized or underrated. By all the standards of the historians it was a stupendous miracle.

But our present intention is not to admire Mediæval Christendom, but to understand its failure. In doing so we are not judging it. The point of view from which we can interpret it forbids such judgement and is incompatible with it. We are seeking to escape from the dualist form of consciousness and to maintain the religious attitude, which can see every stage of historical progress, as at once the triumph of the purpose of God and the manifestation of human self-frustration. What we have to notice is first that the measure of conscious human co-operation with the purpose of God which the Mediæval world contains is the measure of its progress beyond the stage of history represented by the Roman Empire; and secondly that the measure of its failure is the extent to which the will to power remains dominant within it.

From the time when Christianity accepted the position of the official religion of the Roman Empire, it ceased to be possible to identify Christianity with the Church. This follows at once from our understanding

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of Jesus. Christianity can only be defined by its intention, and the teaching of Jesus defines that intention. By becoming the religion of the Roman Empire the Church maintained a continuity of constitutional development at the expense of the continuity of the Christian intention. The religion of any human society is the expression and spiritual bulwark of its social organization. The religion of a dualist society must be a dualist religion. The religion of a society based upon the will to power must itself be based upon the will to power. A Christianity which is also the religion of the Roman Empire is divided against itself. Christianity must be in opposition to any form of society which negates by its structure the principles of freedom, equality and common humanity. It could only be the religion of that unified humanity which is the kingdom of God on earth; although with the achievement of that community of mankind the mission of the Christian Church will be at an end.

In Mediæval and Modern Europe, then, Christianity has become an ambiguous term. It means either any or all of the various "religions" of Europe, or it means the leaven of the Jewish influence in the mature form given to it by Jesus, which expresses itself in the continuous and sometimes revolutionary transformation of human relationships within European society. The difficulty is all the greater because we habitually, in our conscious reflection, identify Christianity with the official organizations or official doctrines, of the various Churches; and it is precisely in this sense that Christianity defines its own opposite. It is as an official religion that Christianity is in self-contradiction. The official religion is the religion that is expounded and enforced by the governing class of the Church, and as

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the religion of a dualist society its function is to maintain the governing class of the society. But Christianity is necessarily, in such a situation, the religion of the common people in their conscious or unconscious opposition to any governing class, and its function is to sustain and enlighten the struggle for freedom, equality and common humanity as the basis of human relationship. This alone explains why we habitually associate the forces in European history which aim at equality and freedom with secular and political action, and yet can find that they have their origin in the teaching of Jesus and nowhere else. No one, I imagine, would maintain that official Christianity has been the protagonist in Europe of the struggle for freedom and equality. These are secular, not religious, ideals. Yet at the same time it is undeniable that the successive "Churches" which have arisen in the course of the development of official Christianity have arisen by pressure from below, have begun by denouncing the official religion from which they revolted as a negation of Christianity, and have been associated, directly or indirectly, with those upthrusts of popular revolt against organized privilege which mark the stages of European progress. The religions of Christendom are Christian—they are the product of the impact of Christianity upon European man; and this is proved by the fact that none of the pagan religions have been able to stand against Christianity, and no attempt to establish a new form of religion in Europe has been successful unless it claimed to be the true Christianity. Yet the very form of the Church and of its relations to the State, the way in which it has broken up in schism after schism into a great number of rival Churches, and not least its failure to deal either by persecution or by

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absorption with the Jews, are proofs that it is *not* Christian. In fact the dualism of European society, in all its forms, is concerned with Christianity, which it can neither accept nor reject. It must have a religion because it is a human society. It cannot have any other religion than Christianity. Yet Christianity is incompatible with any dualist society. The essential truth of Christianity prevents Europe from destroying itself, and at the same time forces it through a series of revolutions which mark stages in the progress both of the acceptance and of the rejection of Christianity; and all these stages lead progressively towards the destruction of dualism and the achievement of equality, freedom and universal community. And since the official Churches are themselves dualist the impetus of Christianity in Europe leads towards the destruction of official Christianity.

When we look at the Mediæval civilization which the Church built out of the ruins of the Roman Empire, we find that the main feature of its structure is the dualism of Church and State. Both of them are "powers"—the Church being the "spiritual" power and the State the "temporal" power. Both have "taken the sword". The Church wields the spiritual sword, the State the temporal sword. In other words we find two ruling classes, each with its own will to power, and each organized in a hierarchy of administrative functions. These two ruling classes govern the same common people, and their power rests upon the control of this great subject population. From the beginning, therefore, there are built into the structure of this society all the elements of a struggle for power between two claimants for power, and the result of that struggle depends upon which party can secure the

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allegiance of the common people. In this struggle the initial advantages lie with the Church hierarchy. The Church has the prestige and the understanding which come from the fact that it was the primary agent in the unification of Europe. It is highly centralized and disciplined throughout, and it has a practical monopoly of reflective culture. The State, on the contrary, is not effectively unified under the Emperor. The material unity of Europe as a political federation remains largely theoretical, in spite of the efforts to unify it as a federation. Competition for power among the constituent parts of the "temporal" society is the rule. And the material means for an effective unification of Europe on the material plane are lacking.

Yet the contradiction which is inherent in dualism must reverse this superiority of the spiritual power. The codification of belief makes the spiritual society a fixed society, whose task is essentially a negative one. It must maintain the "faith" so defined by preventing changes of belief. Its dualism is of the Greek type—the reflective or spiritual life is the ideal. It cannot, therefore, itself will the material task of unification. It can see it only as a necessity which is the result of evil. But it has been forced into action: it must extend and secure its power, or it will cease to control the common people. It is forced, in its governing capacity, to adopt the Stoic attitude to material life; and the end set for it by natural necessity is the political unification of Europe. As a result the struggle for temporal power becomes the natural objective of the Church. In practice it can only have a material objective, *because* it makes the spiritual supreme. Yet the more it succeeds in achieving the unity of Europe on the material plane, the more it strengthens its adversary. If the political

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unity of Europe could have been effectively created by the Church, then the Empire would have asserted its will to power over the Church and reduced it to dependence. The Church is in contradiction with itself. It is driven by its contemplative dualism to create an independent political unity. It is driven by its will to power to suppress the temporal will to power, which alone could achieve, in a dualist society, an administrative unification. Thus the dualist Church destroys itself, and does not even achieve the political unification of the society it set up.

The temporal power, on the other hand, is equally driven into self-contradiction. It also is dualist—an aristocratic hierarchy governing a subject people. And since it depends upon the people it governs, it must secure their loyalty and obedience. Now loyalty and obedience are spiritual qualities; and the State is driven into competition with the Church in the spiritual field to secure them. The creation of the spirit of nationalism and patriotism is a spiritual necessity for the State, if the temporal power is to be real. Just as the Church is driven to struggle for temporal power if it is to realize its spiritual authority, so the State is driven to struggle for spiritual power if it is to realize its material authority. This struggle is none the less real because it is mainly unconscious; and the real driving force behind it on both sides is the pressure, among the common people in the main, of suppressed Christianity. In the struggle between the two wills to power in Mediæval society it is the practical will which must win. The spiritual society of Europe which contains the material society within it must give place to a world in which the situation is reversed, and the material society contains the spiritual society within it. Modern Europe is

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the dialectical antithesis of Mediæval Europe. And in the process the Christian intention will make a great stride in advance. Both Church and State will be weakened and the common people will again inherit the earth.

In Mediæval Europe it is the Church that is in the ascendant; and the dualism in the Church is therefore more important for our study. So far we have been considering the dualism of Church and State in relation to the common people whom both govern as superior and ruling classes. But there are two aspects of the dualism within the Church which are of outstanding historical importance, and to which we must briefly refer. The first is the dualism which split the Church into two great antagonistic organizations—the Western centred in Rome, and the Eastern centred in Byzantium. With regard to this we need only note that it rests upon the dualism between the Greek and the Roman consciousness in a definite historic fashion. It is no accident that the Eastern Church is known as the Greek Orthodox Church. Reflectively the distinction between the Greek and Roman Churches is the distinction between the orthodox Greek mind and the unorthodox Stoic mind which became the orthodoxy of the practical Roman world. Byzantium is the capital of Hellenistic culture, and it remained truer to the contemplative ideal than did the Western part of the Roman Empire. Eastern Christianity, when it succumbed to dualism, did so in the pure contemplative mode, not in the ethical mode which compromises with the necessity of practical activity. The result is an official religion which is non-intellectual and does not codify belief as a law of faith and action, but instead develops an æsthetic and mystical character and seeks

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a dramatic expression. In relation to action such a religion performs a negative function. It provides a contemplative expression for the suppressed Christianity which it introduces into pagan society and so provides an escape-mechanism for emotional energies which might otherwise have sought expression in social change. This is indeed the social function ascribed to drama by Aristotle, and a dramatized religion is even more effective for this purpose than any secular theatre can be; provided, as we have seen, that the society is not forced into social construction by circumstances. The Eastern Church tends therefore to be apocalyptic where the Western tends to be ethical. The dualism which we noticed between ethic and cosmology in the contemplative consciousness has thus a close analogy in the two great divisions of Christendom.

The importance of the Eastern Church lies in the fact that it became the religion of Russia, and maintained itself in Russia until the revolution in our own days. There it created and maintained a form of Christianized consciousness which is complementary and antithetical to that developed in the rest of Europe by the Western Church. Through Russia, too, the Jews were scattered, and the dualism of official Christianity in Russia showed its characteristic resistance to the Hebrew tradition by its persecution of the Jews. The purely contemplative mode of consciousness so produced and maintained explains both the ease with which the ruling class maintained its position at the expense of the common people, and also the ease with which the "spiritual" and "temporal" rulers could avoid conflict among themselves. But the process by which the will to superiority in the governing classes destroys itself is not thereby avoided. It works only

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more slowly and more surely; and it had the result that in Russia, when at last she was forced into action by the impact of the Western world, it destroyed both the ecclesiastical and political ruling classes at one blow, and discovered a will to equality and freedom in the suppressed classes all the more effective and creative for the form and the length of its suppression. It is the history of the Eastern Church which explains why it was Russia, in the long run, that was able first to establish a socialist society, and to begin a new chapter in the history of the Christian intention in the world.

The Roman Church, however, is the positive aspect of this dualism, the Greek Church the negative. The Roman Church is positive because it is driven into action, although its claim is a theoretical one. This contradiction within its own field results in a tension within the Church itself, between its purely spiritual activities and its administrative activities. The codification of belief as a fixed law for the spiritual life, while it provides a basis for the government of the spirit by the ruling class in the Church, makes the spiritual life impossible. For the spontaneity of the spirit is its essence. It is one thing to rule the minds of men who are themselves primarily engaged in the practical affairs of the world. For that the codification of doctrine is an excellent device for maintaining power, especially if it can be backed by threats of punishment in the other world for conduct which is disapproved by the spiritual authorities. But it is quite another thing to use it to govern men who are themselves devoted to contemplation, and whose lives are spent in the cultivation of theoretical ends. Such men turn to the Church as their natural home, for the Church is the guardian of the

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whole of the spiritual side of life, of the whole of reflective culture. Thus there is formed within the Church itself a governed class, a spiritual common people who are the artists, writers, thinkers and mystics of Mediæval society. This is the significance of the hermitages and of the monastic orders. It is here that the creative forces of the spiritual life are to be found, and here that the ferment of Christianity is most powerful and most difficult to deal with. If the will to power in the Church is to maintain itself, it must suppress the spiritual creativeness within its own bosom.

The impulse to do this is the inner significance of the Mediæval struggle to subdue the flesh. The Stoic struggle of reason against the passions takes on a violence which the Stoics themselves would never have dreamed of. The passion to escape from action into a purely "spiritual" life drives men to retire from the world, and put the whole of their spiritual resources into the struggle against the flesh. The will to power is here turned passionately against itself. The "reason" of the Stoics shows its real nature as a negative passion for a "holiness" which is in fact a desire to escape from the reality of this world and this life into another world and another life. The violence of the struggle is the measure of the strength not only of the resistance to Christianity but of the pressure of Christianity which has to be resisted.

In the Middle Ages proper we find that this passionate Stoicism of self-suppression has been incorporated in the organization of the Church and brought under the control of the administrative hierarchy, where it functions as part of the general polity of the ecclesiastical order. The monastic orders are the clue to the inner history of Mediæval Europe, and it was in the

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monasteries that the modern world was prepared, and the destruction of the Mediæval society was brought about. To understand this we must remember that the process is almost completely unconscious, and that it is therefore specially important to refrain from any implication of ethical judgement, which concerns itself with conscious motives alone, and seeks to fix individual responsibility. With such judgement we have no concern. We are seeking to understand how a society which has incorporated the Jewish heritage of Christianity in its life, and yet is seeking to maintain its own dualistic structure, inevitably destroys itself in the process and realizes a further stage in the progress towards that universal community of men which was the intention of Christ.

The function of the monastic system is to segregate the creative forces which would seek to realize Christianity and in so doing destroy the dualist structure of society. To do this it must prevent these spiritual forces from issuing in social action, and keep them suppressed; allowing them to express themselves only in a purely spiritual, that is to say, a purely theoretical or contemplative form. The pressure of the Hebrew tradition in Christianity is towards the unification of theory and practice, of spiritual and material, in order to create a community on a basis of freedom and equality. Theoretically the Church exists to further this purpose. Practically, it exists—as the religion of Christendom—to sustain the dualistic structure of Mediæval society. These two purposes negate one another, and produce a dualism and a tension in the body of the Church itself. The Church must absorb into itself those men in whom the profound Christian intention works. If it did not they would become the

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spiritual leaders of the secular world and would endanger the spiritual control of secular society by the Church. But if it absorbs them, it must also suppress them; otherwise they will transform the Church by destroying its own organization of spiritual government. To realize this one has only to imagine what would have happened to Mediæval society if the early Franciscan movement had been a widely successful movement outside the Church, or if inside the Church it had succeeded in dominating the governing hierarchy instead of obediently submitting to its judgement and discipline.

Both the organization of the monasteries and the monastic vows of poverty, chastity and obedience are evidence of this effort both to separate the creative impulse of Christianity from secular society and to suppress it within the Church. Within the monasteries there exist communities in which a considerable degree of equality and human freedom in relationship is achieved. Considered apart from their setting in society as a whole each of these communities is much nearer the original conception of a Christian brotherhood than anything that is to be found outside them. But in relation to the social order the important feature of the monastery is that these communities of social creativeness are segregated. They are cut off from the world, and controlled by an ecclesiastical organization which is itself built on a different pattern. Whatever the conscious purpose may be, the effect is to isolate the monastic community and turn it back upon itself. It becomes an "otherworldly" organization devoted to the cultivation of the spirit for its own sake.

The effect of the monastic vows is the same. The vow of poverty prevents the monk from exercising per-

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sonal power in secular society, and makes him materially dependent upon the Church organization. The vow of chastity cuts him off from the natural social functions and from the propagation of his kind. But it also determines the direction of his own spiritual life by making the suppression of sexual impulse—that is to say, of bodily creativeness—the primary object of the inner life. Thus the creative impulse is divided, in Stoic fashion, against itself—spiritual creativeness against material creativeness—and this intensification of dualism is identified with Christian saintliness. The effects of such a suppression of the sexual impulses have been much studied by modern psychotherapy, and we are beginning to have some knowledge of its disturbing effects upon the integrity of personality. In using this knowledge to understand the significance of the rule of chastity upon European religion we have to remember that it is not the abstinence from sexual experience that is the root of the trouble, but making this an end in itself. Then it becomes an expression of negative self-centredness; of the desire to be superior to one's own nature, which can only rise from a sense of inferiority; of the will to save one's own life by which one loses it.

The vow of obedience completes this self-suppression. It subordinates the spiritual life itself to the rule of faith which is the instrument of domination in the hands of the ecclesiastical ruling class. It commits the creative impulse to a life-long struggle to destroy its own spontaneity. For not only does it refuse freedom of thought, but it condemns it as evil. It makes the suppression of one's own spiritual freedom the goal of spiritual effort. It prevents the development of thought which aims at the trans-

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formation of social life, either in its ecclesiastical or its secular forms.

Thus the ecclesiastical will to power not merely segregates those in whom the creative impulse of Christianity reveals itself in the monastic orders, and suppresses their action upon society, but pledges them to a personal effort to suppress the creative impulse in themselves. The self-suppression which it so secures is thorough-going. It involves the suppression both of material and of spiritual spontaneity, and in the spiritual field both of the emotional and of the intellectual forms of spontaneity. In this complex effort to save its life it loses its life. The law of self-frustration comes into play. And the tension between the monastic life and the life of the ecclesiastical governing class is the most powerful of the forces by which it works its own destruction and prepares the new order of life which will succeed it. The tension is largely unconscious. The psychological suppression is in the main effective in preventing the struggle from reaching consciousness. But occasionally—and more frequently as the period draws to its close—it breaks out into the open, and produces heresies which have to be suppressed by persecution. When this happens the real inner structure of the Mediæval world appears. The will to power in Church and State—the spiritual and the temporal power—unite to exterminate it and to re-establish the unbroken and unchallenged authority of the rule of faith. The danger which lurks below the surface of Mediæval civilization is the penetration of the Christian impulse from the unconscious to the conscious mind. The existence of the social order depends upon preventing this; and it cannot be prevented. The very efforts to prevent it must

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necessarily bring it about. The will to power must always destroy itself and accomplish the reverse of its own purpose.

The two movements in which the modern world takes its rise—the Renaissance and the Reformation—come from the monasteries. The two men from whom these movements spring—St. Francis of Assisi and Martin Luther—were both monks, and monks who took their vows of self-suppression with a passionate sincerity. In both cases, too, the background of their action is a recognition of the conflict in Christendom, and in the Church particularly, between theory and practice, and the impulse to overcome it. But this is only the obvious and large-scale expression of the part played by the monasteries in destroying the Mediæval form of dualist society and creating the modern world. The necessity of this result is less obvious and more important, and demands at least a cursory treatment.

In the first place, the effects of monastic self-suppression as a life-long religious duty must have results quite different from those intended. The suppression of desire does not eliminate desire. It drives it into the unconscious and strengthens it. Turned back upon itself, desire builds itself up, and finds disguised and symbolic expression. In the monasteries, the suppressed forces of creative action are built up, below the surface, to a point at which they are strong enough to overthrow the power that suppresses them. When such forces ultimately burst out, their immediate effect is destructive, like the bursting of a dam. But further, the conditions under which the process of repression goes on could not be better designed for bringing the significance of the Christian impulse to consciousness.

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Not only are the keenest and most reflective minds drawn into the process; they are committed to a continuous self-examination and introspection. This constant practice of introspection, which is not merely theoretical, but has self-control as its conscious aim, can only result in increasing self-knowledge. In the end this must bring to consciousness the contradiction between the positive Christian forces which are being suppressed and the negative religious impulse to suppress them. The monasteries thus provide a psychological laboratory for bringing the unconscious forces of Christianity to consciousness.

In the second place, the suppressed forces find symbolic expressions for themselves, both in the æsthetic and in the intellectual field. St. Francis is perhaps the best example of the æsthetic symbolism. His naturalism anticipates the Romantic movement of the later Protestant world, but even more significantly symbolizes the intention of universal brotherhood and the impulse to human equality. On the intellectual side the reflective creativeness, debarred from substantial expression by the codification of belief and the rule of obedience, finds an outlet in the field of formal construction, of which the scholastic philosophy is the product. In its revolt against formalism, the modern world has, on the whole, failed to do justice to the achievements of the scholastic mind. The philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, which is its mature product, has never been surpassed, and is hardly likely to be equalled as a triumph of creative thought in the field of formal synthesis. The substance of belief is given. It cannot be questioned. The whole spontaneity of pure thought is thus driven into the creation of a universal form of ideal synthesis. As a complete

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philosophy or theology it is an expression of the contemplative mind. Its inspiration comes from the Greek, not the Hebrew heritage. But its Aristotelianism is wider in its scope and fuller in its achievement than its Greek prototype because the world which it reflects is wider than the Greek world; and the difference is the result of the impact of the Hebrew consciousness upon Europe. And its enduring achievement is not its intention. In attempting to stabilize in thought, in a final form, what the Middle Ages took to be the whole content of Christian belief, it achieved the form of consciousness which is the basis of modern science. The idea of the subordination of the whole universe to law, of the systematic interrelation of all things, became a general and accepted possession of the European mind; and the technique of logical analysis and synthesis was brought to a point of development and precision without which science, in the modern sense, would be inconceivable.

It is not only in the reflective field that the monasteries unconsciously created the modern world. The segregation of the creative impulse from the field of social construction was ineffective. The communal life which the vow of poverty entailed laid the basis of communal wealth. The monasteries became powerful corporations, self-governing and independent, within the general system of Mediæval society, and as the centres of culture and knowledge they became the source of profound effects upon secular society. The social services, of education, of care for the sick and indigent, fell into their hands. Thus the suppressed classes of the ecclesiastical order and of the secular order were brought into practical relationship of a type

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which is antithetical to the relation between the two ruling classes. The importance of this will be clear if we remember that the separation of the spiritual and the temporal aspects of life, in a dualism which brings them into conflict is the condition of maintaining the form of Mediæval society; and their union in the life of the common people is the direction of progress, and the goal of the Christian impulse which works in the heart of society like leaven hid in the lump. Perhaps the most significant symbol of the direction in which the process tends is the translation of the Bible into the common tongue.

There are other features of the monastic system which reveal, in the heart of the Mediæval world, the growth of the social structure which was to succeed it when it had destroyed itself. But since the purpose in hand is only to indicate the working of a principle, and not to give an historical account which is even in outline complete, we must pass them over. There is, however, one feature which is of such importance for the understanding of the modern world that it must be emphasized at this point. It is the development of individualism. The imposition of a law of orthodoxy in the spiritual field is an attempt to achieve a stability and fixity of thought and feeling which involves, as we have seen, an intensified activity of self-suppression wherever the spontaneity of the self reveals its creative energy. It is in the monastic life that the self-suppression is most acute and most effective. But its effect is to produce a concentration of the self upon itself. The individual self becomes the central problem; its impulses and demands are the constant preoccupation of the mind. It is true that the conscious aim is their suppression; but this makes no difference to the fact

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that they form the central focus of consciousness. The rule of the spiritual life, just because it is the rule, and is authoritatively declared and accepted, is taken for granted. Consciousness is perforce busy with the self and its nature and its desires. If the authority of the rule is called in question, the effect will inevitably be that the impulses of the natural self, which are the central preoccupation of consciousness, will remain central. But the effort to suppress the self will disappear and the demand for self-fulfilment and self-satisfaction will take its place. The negative individualism which suppression has created will manifest itself as a positive individualism. It is this individualism which is the key to the spiritual character of the modern world.

But before we pass on to consider, from the same point of view, the pressure of the Hebrew mind upon the modern world, it is important to guard against a misapprehension that might arise through this concentration upon the religious tension in the Church. The reason for dealing so largely with the spiritual aspect of the Mediæval world at the expense of the secular and material aspect is partly that the latter has been adequately dealt with by the historians. But it is even more because in the Middle Ages the Church is in the ascendant, and the decisive struggles are centred in it. It is not because we are specially concerned, in tracing the influence of Christianity, with the spiritual as distinct from the material aspect of life. On the contrary, it is precisely this dualism of spiritual and material which marks the resistance to Christianity. In fact, all human activities are both material and spiritual. A spiritual activity that has no material aspect is as nonsensical and as impossible as a material

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activity that does not express a spiritual attitude. The organized religion of the Middle Ages is a political force, and is concerned with governing European society. The controlling mind of the Church is organizing and administrative. It is not an expression of the Hebrew religious consciousness, but of the Roman pragmatic consciousness. In the Middle Ages the structure of the Roman world has been reflected back and duplicated in the field of reflection. The Empire over man's bodily life has become, in reflection, the Empire over man's spiritual life. It is of no avail to assert that the temporal power is of this world, and the spiritual power is of the other world. Both are empires, and regulate and govern the lives of men *in this world*. Both express the will to power of men over men. Both are concerned to control *action*, and action is necessarily material. The power of men over men can only be achieved by negating the spontaneity of action, and this is only possible by frightening them. It is a matter of little importance whether the inhibiting motive is fear of what may happen to them in this world, or fear of what may happen to them in another world. Imaginary fears work as satisfactorily as real ones in preventing the creativeness of the human spirit from realizing itself in action. But as a matter of history, it was the "spiritual" power which created and maintained the unity of Mediæval society. There was no temporal power sufficiently developed to maintain it. Progress beyond the Mediæval world, which Christianity enforces, depends therefore upon the destruction of the ecclesiastical power. It is for this reason only that we have concentrated upon the "spiritual" side of the Mediæval dualism, in order to understand how the spiritual will to power negates itself and accom-

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plishes, in spite of itself, the opposite of its own intention.

There is, on the other hand, a parallel process going on in the secular field, based upon the tension between the secular governing class and its subjects. The key to this lies in the development of a spiritual purpose in the national field, particularly in the common people, and the development outside the Church, of a secular culture, and centres of initiative which form the vehicle of its expression. The main dualism of Church and State governs the situation, and the triumph of the State over the Church is the final outcome of the tension. But the secular power could never have overthrown the ecclesiastical power unless it could become the expression of a popular ideal—a will of the common people—in opposition to the Church hierarchy. The building up of this secular ideal, and the impulse to break with the Church, is the work of the Church itself. Because the will to power which is dominant is the “spiritual” will, it must destroy itself. It is the union of the suppressed elements in the Church and the suppressed elements in the State, with the religious elements acting as the leaders and symbols of revolt, that is required to break up the religious structure and defeat its will to power. When Martin Luther challenged the Mediæval Church in the name of original Christianity, he found himself not only the mouthpiece of a new religious movement but of a popular revolt; and he found the secular powers ready to use this combination of spiritual and temporal rebellion—this unity of what the Mediæval world had sought to keep separate; this fusion of spiritual and material in spontaneous action—as the means for establishing the supremacy of the secular will to power over the ecclesiastical.

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THE MODERN WORLD

In the modern world the dualistic structure of society remains. But the dominant will to power is secular. The State has taken the place of the Church as the instrument of government. Official Christianity, in its dominant forms at least, accepts the priority of the secular power, and acts as a subordinate partner in the effort to maintain the dualist organization of society. But there is a fundamental difference in structure between Mediæval and Modern Europe. We do not find a mere reversal of the relations of the spiritual and the temporal power. Both Church and State have been broken up into fragments. They have become a series of Churches and a series of States, each of which claims autonomy and independence; and each is in opposition to the others. We find that the dual will to power of the Mediæval world has been divided up into a number of wills to power both in the religious and in the secular field, and that in practice the will to power in the religious field has been absorbed in the secular will to power. The distinction between Church and State has become a distinction of functions within a unity of society in which there is only one effective rule of law, and that is the secular law.

This static picture of the modern world is misleading unless we add a dynamic feature to it. Modern society is progressive in the sense that it includes and allows for the tendency and even the effort to change its form by deliberate action. After the Reformation there is a marked tendency towards a splitting up of the Protestant Churches into smaller fragments, each asserting its independence and autonomy, each claiming against

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the others to be the true Christian religion, and each competing with the others for the allegiance of the common people. A similar tendency to splitting up into smaller independent units is characteristic of the secular field, although it is blanketed and suppressed by other factors; partly by the fact that the weakness of the secular power in Mediæval times postponed the unification of national groups until the dominance of the Church was broken up—as in Germany and Italy; partly by the dominance of the secular will to power and its ability to impose and maintain administrative unity against the tendency to internal division, as in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It would be truer to say that the modern world tends towards the dissolution and elimination of the spiritual will to power, the unification of the cultural and material aspects of life in a secular form, and also to the disintegration of the unity of the material will to power into a series of competing units. It is this structure which we have to attempt to understand in terms of the Jewish consciousness and in terms of the pressure of Christianity upon Europe.

The clue to what is happening in the modern world is this. The Christian intention, which defines the continuity of Christian action in the world, was suppressed by its antithesis—the will to power in the Mediæval world; and it was suppressed by the Church. It worked in the unconscious. The ecclesiastical will to power worked out its own frustration, and the completion of this process, by weakening the forces of suppression, brought the Christian intention to consciousness. This is the inner significance of the Renaissance and Reformation. But because the dualism of mind and of society remains, and because the suppressing

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agency in society is the religious organization, Christianity asserts itself in consciousness as a *secular* movement towards freedom and equality and common humanity as the basis of society. And further, because in the main the official form of religion retains the general religious conceptions of the Mediæval Church, together with its theology and ethic (though they are shrunk, and limited in scope by the rise of a secular philosophy and ethic alongside of them); and even more because they serve, more or less consciously, the secular will to power of the ruling class, the secular movement which is the bearer of the Christian intention tends towards the destruction of organized religion. The Christianity which comes to consciousness in the modern world is not recognized as Christian, and tends more and more to be considered anti-Christian and anti-religious. The paradoxical appearance which this presents is not really a contradiction. It is only a contradiction to the dualist mind which has identified Christianity with the organized religions of Europe. The non-dualist religious consciousness recognizes its necessity, as part of the progressive action by which Christianity is achieving the salvation of the world.

This coming into consciousness of suppressed Christianity at the end of the Middle Ages is one of the most remarkable and revolutionary changes in history. Negatively it is a revolt against authority, and as such it is no new thing. But its novelty consists in the fact that it rests upon a positive claim of right. The revolt has become a matter of conscience. The intention of the revolt is positive. It is no longer a blind fury seeking revenge for intolerable suffering inflicted by a ruling class. It is a creative purpose seeking the opportunity to express itself in action. It is highly

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reflective and therefore highly individualist; not an outbreak of unconscious impulse. In its broadest definition the new thing is the claim of the individual to the *right* to live his own life in his own way; and this claim is made in the name of humanity, on the ground of natural right. In all societies at all times there have been men and groups of men, who have refused obedience to traditional standards of thought and conduct. But it is not until the end of the Middle Ages in Europe that we find a general movement of human effort in this direction associated with a sense of rightness, and widely supported by the conscience of the masses. Until then, when men threw over the trammels of tradition and lived in their own way, they knew that they were doing wrong. At length we have a situation in which men live their own lives in their own way and feel that they are doing right. That "freedom from the law of sin and death", that release into "the glorious liberty of the children of God" where "all things are lawful unto me", which defined for St. Paul the effect of the gospel of Jesus, appears at the end of the Middle Ages as a widespread social phenomenon. A new conscience and a new moral outlook, which has the most revolutionary consequences, is being formed. So we find Martin Luther, before the diet of Worms, which represented the power behind the rule of belief and life which sustained Mediæval society, challenging its basis in the name of a truth and a right which it denied; and doing so with a sense of moral and religious compulsion. "Here I stand," he says. "I can no other. So help me God."

This association of rebellion against traditional authority with the sense of moral rightness is the state of mind without which no intention of progress is

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possible. Its occurrence means that the Christian drive to progress has become at length a conscious intention: and this is confirmed by the fact that increasingly the ideas of freedom and equality begin to define the direction of the intention. The change can be summarized in the following way. Whereas up till this time men had thought that the right way of doing things was the way they had always been done, they began increasingly to think that the right way to do things was to do them better than they had been done before. Instead, therefore, of looking to the past for their standards of rightness they find themselves looking to the future for achievements that shall surpass the achievements of the past. This involves a conscious break with the past, that is to say, with traditional authority, as a rule of behaviour. It involves the substitution of free action for obedience to a rule.

This intention of progress sets the modern world at once on a higher level of progress than the Mediæval. It expresses a much profounder influence of the Jewish consciousness upon the European races than anything that has preceded it. It marks a decisive triumph of the Christian intention. But it is limited in several ways. In the first place, the significance of the new outlook is vague, and by no means whole-hearted. In the second place, it still works in a world of class distinction, which is therefore dominated by the will to power, and this domination is reflected in the cultural field. In the third place, the means of carrying out the intention of progress is lacking. Progress involves a change in the form of social life which is only possible through a control of natural necessity; and even the knowledge through which this control could be exercised is lacking. Human beings cannot live their own

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lives in their own way, they cannot realize their own nature, unless they can escape from the domination of natural necessity. And they cannot dominate natural necessity without a knowledge of Nature which is designed for this purpose and without a technique for its practical application. The first step in realizing the intention of progress is the development of natural science—of a technical knowledge of the means whereby nature can be constrained to serve personal ends.

But besides these limitations there is another which defines the structure of modern society in a characteristic way. The form of the modern consciousness is individualist. This individualism is a product of the process by which, in the Mediæval world, the Christian impulse was brought to consciousness, through the reflection of the self upon itself in the effort after spiritual self-control. In the process of self-examination and self-suppression the self becomes the centre of its own consciousness. When the suppression is removed and spontaneity is restored it comes as the spontaneity of a self-centred consciousness. It appears as a practical egocentricity aiming consciously at individual self-realization.

Now individual self-realization is an impossibility. Selfhood is inherently mutual, and it is only in relationship with others that the self has any reality or can express it. Individualism, in which the individual self becomes its own end, is incompatible with the nature of action, in which the end must lie outside the self. The impulse to self-realization is an impulse to spontaneous action. But the concentration upon the self negates the basis of action. Thus the modern world is in contradiction with itself, and the dualism which results between theory and practice has a new and

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intimate character. It is no longer a suppression of practical spontaneity in obedience to an external authority, but in obedience to a self-imposed law. Hence the modern man knows that he ought to be free, but cannot be; unlike the Mediæval saint who knows that he ought to be not free but obedient to an external authority. The modern world agrees that men have a right to freedom but finds itself incapable of realizing this right in practice. So freedom, equality, and common humanity become theoretical ideals, which are found to be in conflict with the necessities of practice. The reason for this contradiction between theory and practice—for the persistence of dualism—in the modern world is the individualism of its consciousness. Individualism is the negation of community, and expresses the fear of community inhibiting the impulse to community. And community is the condition of human freedom. The modern world is aiming at action; but it cannot act, because its individualism, its self-consciousness, its egocentricity, by turning the self back upon itself, prevents that fusion of practical impulse and reflective reason in which action consists. Or to put it more concretely, its individualism is the restriction of the desire for freedom to the individual self; and this restriction is in fact the defence of the individual's freedom against the encroachment of all other individuals. From this arises the modern tension between the individual and society, which can only signify a tension between each individual and all the others. Each individual is trying to achieve freedom for himself and is aware of all the others as obstacles to his own freedom, and consequently he must seek freedom in competition with all the others. This, at least, is the norm to which modern society tends; for

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since it is a dynamic society, it can only be truly described in terms of its direction of movement.

To the individualist, freedom necessarily appears in a negative form, as an escape from social determination. Because human action is inherently social, whenever he tries to act freely as an individual, he finds that he is frustrated by the interference of other people. This interference is simply the expression of *their* effort to realize individual freedom for themselves. He is driven into a struggle to subordinate the activities of other people to his own freedom, so that individualism makes the effort after freedom a struggle for power. The will to power has been universalized in modern society as a competitive struggle for the means of individual freedom. In this way the effort to achieve freedom is made self-frustrating. It necessarily achieves its opposite; and the more intense the effort that is made, the more complete is its frustration. It is the inevitability of this result that we have to understand. It is inherent in the nature of individualism. If all the members of society are seeking to free themselves from society, what other result can be achieved? They constitute society, and society is simply the condition of their existence. Their struggle against society constitutes, in this case, the life of society. To be free from society is to cease to be a living human being. If all the members of a society were to achieve such a freedom from society, society would be dissipated into its component atoms and would cease to exist. Necessity sees to it that the activities of men maintain the unity of society. If their intention is to be free from society—to achieve an individual freedom which is their own private possession—then their intention is opposed to the nature of the reality which is made up of their own

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activities, and their own activities achieve the opposite of what they intend.

Yet the egocentricity of the individualist makes him incapable of realizing that it is his own practice that is frustrating his own ideal. Instead, society appears to him as an impersonal mechanism governed by laws which he cannot control or escape. His effort to achieve freedom is always thrown back upon himself, and in the development of the modern world, the more complex and reflective the effort becomes, the more insistent, rigid and automatic becomes the system of social pressure which subordinates his activities to a mechanical determinism.

This natural determinism which frustrates the freedom of modern society is an economic determinism. The laws which bind individualist society are economic laws; and they appear to it as a system of external material forces operating upon man. Man is then by nature free, yet everywhere he is in bondage to nature. Rousseau can open his treatise on society with the words "Man is born free, yet everywhere he is in chains" as if the paradox were already a commonplace. He goes on at once to announce that he cannot explain how it has come about, but thinks that he can justify it. Yet it is explanation that is needed. For the paradox is even more curious than Rousseau imagined. Clearly the economic laws and the laws of social structure to which men are in bondage are not external to themselves; they are the laws of their own behaviour. The freedom from economic law that they are seeking is clearly freedom from the substantial reality of their own nature. They are in bondage to themselves, and their effort after freedom is an effort to escape from themselves. It is the individualism of the modern world

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which necessitates this result. A self that has become its own end is in bondage to itself and cannot escape from itself. In its effort to save its own life of freedom it loses it. Egocentric freedom is self-negating. It produces a psychological dualism which divides the self in two, and sets the "higher" self against the "lower" self, reason against impulse, mind against matter. Modern man is in rebellion against himself; consequently his ideal of freedom produces in his practice the actuality of bondage. So individualism destroys itself in accordance with the law of self-frustration, and achieves its opposite.

If we recall the Hebrew religious conception of the nature of man and of God we shall find the clue to this elaborate complication. God is a worker. Man, made in the image of God, is also, in his real nature, a worker. Evil, which is the self-negation of man, his refusal to be himself, expresses itself in the will not to be a worker. The individualist struggle for freedom is a struggle to escape from work. This is, of course, the formal will of every ruling class. But in the modern world the Christian pressure to progress has broken through into consciousness, and so has been universalized. Freedom, equality and brotherhood have become general ideals, in principle applicable to all men. Every man should be free; and this means, to the individualist, that every man should escape from the necessity of work. No man should be a worker; every man should be a gentleman, a member of the leisured class. The working class would thus be eliminated and equality realized. This is, on the face of it, nonsensical. Yet it is the underlying ideal of modern society. Universal freedom signifies to us universal leisure; and it can be achieved, or at least approximated to, by the development

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of machinery. The ideal society would be one in which all the work was done *automatically* by machines. All men would be set free for the life of leisure, and the kingdom of heaven would come on earth through the mechanization of labour. This dream of universal freedom is really the nightmare of general unemployment.

This explains the dynamic character and the fluidity of the modern social dualism. The intention of progress has penetrated into consciousness. But the intention remains formal because of its individualism, which prevents the determination of a social content for the intention. Practice is not directed to the creation of a new and universal community. The dualism between theory and practice remains. But in fact, if not in intention, theory and practice are united in all human life, and the formal intention of progress determines unconsciously a progress in the practical field. The end to which this progress moves, however, is the destruction of individualism. Society becomes progressively more individualist, in two ways: firstly, in the spread of the individualist attitude to ever larger sections of European society; and secondly, in its spread through deeper layers of individual consciousness. Individualism penetrates downwards from the upper class into the suppressed class; and it penetrates downwards from the superficial layers of consciousness into the suppressed layers. The first aspect of the development shows in history as the successive rising of social classes into the struggle for freedom; and the second aspect shows itself as a progressive release from unconscious suppressions, i.e. from the control of action by tradition. Since the most deeply suppressed layer is the sexual, this progress terminates in the conscious

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effort to secure individual freedom and equality in the relation of the sexes, with the consequent dissolution of the basic community life of the family. This process, because of its individualistic or anti-social character, necessarily produces the opposite of its intention. It replaces the spiritual bondage to tradition which is broken by an external and material bondage to "natural law", which means, as we have seen, the necessity of social unity. If social unity is not maintained by love, it must be maintained by force, since human life is, in fact, social.

This process of individualism has, as its consequence in general, the final realization of a pure dualism between mind and matter; that is to say, between the ideal aspect of life and the material or practical. As the ideal of freedom is more and more realized in the European mind, its practical life becomes more and more a bondage to material necessity. Thus the social dualism of modern society tends to a point at which it is purely based upon wealth, and upon wealth in its most purely technical and impersonal form, which is money. Money is the mystery of the modern world; and it is a mystery because if it were not, the modern world would collapse. A mature individualist society must not understand money, or the dualism which is the form of its consciousness would disappear. For money is the symbol of the self-contradiction of modern society. It is at once the means of individual freedom and of social bondage. Its possession measures the worth of the individual human being, for it measures his "independence", his freedom from society, his escape from the necessity of working. But its use, which should mean the realization of his freedom in action, is the measure of his dependence upon society.

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It can only be used by being spent; by being transferred to other individuals. If he keeps his money he remains free and independent, but then it is valueless in practice, for its practical value lies only in exchange. If he spends it he realizes its use, but at the expense of losing his freedom and being reduced to the necessity of "working for his living".

As a result the class distinctions of modern society are fluid. They rest upon the shifting basis of the possession of money, and the relative amount of money possessed. They function through a continual process of exchange. The inferior is the poor man, the superior the rich man. The upper class is the class of rich men, the lower the class of poor men. But the rich man may be ruined by a stroke of luck on the Exchange, and become a member of the inferior class. And the poor man, if he can gain possession of money, becomes a member of the upper class. So the whole process admits of endless relativity.

Since individualist freedom is freedom from work, that is to say, freedom from the social nature of personal life, it can only be gained at the expense of others, by making other members of society work for you as well as for themselves. This divides society into two classes, those who set others to work—the employers; and those who are set to work—the employed. But because freedom and equality are conscious ideals, this naked employment of others to relieve you of work and so make you "free and independent" must not appear to be what it really is. Money secures this substitution of appearance for reality; for money really represents the power to make other people work for its "owner"; while it appears to be a private possession of a purely material char-

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acter measuring the "value" of other material goods, and exchangeable for them. Every member of such a society can *appear* to be a free agent, and the possessor of money can actually control the other members of society while seeming to interfere in no way with their freedom. Moreover, it enables the ruling class to be unconscious that it is a class by making their social relations indirect, in terms of material interests. Its members are in competition with one another; their unity against the lower classes is unconscious and practical, not conscious and theoretical. They do not form a community united by spiritual or reflective bonds. They are only forced into unity of action by these "inexorable economic laws" over which they have no control. Their unity, therefore, only appears in face of a threat to the "property structure" of society. The common action which they take to preserve their possessions, and so their power over the rest of the community, is always against their will; it always appears as a deplorable necessity which they must undertake as a duty for the good of the community. For in the mature society with an individualist outlook, the struggle for freedom is the struggle for money.

It would be wrong to assume that modern society does not achieve freedom at all. There is one field in which individualism is compatible with freedom, and that is the field of reflection. In reflection individualism is a reality. Both thought and emotion, the two aspects of reflective consciousness, are inherently private and individual. If they are realized in action they are necessarily published, and cease to be private in becoming social. But if they are dissociated from action, and made ends in themselves, then they con-

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stitute "another world" which is a private world of ideas. *In fact* this world of ideas is not individual. It has a reference to the real world of practical activity. But the reflective activity which sustains it is individual of necessity. No man can think another's thoughts or feel another's emotions. And the conscious intention of the individual need not go further than the ideal world of his own reflected self-hood. The individualist can thus realize himself progressively *in idea*, and make *experience* his aim. Thus the modern world can achieve an ideal freedom, and even the idea of practical freedom. What it cannot achieve is the reality of freedom—freedom of action. Ultimately it cannot because it will not. Its will is egocentric, while action cannot be egocentric, since it is necessarily social. Individualism rests upon the impulse to be responsible to no one but myself, and so to escape responsibility to others. But action necessitates social responsibility, and the individualist ideal is therefore only possible if he identifies himself with his reflective self, and seeks his freedom in thought or feeling. In action he is bound by material necessity, but he can achieve freedom of thought and freedom of mind, and with this the ideal symbol of reflective community, freedom of speech. Moreover this freedom is no longer the freedom of contemplation which was the Greek ideal, nor the tranquillity of spirit of the Stoics. Christianity has altered this; the Hebrew consciousness has penetrated so far into the European spirit that it is consciously progressive. Freedom now means creative spontaneity, and the freedom of reflection which has been achieved is freedom to create in the world of ideas. The modern world progressively achieves the intention of progress in the intellectual and the emotional

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fields—in science and in art. In science above all, because, as we have seen, the spiritual side of modern life is itself secular in form, as against the religious form of the Mediæval world which it negates; while the Western Church itself is intellectual in contrast to its opposite the Eastern Church, which is æsthetic in its spirituality. It should perhaps be noted here, in passing, that in a dualist form of consciousness, the opposition between action and reflection is itself reflected back and appears as an opposition between intellect and emotion, between thought and feeling, the two aspects of the reflective life. Thought and feeling, or reason and emotion, can only be integrated in action. In reflection they fall apart and must be developed separately. In dualist reflection, where the intention does not travel further than the ideal world of the reflected self, they are not merely separated but brought into opposition. As a result the ideal spontaneity of the modern world achieves both progress in knowledge and progress in art; but art and science are in opposition to one another; and science is dominant while art is suppressed. This modern conflict between the intellectual and the æsthetic creativeness is not at first sight so obvious as it should be, because the modern mind, which is non-religious, tends to identify religion and art by conceiving religion as emotional and mystical. It recognizes in consequence a conflict between science and religion, where what is really present is a conflict between the intellectual and the emotional aspects of reflective life. Science is the creation of intellectual freedom; art of emotional freedom. Religious creation is impossible for a dualist consciousness, since that implies creation of community, not in idea but in action.

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The real creation of the modern world is science. In its philosophy there is development, but it is formal rather than real. It defines the reflected self and its self-consciousness; and seeks to overcome, in idea, the dualism that it creates. The resolutions of the dualism are necessarily unsuccessful, because they are the work of dualist thought, and the monistic conclusions are refuted by the dualism of the thought that produces them. They are self-conscious philosophies, and in their final outcome philosophies of self-consciousness. They do not concern us in detail, but it is worth while to notice how Descartes, who is the source of modern philosophy and who prescribes its universal form, corroborates the analysis which we have given, though of course, unconsciously. His starting-point, the famous "Cogito, ergo sum", yields him the certainty of his own existence as a thinking being. It thus makes the reflective self the centre of reflective attention, and establishes a dualism between the Self and the World, which is generalized into a dualism between mind and matter. But the underlying meaning of the "Cogito" is the self-assertion of the individual as an activity of thinking. "I am a thinking being" signifies, as an attitude to life, "I will not be passive in reflection; I will not accept my beliefs on the authority of tradition; I will think for myself." So the philosophy of Descartes rests upon the assertion of individual freedom in the field of reflection. In this there is concealed the negation of freedom in the field of action. Descartes does not claim freedom to act, only freedom to think. This is not a mere omission. It is both central to his position and suppressed from consciousness. Thinking is the *essence* of the self. The self is a mind. The body is excluded from the self, and is not essential to

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selfhood. Consequently the only intention that the self can have is a reflective intention. Knowledge is its goal. This identification of the self with mind, and so with the spontaneity of reflective life in a world of ideas, in opposition to a material world which is *external* to it is characteristic of all modern philosophy; and we can see at a glance, in view of what we have already said, that it is simply the reflective expression of the character of modern society. The "Cogito, ergo sum" is in fact equivalent to the assertion, "I will not be a worker."

The self-negation involved in this necessarily develops as a self-frustration. The mind is forced to construct a picture of the world which is its own contradictory and its own completion. The external world becomes an automatic system of activities governed by laws of a complete and rigid determinism. And this external world includes the body. Consequently all human action in the world is completely determined by laws which cannot be broken. Freedom of action is impossible. We are free to think, but not to act. But now, if the self is part of the world, its activities of thought must be subject to the same determinism, and we cannot be free to think, and the freedom of thought is an illusion. On the other hand, if we are free to think, then the self (which is the free mind) and its activities and ideas are not part of the world, but belong to another world which has no essential relation to the external world. In that case the thought constructions of the mind can have no necessary relation, indeed no relation at all, to the external world. Knowledge of reality becomes impossible. The self can only know the world of its own ideas; and this is not the knowledge which the self set out to seek, but its negation. This is

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Kant's conclusion. "Reality is unknowable." Freedom and determinism are contradictory. "We cannot comprehend freedom, but we can comprehend its incomprehensibility." In this world our actions are determined, but our wills are free because they belong to another, and unknowable, world. The world we know is the reflection of our own activities of knowing. And we must not overlook the fact that this means that our idea of the external world, governed by automatic processes, and determined throughout, is the reflection of our own way of thinking.

What is this but the self-frustration of the individualist mind? Individualist society, as we have seen, seeks freedom in an escape from work, and so in reflection, in preoccupation with the self. For this it needs a world in which work is done automatically. Its *ideal* world is a world which *works* by determinate laws, so that it can be free to consider itself and enjoy its own reflection. And it finds in consequence that unless it is itself bound in this automatism it cannot be free, and if it is so bound it cannot be free either. So individualism destroys itself by its refusal to be part of a work-a-day world.

The ethic of the modern world, on the other hand, is an ethic of duty and obligation, either through obedience to a moral law, or through the performance of social functions. It must be cut loose from religion so that it may be an autonomous ethic; and it must either have no end beyond itself, or the end must be subjective. Virtue may be its own reward, or it may be a means to happiness or self-perfection. But right action is always *obligatory*. And the obligation is always a compulsion to curb the spontaneity of action. Its clearest and most uncompromising expression is to

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be found in Kant, who identifies acting from duty with freedom. The will is free only when it acts under obligation. This is indeed true of an individualist society. The freedom of the individuals must be a subjective freedom, and its condition is that society should be automatic and bound. Kant is explicitly an extreme individualist in ethics. All my duties, he maintains, are essentially duties to myself. My duties to other persons are secondary and derivative, and rest on the fact that they also are free individuals, and my freedom must not interfere with theirs. How then is society possible? Only if each free individual imposes a universal law upon himself which is the same for all the individuals. This would achieve a society of persons on condition that none of them acted from inclination, and so exercised freedom of action. Each will then retain the form of freedom, provided none of them claim its substance. Freedom is achieved by not acting freely. Each will exercise his freedom of will by using it to suppress his own freedom of action in favour of a universal law which determines the actions of everyone alike. So the freedom of the self becomes a slavery to the self. The self negates itself in action in order to be free in theory. In the social field Rousseau's theory of the free society is the exact counterpart of Kant's ethical theory. It is the source of all modern democratic theory. The obligation to obey the will of society—the general will—is squared with the demand for individual freedom by representing each individual as willing his own subordination to the law which society imposes. And this absolute obligation to act in the way determined by society is represented as real freedom. All the individuals *will* the same law. If any individual transgresses this law, and so fails to do his

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duty in society, society will "force him to be free." So the illusion of freedom (and the reality of reflective or subjective freedom) is achieved by a formal and mystical identification of the individual with society. The self-centred individual has abolished society in thought, only by submitting to the complete domination of society in practice. And what is this "society" but all the other people appearing anonymously or objectively as a system of external law by which the individual is bound, and from whom he is struggling to be free. More simply, it is the necessity of getting work done in a society of individuals all of whom are in theory free to refuse work. They are all free in idea because they are all under necessity in practice.

In the modern form of dualism, then, the isolated self is brought into opposition to an external world. The external world is governed by necessity, the isolated self is free. Moreover, in their isolation, all the individuals are equal, because they are free from one another. They are, in reflection, identical units. But the external world has two forms, as the reflection shifts from the theoretical to the practical field; from cosmology to ethics. Cosmologically, the external world is the material universe which is opposed to the spiritual. Matter is bound by law; spirit is free. Ethically, the external world is Society. Then as individuals men are free, but as members of Society they are bound by necessary laws. Society must at once be composed of individuals and yet be opposed to individuals. It is opposed to them as the State, which is at once identical with and different from Society. In a word, there is no *real* community. There is a mystical or theoretical community of the spiritual individuals, and an actual compulsory unity of individuals under

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law, backed by force. This dualism, however, must never be admitted in theory, although it cannot be escaped in practice. The State must appear as a spiritual society. Law must exhibit the form of freedom. All citizens must be equal before the law, and all citizens must freely impose the law on themselves. Thus the pressure of progress in individualist society creates a formal or theoretical or "spiritual" democracy; in which the political aspect of life is opposed to the economic. In modern democracy all men are politically free and equal, and economically bound by "inexorable" laws. And this "freedom" and "bondage" are two sides of the same thing; they are contradictory and yet inseparable. It is only by having a material life in a material world completely organized, completely determined, and completely automatic that there can be a spiritual life of the mind which is completely free. If the individual acts freely he necessarily loses his spiritual freedom. Because that would mean the loss of his individual isolation, which for the egocentric self is its *real* life. It would involve the end of dualism and the unity of reflection and action in action. It would mean binding himself in communal relations with all the other individuals. It is this above all else that is impossible for the individualist. He must assert himself against the others and free himself from essential relations with them. This is the form of the individualist will to power. The individual must save his own self-hood from the world of externality. And he is incapable, so long as he remains an individualist, of realizing that in thus seeking to save his life he loses it. He cannot think that by losing his individuality in community he would find it.

So the modern world falls under the law of self-

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frustration and destroys itself. Its aim of freedom, equality and progress through the escape from externality—from its own material nature as a community of workers—necessarily achieves its opposite. Like the Mediæval world it is driven, by its own efforts to maintain itself, to create within it the new world which will inherit its achievement; though, because the Modern world lives at a higher stage of progress, the process is both more rapid and more conscious. It has two sides, which reflect the dualism of its form—a theoretical one and a practical one. The theoretical one—which is intentional because it is reflective, is the creation of science. The practical one, which is the unintentional but necessary consequence of this, is the creation of an organized industrialism. Both these achievements are *technical*, that is to say, they achieve not human ends, but the means to human ends, and the reason for this is clear from our analysis. The negative form of freedom which is the aim of the egocentric self makes it incapable of determining external ends. As a form of the will to power it inverts the true relation of means and end. What is by nature the means to ends becomes for the dualist consciousness an end in itself. Consequently where it realizes its ends, they turn out to be not really ends but means to real ends, which it cannot use. The achievements of individualist society are necessarily technical; and they are the means to achieving a non-individualist, communist or at least collectivist society. But to use them would be to destroy itself.

The production of science is both necessary to modern society and yet contradictory to it. (We may note in passing that this explains the combination of preoccupation with science and antagonism to science

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that is characteristic of modern philosophy.) We have seen that self-consciousness and the consequent limitation of freedom to the "spiritual" or theoretical field, sets modern man in opposition to the external world. It is the necessity of the practical life which is the obstacle to individual freedom. But the drive to progress and the achievement of freedom and equality, even in its negative or theoretical form, is real, and is a partial acceptance of the pressure of Christianity. Consequently the overcoming of the obstacle to its realization is the problem that faces modern society. This necessarily involves, in those individuals in whom the creative impulse is effective, a preoccupation with the external world. The underlying impulse is to "control" the external world; indeed, in a sense, to "suppress" it. The scientists are the "hermits" or "monks" of the modern world. They differ from their prototypes as the modern world differs from the mediæval. Their retirement from the world is free, not organized; and their self-imposed task is to achieve spontaneity of reflection, not conformity to a rule of belief. The opposition they have to overcome is not in their own creative impulse, but in the external world, over against which they stand, and which is theoretically the material world, and, practically, society. The centre of interest and attention thus becomes not the self, but the external world. Thus the scientific mind is forced into objectivity by the effort of society to escape from objectivity. Science negates the subjective isolation of the individualist mind in its very effort to maintain it, and destroys the egocentricity which gives birth to it. The modern world is intensely egocentric in its attitude; therefore it is compelled to create a scientific theory of the universe which is the complete negation of this claim of the in-

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dividual to be the centre of all reality. Its materialism negates the spiritual conception of the self. Its universality negates individualism. It is impersonal, non-ethical, and has no room in it for freedom or spontaneity. It shifts the centre of reality from the mind to the external world; from man's own world to the sun, and from the sun to some unimaginably distant spot in interstellar space. Man himself shrinks to an insignificant and unnecessary atom on the surface of a relatively unimportant planet; and the individual becomes a mere momentary expression of the life of the species. In the end this reveals that mind itself is an illusion; that freedom of thought is a mere appearance, and freedom of action an absurdity. So modern man creates the negation of his own egocentricity.

This so-called "scientific" picture of the world is, however, not science. It is the effect of science upon the individualist mind. In particular, the emotions that are attached to it are quite extraneous to science. They express the fear of the isolated self before its own isolation from the world. For the development of science means the discovery of the unreality of the isolated individual. Through science modern man discovers his own powerlessness, and his own meaninglessness in isolation from the world and from the human community. His individual freedom becomes an increasing and terrifying loneliness. The materialist metaphysic which develops in the modern mind under the influence of science is simply the complementary opposite of its conception of its own spiritual reality. It is the suppressed side of the dualism forcing its way into consciousness.

Science itself is not a metaphysic, but an organized knowledge of fixed habits of behaviour in the external

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world. It is a special kind of knowledge arising from the peculiar preoccupation with the world which gives it its impulse. It aims, though unconsciously, at control, and selects and organizes its material from this point of view. And for this reason it is experimental. This is of fundamental importance. It means that the European mind has achieved the unity of theory and practice (which the Jewish consciousness demands) in its method of understanding. Experiment is action based on theory and determining theory. Science is real knowledge because it has overcome dualism: it is therefore the expression of the full achievement of the Christian intention; and its capacity for co-operative progress, which knows no frontiers of race or nationality or sex, its ability to predict, and its ability to control, are the fullest manifestation of Christianity that Europe has yet seen.

But this great Christian achievement is limited. It is limited in the first place by the theoretical character of the intention. The unity of theory and practice is only found in the means to knowledge. The spirit of the modern world insists that science should be purely theoretical in its objective. It must pursue knowledge for its own sake. The knowledge so gained must not be unified with action for the sake of action. The end must be dualist and spiritual, even if the means are not dualist. Now scientific knowledge is power; and the will to scientific knowledge is the will to power. And as we have seen the will to power is not the will to use power, but to possess it. So the knowledge which science achieves must not be used as an instrument of human action; it must be reflected back on itself as its own end. But science has achieved the reality of progress, and it can only be reflected back on itself

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dynamically. Power gained must be used to secure more power; and the knowledge that is power must only be used to secure more knowledge of the same kind. So modern society builds up within itself an increasing and accumulating store of scientific knowledge, based on the unity of theory and practice, which is available for the control of the world for human self-realization, and cannot use it. For if it did its whole dualist structure would be destroyed, individualism would disappear, society would be integrated as a community, and the Jewish consciousness would triumph. It must suppress its use, prevent it from breaking out of the isolated self into human action for the transformation of the world. And such suppression has the effect of increasing the energy of what is suppressed, and in the long run must achieve the opposite of its intention. To-day, at the end of the modern period, we are only too painfully aware of this. Science, which is the achieved spontaneity of thought, is actively destroying modern civilization. We can no longer control it. We *must* use it, and yet we can only use it for the destruction of our civilization. Western Europe is now actively building its economic and practical life round the use of scientific knowledge for the construction of armaments. It is, at last, as we should expect from our understanding of history, driven, against its will, to unify theory and practice for its own destruction. The will to individual freedom which is the conscious side of the egocentric mind, has as its unconscious opposite the exclusion of society, that is to say, the others, from consciousness. If this egocentricity is driven into action, it must take the form of excluding the others from freedom and from life. And in killing the others it kills itself. "Whosoever

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hateth his brother is a murderer." And hatred is love frustrated by fear.

This is the conscious and theoretical side of the modern achievement. But however much the dualist mind may insist on pure knowledge being the end of science, it cannot annul the actual unity of theory and practice which is the truth of all personal life. It can only suppress it from consciousness by refusing to *intend* the corresponding material development. The intentional unity of theory and practice for the sake of theory is necessarily accompanied by an unintentional unification of theory and practice in the practical field. The organization of knowledge as power is planned; but it is accompanied by its shadow—an unplanned organization of social behaviour as power. Because this process is unplanned and unintended, it appears as a mere social development proceeding according to determinate laws of Nature. It is apprehended as external to man, as a process of natural evolution in the external world. (For society, as we have seen, is "external" to the self-centred and reflective consciousness.) But in reality it is that increasing automatism of practical life, that progressive mechanization of practical relationships which is the complementary opposite of the increasing spontaneity of the inner life. The freedom of the mind which is isolated from practical behaviour, demands determinism in the practical or material field as its outer condition. Moreover, since the conscious progress of scientific knowledge is technical, so the corresponding unconscious progress in the external life is technical also. It is the organization of power; and the social organizations which it produces are "Powers". In this field also power, which is a means, becomes an end, and power

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achieved can only be used to create more power. The wealth which is accumulated by the process can only be used to accumulate more wealth.

The impulse of the egocentric self is, as we have seen, to mechanize the material life, in order to achieve freedom from work. The possession of money is the means to this end, because it is the power to compel others to work, and so to shift the burden of labour from oneself on to "Society". But, alas! it is only by spending the money on the others that this can actually be achieved, and money spent is money lost. If his end is to be achieved the individualist must be able to spend money without losing it. This is obviously not possible. You cannot eat your cake and have it. But it is possible to *seem* to do so, and this is the achievement of capitalism. The money I have can be *invested*. It is spent, and yet I am *credited* with it as if it were not. This is one of the triumphs of freedom of thought. So long as society will credit me with the possession of wealth I can actually lose it while retaining its ideal substance—the power to make other people work for me. I can live by owning, not by working. My money shall be my material self, and work for me; so that I needn't work. In fact, what I do is to live by spending, not the money that I own—my capital—but the interest on it. Society pays me for my ownership of capital, and this payment, of course, means that I am given more power to make people work for me than I already possess. If I do not spend all of this I can reinvest some of it, and compel society to pay me more than before. Thus the process becomes a process of the accumulation of capital. I can thus own money without using it by allowing other people to use it without owning it.

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There is no need to follow out in detail the mechanism of this social mystification, in which real wealth is opposed to ideal wealth, and the ideal wealth appears to be real. That has been done by others, especially by Karl Marx. Our interest lies in seeing how the process achieves its opposite, and destroys the system which it sets up, from the point of view of the law of self-frustration which Jesus discovered. Now the aim of the individualist is self-cultivation. He can achieve this only by securing leisure, and leisure only by a mechanization of the practical life. But this mechanization involves a unity of theory and practice in the practical field. The material world does not supply man's material needs automatically. If it is to do so it must be by making labour, which cannot be escaped, as mechanical as possible. This is possible, in turn, only by planning; by turning from traditional methods, applying creative thought to the means of labour and developing freely a technique of production.

In its first stages this effort is negative: it is an attempt to break down the resistances to the accumulation of capital and allow a general development of the process of trading which had begun in the practical self-contradiction of the Middle Ages. When this stage is sufficiently advanced the process passes on to the positive stage of industrialization in which the owner of accumulated capital "organizes labour". He becomes the planner. His work is reflective. He thinks out the organization of labour and sets it to work. So he becomes a manufacturer, a man who makes things—boots or blankets or pottery—by thinking and not by working. Labour is thus banished from his life, and he lives a purely mental existence. Since for the modern consciousness it is the mind which is the real self, the

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real shoemaker is the owner of the factory, not the men who handle the leather. They are merely "his hands". But there is also a third stage of the process which is necessary to the completeness of this escape from the body into a purely mental existence. The business of planning labour and mechanizing the process of production still keeps the owner of capital bound to the cares of this world. He is not free in his mind so long as his freedom of thought is necessarily concerned with the organization of material activity. He cannot concentrate fully upon his own spiritual life. He must think for others. But he can secure complete freedom for himself by hiring other people to do the work of planning the work for him. So he retires further into his heaven of spiritual existence. He becomes an investor, concerned only with the accumulation of capital and not at all with its use. And presently even this infringement of his freedom is handed over to the organizers of investment. Everything practical is done for him by others, and he becomes a gentleman at leisure. He has nothing to do but enjoy his own experience. He has created his ideal—an automatic society which does all the necessary work for him and so makes him a free individual who can live without working. But in the process he has completely negated his own reality. His "superiority" is in fact a complete dependence upon his "inferiors". They are indispensable to him; he is not indispensable to them. And he can only exist at all so long as society *thinks* he is indispensable. His existence now depends upon his ability to keep up appearances.

The basis for this keeping up of appearances at the expense of reality is the persistence of the peculiar dualism of the modern consciousness. Freedom and

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equality must *appear* to be realized. Everyone must believe that they are equal and free, and this can be achieved so long as everyone remains an individualist, intending his own purely "spiritual" self-realization, and identifying the reality of himself with the life of the mind and not with the material life. For this reason the modern idealism thinks that the manufacturer employs *labour* and not *men*. Men must remain free. But as men they are minds—thinking beings, and therefore in employing their labour he is not employing the real man; and in mechanizing labour he is not mechanizing men; in organizing labour he is not organizing men. The egocentric dualism not merely permits, but compels modern society to oppose body and mind, and so to suppress from consciousness the material reality of human life. So labour can appear as a pure mechanism; and a struggle between capital and labour can appear to be quite compatible with the friendliest relations between capitalists and labourers as free and equal members of a democratic community. It is only their material interests that are in conflict; in spirit they remain united, all equally intending the common good.

In reality what is happening is that the intention is not being realized; but its opposite. The individualist will to power necessarily achieves collectivism in the organization of society. The only way by which the individualist can succeed in setting himself free as a pure spiritual being released from the necessity of work, is by obtaining power to organize the workers. It is possible to separate and oppose mind and matter, body and soul in theory; but it is not possible in practice. It is possible in theory to organize labour without organizing the labourers themselves, but not in reality. The

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organization of labour is in reality the collectivization of the workers. It is they who are in reality formed into co-operating groups of progressively increasing size and elaboration. In this way there is created an increasing dualism in society between a class of owners who are in practice competing individualists and a class of workers who are in practice co-operating collectively. The producers of real wealth become collective and co-operative. The owners of ideal wealth become competitive and individualist.

This is, however, only the material and practical aspect of the process. So long as the dualism of theory and practice remains the form of consciousness; so long as freedom, equality and community remain in idea purely "spiritual" ends, both owners and workers will remain unconscious of this process, and will remain in thought free and equal individuals. But the process itself prevents this. It forces upon society an increasing unity of theory and practice. On the ideal side the necessity of maintaining the dualism of appearance and reality compels the creation and development of the forms of democracy, and so creates the instrument and the technique of social freedom of action. If the form of modern society is to be maintained this instrument must not be used for real democratic ends, but only for formal and ideal ends. The majority of the equal and free individuals must, for example, have the formal right to deprive the owners of their private possession of accumulated wealth, but this right must not be exercised in practice. Yet the working class is increasingly the great majority of the members of society. This result can only be achieved by maintaining the dualism in consciousness. The majority must *willingly* refrain from using their formal rights. If the working

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class developed a consciousness of their collective reality against the individualism of the ruling class; if they ceased to intend merely individual freedom in idea and intended it in practice the whole form of modern life would collapse. Freedom of collective action would take the place of freedom of the individual mind. The Christian intention of the Hebrew consciousness would win another resounding triumph. But equally, if the effort to use these formal rights in practice were met by a resort to force this also would mean the collapse of the form of the modern world. It would mean the abrogation of the forms of freedom and equality and therefore of the dualism between freedom of thought and mechanization of practice. The modern world can only maintain itself by spiritual pressure, since its ideal is a pure spirituality.

But it is driven to destroy the possibility of this by its own effort and against its own intention. In the first place, it can only achieve the organization of labour with the consent and spiritual co-operation of the workers. It is compelled to create a system of compulsory universal education. The social dualism between upper and lower classes only corresponds properly to the dualism of mind and matter if the superior class is an educated class and the inferior uneducated. Compulsory education, however limited it may be, is the beginning of a process which inevitably destroys the power of the individualist upper class. Yet it is imposed in order to secure the means to power for the upper class. The spiritual freedom of the egocentric mind, its release from preoccupation with work, makes it necessary that the worker shall put his mind into his work and not merely his body. The workers cannot be merely "hands". Their hands must have heads

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behind them—workers' heads, preoccupied with work.

But this in turn sets going a process by which the collective character of industrialized labour becomes conscious in the working class, and a unity of theory and practice in the workers is achieved. The consciousness of the collective character of labour will thus emerge and initiate the process of the formation in the workers of a collectivist consciousness. The workers will then begin to organize themselves, primarily for formal ends of a practical character. The formation of Trade Unions is the result of this; for in the trade union the fact of collectivity has become the effective consciousness of collectivity. But this collective consciousness is still limited by the dualism in the minds of the workers. The unity of theory and practice, just as in the case of science, remains ideal in its intention. The Trade Union is a purely practical organization, having as its function the safeguarding of the rights of the workers in working practice, their freedom to perform their function as workers, and to sell their labour freely and to secure their share of leisure or freedom from work in which they can live human lives as free individuals. But the Unions become necessarily more than this; they become centres of a collective life of the workers as human beings, not as workers; and help to carry the process from the purely economic plane into the political field. Political labour parties arise, representing the collectivity of labour in society, expressing its growing consciousness of collective being, and defending its formal rights to freedom and equality in an individualist society. Here again the dualist form must be maintained. The economic organization of the Trade Unions and the political organization of the Labour Parties must be apparently separate and

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independent. The political party must concern itself with the ideal field—the securing of the freedom and equality of all individuals in the society as a formal unity of persons, while the Trade Unions are concerned with the practical interests of the workers as workers. But the increasing pressure of the social development makes it harder and harder to maintain this distinction in practice, and ultimately in theory.

In the next stage this leads to the development of the idea of a socialist society, as the conscious intention of the political labour parties, and of the self-conscious elements in the working-class movement. A political party which must be in the position to form an alternative government, is compelled to create and define a political policy which is an alternative policy, and which must express the ideals of the new working-class consciousness which it represents. This socialist policy is the penetration of a purely reflective socialist theory into the field of formal action, and it carries the process of the unification of theory and practice a stage further. But it remains an ideal, and the dualist consciousness still determines the form of society and the behaviour of all parties. The socialist consciousness still remains dualist; it still thinks that socialism can be achieved without a social unification of theory and practice, without any fusion of the political and economic fields, without any modification of the structure of society or of the substance of law. It still intends, that is to say, a formal socialism by the further development of the formal and technical freedom and equality of all citizens as individuals, a mere extension of the form of modern society which makes no radical break with its traditional structure. It still cannot see that this must mean only an increase in the suppression of freedom

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in the practical field and an increase of the stringency of the material forces to which, in idea, it is opposed.

But at this point the process which has produced the working-class movement cannot go a step further without producing a revolution in society. The means for a collectivist society have been created; and the idea of a socialist society has been generated and a practical instrument for the construction of socialist society has been forged. The contradiction between theory and practice has been brought to the threshold of consciousness. One further step in the process of development will compel theory and practice into unity, and it can do it most simply by revealing the contradiction between the theory and practice of a socialist government which makes the attempt to introduce socialism without unifying the political and economic functions of social life. If they make the attempt they must inevitably produce an economic crisis. If they still persist in their idealism they must combine with the representatives of the ruling classes to achieve a purely political unification of parties at the expense of the workers. In either case, by maintaining dualism they produce a unity of theory and practice in theory; which must in turn create its opposite, the unity of theory and practice in practice.

This summary account of the way in which the individualist will to power necessarily produces its opposite in practice and so destroys itself and achieves the opposite of its intention is already sufficient for our needs. Its main purpose has been to reveal the necessity of the process and its connexion with the pressure of Christianity, in its true Hebrew form, upon the non-religious, dualist consciousness of Europe. The necessity of the process is shown in particular by the

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fact that each step is forced upon modern society against its will. The unification of theory and practice in the field of practice is always resisted both by the working class and by the ruling class; and this resistance is always unsuccessful. Only the unification of theory and practice could successfully resist the pressure. The reason why the ruling class has never been able to prevent the growth from stage to stage of the workers' movement is because it would have to unify its own theory and practice and so destroy its own basis in consciousness, to do so. For it could only resist by throwing overboard the ideal of freedom and equality, destroying the democratic form of society and actively controlling the collective organization of industry for a practical end. In either case collectivism would triumph over individualism, and the freedom which is an escape from society would end. This is the dilemma of the ruling class in modern society. It must produce its opposite. For the process of practical collectivization is the condition of its own individualist and ideal freedom; and yet, if it prevents this collectivization, it destroys itself just as surely as it destroys itself by failing to prevent it. One result, which we need only mention in passing, is that the development of conscious collectivism in the workers produces a corresponding and opposite collectivization of the employers. The self-organization of the workers, as against their organization by the employers, is answered by a self-organization of the employers, which has a corresponding development to that of working-class collectivism. This combination of capital, which is a hidden combination of capitalists, is itself a form of the unification of theory and practice in the employing class against the workers. But it is necessarily a

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negative phenomenon, in contradiction with itself. For its purpose is anti-collectivist. It is a defensive weapon against the forces leading to the destruction of individualism. Yet it is easy to see that it must achieve its opposite—the limitation of “free” competition and the suppression of individual ownership. This movement, too, must develop forms of political action, while retaining the appearance of the separation and even the opposition of its economic and political activities. And it tends also to the unification of the theoretical and practical activities of society. The political and economic functions of the ruling class tend to fuse; and at the point at which the appearance of a distinction between theory and practice can be maintained no longer, this process too, against the will of the ruling class, will force a revolution and destroy the form of the modern consciousness and of modern society. The working-class movement tends towards communism in practice but rejects the intention of it; while the employing class tends equally in the direction of fascism against its intention. These movements are necessitated and compulsory in both cases. In intention both classes seek the preservation of ideal democracy, which means the restriction of freedom, equality and community to the political field; to the form of social relationship in opposition to its material economic substance.

We see, then, how necessary is the working of the practical law of contradiction in the modern world. The discovery of Jesus is completely verified by the whole course of European history down to our own day. The will to power necessarily frustrates itself. The dualism which it establishes in the life of men, by creating an intention which negates its own reality,

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compels him to achieve what he is seeking to prevent. The human will which is opposed to the will of God necessarily accomplishes the will of God and not its own will. In the modern period, the egocentric will to freedom and equality of the individual self in isolation necessarily achieves its own destruction and the establishment of its opposite—collectivism and the collective mind which intends freedom of *action* and equality in the *material* field. The accomplishment of the Christian intention of a universal community of freedom and equality is inevitable. Christianity leads to liberalism, liberalism to ideal socialism, ideal socialism to communism, as the fascist philosophers are accustomed nowadays to assert.

But how is it, we must ask, that fascism and not socialism is the product of this process so far in Western Europe? How does fascism as we see it in Italy and Germany fit into this progress of the triumph of Christianity? Why is the first socialist society established in Russia, not in the West; and why is it anti-religious and anti-Christian? The latter question we have already answered in anticipation. Soviet Russia is the nearest approach to the realization of the Christian intention that the world has yet seen, for the intention of a universal community based on equality and freedom, overriding differences of nationality, race, sex and "religion", is its explicit and conscious purpose. It expresses the continuity of the Christian intention in an explicit and practical form, and thus marks an immense human advance in the progress that Jesus began. It is anti-Christian because it completes the process which began in the Roman Empire of the self-negation of the Christian Church, and which made all the conscious Christianities of Europe the religions

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of secular societies built on the will to power, and practical negations of the Christian intention. Christianity has come to full consciousness in the world as a substantial, secular, material intention which negates its own form. The mediæval Christianity, through the acceptance of dualism, became spiritual in idea and material in fact; other-worldly in form but this-worldly in substance. The Christian intention was forced into opposition to a spiritual will to power, and became necessarily, in the modern period, a secular and material pressure opposing the "spiritual" will to power, first in its religious and then in its secular form. Because socialism came into existence as the material aspect of a dualism, its opposition to the idealist aspect marks its primary form. The consequence is that modern communism is still unconscious of its historic continuity with its Christian origin, and identifies Christianity, and religion in general, with the dualistic spiritualism which is the self-negation of Christianity. Yet the practical proof of this continuity is the disappearance, in Russia, of the persecution of the Jews, and the practical solution of the Jewish problem. Once we have understood the Jewish consciousness, and consequently the significance of the life and teaching of Jesus, the "anti-Christian" form of the realization of the substance of Christianity is no longer a paradox. It is at once inevitable and the source of a dangerous limitation. The disappearance of dualism is not complete in Soviet Russia. Russia is communist in intention, not in fact; and progress has gone so far that Russia is conscious of this. But the realizing of this intention depends upon the full discovery of the historic continuity of Russian socialism with its Jewish origin in the religious consciousness.

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The reason why it was in Russia that socialism was first realized has also been anticipated. We saw that the dualism of theory and practice is necessarily reflected back into the theoretical life as a dualism of intellect and emotion; and it was this dualism that resulted in the great schism that divided Christendom into an Eastern and a Western Church; the Eastern developing an emotional, dramatic spirituality and the Western an intellectual and scientific spirituality. Now it is emotion which furnishes the driving forces of action—its spiritual substance, as it were. The intellect is formal and technical, providing the means and the direction of action. The intellect *moves* nothing, as Aristotle said. It was in Russia, therefore, that the reservoir of emotional energy for the accomplishment of the revolution was built up. It was in the West, and in Germany in particular, that the intellectual mechanism of understanding and direction was created. But in separation, intellect and emotion are powerless. Emotion remains blind and intellect has neither hands nor feet. It was the penetration of the Marxist theory by the emotional driving force of the Russian people that alone could produce that unity of theory and practice in action which was involved in the practical realization of a socialist society. Further, Marxist theory was a fairly recent introduction into Russia, and the fusion of the emotional organization of the Russian people produced by centuries of Eastern Christianity with the developed and organized theoretical progress of Western Europe was very imperfect at the time of the revolution and remains still very incomplete. This is reflected in the formal dualism of Soviet organization under the leadership of the communist party. Here again the conscious intention is their fusion, as is

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shown by the Soviet democratic organization of the whole people and its intimate and ambiguous relation to the party dictatorship, as well as by the terms of the new constitution. But the achievement of this intention is proving much more difficult in practice than was anticipated; and this is ultimately due to the purely negative relation of the theory and practice of the regime to religion. For the unification of theory and practice, of the intellect and the emotions in communal life is the essence of religion. The anti-religious attitude of mind looks to the formal organization of the material structure of social life as the solution of the full problem of human relationships; while the substance of direct personal relationship is considered an "individual" matter. Yet a human society can only rest upon the acceptance by all individuals of the communal nature of their own personal lives. So long as this distinction between the individual and the social life persists dualism has not been completely overcome, and collectivism cannot pass into communism. We must not forget, however, that so long as the intention of achieving communism remains it must necessarily produce a process of development which will negate the unconscious dualism and bring the continuity of Christianity into consciousness. The danger-point in Russia is that the tension between the substance of individual life and of social co-operation should idealize the communist intention and so generate a new form of the will to power.

There remains the question about fascism. How can it come about that the self-destruction of individualist society and the creation of collectivism can result in the production of a society which is consciously anti-communist, anti-progressive, anti-equali-

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tarian and which persecutes the Jews? If our analysis is right, and if the principle which Jesus enunciated for the understanding of history and the guidance of action is valid, it certainly looks as though the breakdown of the individualist structure of modern society, with its ideal and formal freedom of the mind, and its consequent democracy and organization of a working-class movement, must result in the establishment of socialism. Yet so far in the West it has resulted only in a collectivism which is totally opposed to socialism, and which destroys the forms of freedom that liberalism had achieved. Freedom of thought goes, and its place is not taken by its complementary opposite.

The first part of the answer follows the lines of the explanation of the coming of socialism in Russia, where socialist theory did not expect it. Socialism failed precisely where all the conditions for its achievement seemed to be given, and where it was most confidently expected to establish itself—in Germany. The organization of industry in a collective form had proceeded further in Germany than elsewhere. The theoretical basis of revolutionary technique was more highly elaborated and more widespread than in any other country. There was an extremely strong and well-organized communist party. The democratic institutions of the country were in the hands of a socialist government, professing a Marxist creed. The prophesied and expected revolutionary situation arose in a perfectly clear and unambiguous form. Revolution was inevitable. Yet the working-class movement failed not merely completely but ignominiously, almost without the shadow of resistance. The failure of the working-class movement in Germany was undoubtedly the most spectacular collapse in the history of Euro-

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pean society. It is hardly too much to say that its failure was on the surface fantastic and miraculous, past all understanding. Yet the future—at least the immediate future of Europe—depends upon understanding it. The answer usually given by the communists—that the German working-class movement was badly led—is inadmissible and ambiguous. It might mean that it was taken by its leaders into a revolutionary struggle which was badly planned and so defeated by taking the wrong action. But this is contrary to the facts. There was no struggle; in this sense the movement was not badly led; it was not led at all. The struggle, so far as the organized movement was concerned, remained purely theoretical, purely formal, purely ideal. Moreover this answer is a negation of all communist theory. A socialist movement is responsible for its leaders, and they are responsible to it. It is the people who provide the impulse to action, the leaders' business is merely to direct it properly. If it is true that the German working-class movement was badly led, and that this explains its failure, then the movement was only a socialist movement in form and idea, not in substance. It was a technical organisation—a machinery for achieving collective social action, in which the impulse to act must be provided from outside. We must notice also that to give this explanation is already to have accepted the fundamental principle of fascist organisation—the "leadership" principle. If it is true, then the German collectivist movement was looking for a leader who should determine its direction of movement. If it is true, then the German working-class movement was already fascist in practice, though not in idea.

But the proper explanation is different, and is

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really obvious. There was an almost complete inhibition of action in the German working class. The means to action, theoretical and practical, were completely developed; but the effective motives which would have provided the driving force were wanting. The form of Western individualism had produced, throughout society, the dualism of intellect and emotion. The suppression of emotional freedom in favour of intellectual freedom meant, as we have already discovered, the creation of the means to socialism at the expense of the capacity to use it. The situation in Western Christendom showed itself to be the opposite of that in Eastern Christendom. The Greek form of the Russian Church had resulted in a development of the emotional creativeness of Russian society and so provided a reservoir of motive force, at the expense of the intellectual development which could have directed and guided it. The Roman form of the Western Churches had produced in Western Europe a mechanism of technical organization, theoretical and practical, for the creation of socialism, at the expense of the development of the emotional capacity which alone could provide the motive force for its use. But there is this difference between the two cases, that the technical and formal character of organization makes it easy to transfer. The universality of the intellect lies in the fact that its products are available for common use. Russia could adopt the scientific products of the West. The West could not "adopt" the emotional drive of Russia. There can be no scientific *technique* for the transference of emotional power from one society to another or from one individual to another.

Now the dualism of intellect and emotion belongs, like all dualism, to the field of intentional conscious-

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ness. As a matter of *fact* there is a unity of the two. Suppressed emotion does not disappear, except from consciousness. But in the unconscious it is cut off from intentional human development, and remains primitive. In a mature individual or society suppressed emotion acts as a negative force, determining action in opposition to consciousness, and expressing itself in the negation of the intellect. The suppression of emotion in favour of the intellect generates anti-intellectualism. If the ideals of the intellect are freedom, equality and progress, the impulses of the suppressed emotional consciousness will be anti-libertarian, anti-equalitarian and anti-progressive; in a word the unconscious, in which the motives to action are buried, will be blindly reactionary. This is the simple explanation of the spiritual character of fascism. The incapacity of the intellect to provide a motive for the creation of the socialist society which it had constructed in idea, revealed, as it was in Germany, in a situation in which the organized system of life had collapsed and action had become imperative, could only have one result. The suppression of emotion and the inhibition of action which it involved, broke down, and the unconscious provided the driving force for action. It used the instruments and the techniques built up by the intellect, in the service of its own ends. And these are necessarily the negation of the conscious ideals which have been displaced. The resulting release into action is necessarily negative in relation to the whole structure of modern society. Its social collectivism is impelled to destructive and not to constructive ends. It must destroy freedom, democracy, equality and all the rational forms of modern society; and in particular, its ethical forms.

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But a purely negative movement is not possible. It has meaning only in relation to its corresponding positive and exists through it. It is true of fascism that it is fundamentally directed against communism and yet is possible only through the existence of communism. Its negative character makes it inherently and clearly self-contradictory. The real opposite of collectivism is individualism; yet fascism is a collective form of society in which individualism has been abolished. Yet it is at the same time necessarily individualist. This patently paradoxical character of fascist society is explicable if we attend to one of the aspects of modern individualism which we have hitherto kept in the background. The term society as applied to the Western world is an ambiguous term. It may apply to the cultural whole of Western Europe; or it may apply to each of its component nations, organized as independent sovereign states, severally. In modern individualism, we saw, the self stands over against the external world. But we noticed that the external world varied with the point of view from which the self is looking. From one point of view the external world is the material world in distinction from the spiritual world of "the human mind"; from another it is society in distinction from the individual. But this does not exhaust the relativity of the term. From the European point of view the external world is the world which is outside the pale of European civilization; the pagan world; the world which has not been subject to the progressive process which Christianity brought into Europe; and so, from the economic point of view, the non-capitalist world. Also, from the point of view of each national society, every other nation is part of the external world.

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Now we saw that the individualist is driven into preoccupation with and exploitation of the external world; not intentionally, but inevitably and unconsciously. The freedom of the individual is ideally for all, yet the condition of its achievement by anyone is the exploitation of the "external world"—that is to say, the others collectively. An individualist society is driven into preoccupation with and exploitation of the world external to itself—in this case, all the other nations; in particular, of the European society of nations which is external to each *individual* nation; and also to preoccupation with and exploitation of, the non-Christian, non-capitalist world. The progress of individualism fuses these two interrelated factors, so that Europe¹ becomes a society of individual nations competing with one another for the exploitation of the non-European world. There is therefore inherent in modern European society a collective individualism, in which the opposition of individual and society is bridged by a "mystical" identification of the individual with the society to which he belongs; so that society is conceived as a mystical Person, and the individual's "greater self". This mystification is necessary to individualism. It is the only way in which the egocentric mind can think the unity of society without giving up the idea that he is a free self. He can think society in terms of himself; so that he can think, to use Rousseau's phrase, that "in uniting himself with all he remains as free as before and obeys only himself".

In this mystical, ideal fashion there is generated the

¹ The term Europe here and in similar connexions includes, of course, all European societies whether situated geographically in Europe or not; and in particular the United States of America, and the self-governing British Dominions.

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"collective-individual"—the State-personality, which absorbs into itself the minds and wills of its members and unites them in a "general will" for the common good; and this general will is the *real* will of each of the individuals composing the society. (The real, we must remember, is the ideal, which is opposed to the actual; for the individualist, the self is a mind.) This is the "mystery" of individualist democracy, and it makes each nation, in idea and so in form and law, an independent sovereign State, free and equal in a society of free and equal nations which compose the society of nations; and the freedom of each is individualistic; it is free (in theory) to live its own life in its own way. From this point of view the whole process of individualism which we have already traced is repeated at the collective level; and the law of self-frustration governs the development. The practical aspect of the matter is that each State is seeking freedom for itself at the expense of all the others; and trying to subordinate all the others to itself. The reality of this free and equal society of individualist nations is an international competition for wealth—which is the means for securing for each member state its own "collective-individual" freedom from the others, and of making the others work for it. This, however, must be disguised. The appearance and form of freedom must be maintained; and the mechanism of investment provides, as in the case of the individual, the means of doing this. But equally it prevents any of the nations from using its full power to prevent the development of the others. The form of independent sovereignty must be retained; and therefore there can be no formal or political interference by one nation-state in the internal affairs of the others.

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It is this development of "collective individualism" which explains the paradox of fascism. It is possible for the individual states to become consciously collectivist in their inner structure, while remaining consciously individualist in their collective life. The spiritual apparatus for this is ready to hand. It is the intensification of the mystical idealism in the individual mind by which he freely identifies himself, finally and irrevocably, with the collective individualism of the State; and the symbolization of this by the identification of the nation with a real individual—the Leader. The collective individual becomes intensely conscious of its "isolation" in the society of states; and devotes all its collective energies to intensifying the mystical individuality of its collective self. The removal of the internal individualism allows the nature and process of individualism to appear nakedly in the field of international society. The appearance of ideal freedom and equality must be maintained. Germany, for example, must think its national individualism as a struggle for freedom from bondage to the other nations; as a claim to equal rights. It must intend that each other nation should live its own individual life in its own way. Fascism can only last so long as this is possible. The practical reality of this idealism, however, must be its complementary opposite. It must mean in practice the effort to dominate all the other nations in the interests of Germany. It must mean an effort to achieve imperial domination in the political field which would mean, in practice, the enrichment of Germany at the expense of the rest of the world. The reason for this is one with which we are already familiar. Individualism is self-contradictory and self-frustrating. Its intention is one which cannot be

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realized; and therefore in practice it must achieve the reverse of its intention. Freedom and equality cannot be achieved by self-isolation. Real community is the condition of real freedom.

The conscious intention of fascism is national freedom—freedom from bondage to other nations. To all other nations it is prepared to grant the same right. Each has an equal claim to freedom in isolation. Each only wants to be allowed to live its own life in its own way within its own borders, and not to be interfered with or dictated to by any other nation. This is the sincere conscious mind of Germany or Italy, and increasingly of the other developed capitalist powers. This collective-individualist mind is purely “spiritual” and “idealist” to the extreme point of mystical intoxication. Consequently the fascist mind is completely egocentric—a collective egocentricity—a self-reflection of social consciousness in a passionate effort of self-realization in its inner life. It is the extreme form of modern dualism. And by the law of self-contradiction in action, its practice in the external world must mean, unconsciously, the opposite. Its collective self-consciousness must mean in practice a constant preoccupation with the external world of international society, to which in reality it is bound. Its claim to be free from interference, spiritual or material, from the other nations can in fact only be fulfilled if their life becomes automatic and unfree. For since the interrelation of European society is a fact, any free action by any one nation is necessarily an “interference” with the ideal freedom of isolated nationhood of all the others. Thus the nation which above all wants to be left alone in peace becomes for that very reason the source of war. The nation which will have nothing to do with inter-

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nationalism makes all political problems international. Fascism is the supreme example of the truth of the insight of Jesus. In Italy and Germany, if we have eyes at all, we can hardly fail to see the experimental verification of the law that he that saveth his life shall lose it. And we can prophesy, without hesitation, that what fascism must achieve is the unification of Europe and the destruction of the sovereign, independent State. How long this will take to work itself out we cannot say. We can only observe the momentum and the acceleration of the process in the world.

In concluding this survey we must notice the larger human issues which are involved, rather than the immediate political issues. Political and economic changes are the immediate centres of the day-to-day process of our own world, and to them all other issues are related. But in essence the human issues of personal relationship are the centre of the whole process, and the core of all human reality. If we limit our attention to the political and economic aspects of life we shall lose our perspective and fail to see the whole of which these are parts. So let us consider the relation of fascism to the Christian intention which underlies the whole process of European progress as its ultimate driving force. If we do this in the light of our own study it is perfectly clear that fascism represents an extreme and violent organized opposition to Christianity, and so to the pressure in Europe to achieve a universal community based on freedom and equality. And this opposition, though not fully conscious, is very near the threshold of consciousness. The violence of the resistance in itself would show this, as well as the extremely mystical form into which the dualist consciousness has been driven in its effort to maintain the

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distinction between theory and action; between idea and matter of fact. The leavening of Europe by Christianity has gone so far that unless progress can be stopped altogether the next step must be the adoption of the Christian intention not merely in idea, but in practice. And this would *be* the disappearance of dualism and the end of class society, and the beginning of a planned and practical progress towards the achievement of a universal community of humanity on the only basis on which in fact it can be realized—the Christian basis of freedom and equality.

Now this intention has been adopted in Russia, even if it is in a limited form owing to the theoretical rejection of Christianity. Fascism is therefore consciously anti-communist, and anti-Russian. The insistence on the anti-Comintern pact by the fascist powers as the basis of their unity of action is the expression of this; as well as another indication of how the individualistic basis of fascist collectivism defeats its own ends. They must form a collectivity of nations against the Soviet Union. But here again the theoretical basis is unconsciously in contradiction with practice. Fascist policy must ideally be directed against Russia; but this will mean in practice that it is directed against the non-socialist nations which are industrially developed—against France and Great Britain in particular. It is only spiritually that Russia is a danger to Germany. The real pressure upon her is the competition of the individualist nations for the exploitation of the "colonial" world, and socialism has automatically excluded Russia from this competition. The union of the capitalist powers against Russia is necessarily the fascist *ideal*; but for that reason it cannot be achieved. The simple evidence for this is that fascism has already

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destroyed the practical basis for such a union by breaking up the League of Nations. In practice she must unify the other nations against herself, and produce a situation in which Russia can intervene and determine the issue. The ideal anti-communism of the fascist powers can only have as its practical result in the long run the opposite of its intention—the creation of a universal communism.

But this is still concerned with the "external" activities of the fascist "collective individual". It is in its inner life that the deepest contradiction lies, and in which the law of self-frustration works most certainly and most unconsciously. The mystical self-identification of the individual with the collective is at once the essential basis of fascism and in contradiction to its practical reality. For it is purely formal and ideal, and is contradicted at every point by the actual experience of the practical life of its members. The practical reality is a complete subordination of real human personality to the ideal personality of the collective people. The unity of the fascist State is in fact maintained by organized force, and the will to power of a minority. But it must *appear* to its members as a spiritual unity to which the individual member gives himself freely and in which he realizes himself completely. As the practical subordination of all individuals, with their individual interests, their freedom of action and of speech and of thought, increases, it is impossible to prevent it impinging, at every turn, upon the conscious experience of every member of the society. This every-day experience works directly for the destruction, in the individual, of the ideal belief in his self-realization in the State. It undermines the self-identification of the individual with the collectivity.

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positive, creative force. In creating and educating a unified, collective, emotional life, fascism is creating in its own spirit the positive emotional conditions which will determine the success, instead of the failure, of socialist revolution in Western Europe. The ideal concentration on Russia as the enemy results in the creation of the Russian form of consciousness in the West and effects that unity of intellect and emotion without which creative social action is impossible. It is the function, though not the intention, of fascism to achieve in the West what it seeks to prevent, the creation of the spiritual conditions, in the substance of its own society, for the realization of socialism in practice.

Fascism is thus the final stage of the development of individual self-consciousness. It is indeed a kind of psycho-analytic process in society, which brings the suppressed emotional unconscious into consciousness, and compels society to understand its own impulses and the reason for their suppression. The process of psycho-analysis depends upon dualism in reflection; the intellect must remain distinct from the suppressed consciousness and external to it. Yet the removal of the suppression is the admission of the unconscious into consciousness, side by side with the unsuppressed consciousness; and the completion of the process is the disappearance of the dualism between the two, and the integration of reason and emotion. It is a process of the self-destruction of reflective dualism. The will to suppression is turned against itself, and the mind becomes aware of what it must not know if it is to remain the mind of individualism. It takes its own opposite within itself, and achieves the *idea* of the integration of the divided self. Such a situation is paradoxical and unstable in the extreme. It must be

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resolved either by a "cure" (that is, the achievement of the integration in action), or it will result in madness or suicide. In other words, it produces in consciousness a growing understanding of the hidden meaning of the situation, while maintaining a resistance of the will to the acceptance of the meaning in the practice of life.

It is in this way that fascism discovers, and at the same time violently resists, the truth about itself, and so confirms the central thesis of this book. It discovers that the source of all this pressure towards progress, equality, freedom and common humanity is—the Jew. The persecution of the Jews in Germany has, of course, the same source as their persecution throughout the history of Christian Europe; but it has a significant difference. It is secular, political, conscious and organized in a way that it has never been, and it is felt to be the central problem of society in which all other problems have their roots. (This has been true in Germany throughout the whole history of the fascist movement. It is only now making its appearance in Italy. There are many reasons for this difference, but the central reason is that Italy has always been a purely Catholic country and is the seat of the Holy See of the Catholic Church; while Germany has not merely been predominantly Protestant, but also the country in which the dualism of Protestant and Catholic forms of official Christianity has been most obvious and decisive.) This new anti-semitism of Germany looks completely irrational to us. From a purely intellectual point of view the problem seems, to say the least of it, absurdly exaggerated, and the practical reasons advanced to prove that the Jews are a real menace to Germany, the source of all her misfortunes and defeats,

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and the organizers and creators of all internationalism, and of Bolshevism in particular, are clearly nothing but "rationalizations" of an emotional impulse. Yet we have to face the fact that the Leader of the German people has no doubt in his own mind that the Jewish problem is the centre of all problems, not merely in Germany, but in the world. It is useless to dismiss this as an illusion, because if it is, it demands explanation.

But it is no illusion. It is the truth. Hitler's declaration that the Jewish consciousness is poison to the Aryan races is the deepest insight that the Western world has yet achieved into its own nature; and his capacity to realize this is the proof of his genius as well as the secret of his power and of the curious fascination which his personality exerts. One has only to attend to the form of the statement to see that it is not the practical power or wealth of the Jews that he fears, but the character of the Jewish *mind*. It is the Jewish consciousness which is the enemy, not an organized Jewish army, not even an insurrection of the Jews in Germany. It is the hidden penetration of the Jewish spirit into the Gentile mind that is the danger; and it is a danger because the "Aryan" mind cannot resist it, but must succumb. The task is to extirpate the influence of the Jewish consciousness upon the world. At all costs the leaven must be got out of the lump, or very soon the whole will be leavened, and the result will be the final end of the "Aryan" (*sc.* pagan) tradition. Europe will be so false to itself that it will create a universal communism, which will destroy blood and race as the basis of civilization, destroy the beauties and the heroisms of the struggle for power, deny the natural superiority of the white races, and of Germans in particular, and produce

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universal equality and brotherhood. The Jewish spirit is not merely under the illusion of these ideas; it is the force, in the world, which creates them in idea and compels the rest of humanity to achieve them in practice. I need ask for no greater testimony to the truth of the whole thesis of this book than Hitler's. His inspiration corroborates my own pedestrian reflection. The only difference between us is that his will and mine respond to the truth in different ways. The thought of the triumph of the Jewish consciousness fills me with joyous exhilaration, while it casts Hitler into the depths of despair. For Hitler the Jewish consciousness is a poison. I have learned from the greatest genius of the Jewish race to recognize it as the Water of Life. My own conclusions are of little account. I claim no real originality for them. I have merely held on to the essence of Christianity as the process of the world destroyed its official trappings of theology and Church organization. What fills me with excitement is to find the leader and symbol of one of the greatest peoples of Europe corroborating the prophecies of Jesus in his passionate opposition to their fulfilment.

Yet the fascist understanding is not complete or it could not resist. A complete understanding would mean a complete acceptance, and the end of the opposition. For complete reflective self-realization is only possible in action, through the unification of understanding and will. The fascist consciousness is emotional and expresses itself symbolically; and the symbols are not transparent to the mind. They are disguised self-realizations. The emotional discovery is accompanied by the suppression of freedom of thought. To the free man the symbolism is transparent. What, after all, in plain fact, is the influence of the Jewish

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consciousness upon the Aryan races? The answer is—Christianity. Christianity is, as a matter of history, the Jewish contribution to the Western tradition. Yet we found that the Jewish substance of Christianity had been suppressed in all the official "Christian" religions, and that the conscious forms which suppressed it, both in the practical and the theoretical fields, were not Jewish in origin, but Roman and Greek. The conscious form of European religion thus became not Jewish but pagan, while its Jewish substance was driven into the unconscious. This explains why, when the unconscious is finally brought back into consciousness, the development which it sets up finds its emotional symbol in the Jew; while the intellectual consciousness remains theoretically "Christian". What this means is that fascism desires to accept and incorporate in its own structure some form of official Christianity, provided that it can become *purely* the religion of a European society and be effectively cut loose from its underlying Jewish substance. Fascism could accept and use a Christianity which was totally, ideal, totally other-worldly, and purely spiritual. But this is even formally impossible. A Christian Church which did not express even in idea the component elements of the Christian intention would have stultified itself formally and could not continue to exist. It would die out in a generation. If it continued to express in idea the tradition of Christianity it would be a standing menace to the fascist society. Yet the fascist consciousness needs a religion to maintain the mystical form of consciousness on which it rests. This is the reason for the attempts to revive or create pagan cults which appear sporadically in Germany. But a dead religion cannot be revived; and no religion can be invented *ad hoc*.

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Here also fascism is in contradiction with itself. It is the creation, in the last analysis, of Christianity. No pagan religion can function in it; yet unless it can get rid of Christianity, it cannot itself function properly. Germany is part of the effect of the Jewish consciousness upon the world. In trying to destroy the Jewish consciousness, it can only negate its own unconscious, and its unconscious is the source of its power. Where, after all, did Hitler discover the Jewish consciousness if not in his own unconscious?

The Jews have become, against their will, a universal community, immanent in the nations of the earth. They can neither be got rid of nor absorbed. This is a strange phenomenon, especially when we remember that the Jews have always been willing, everywhere, to identify themselves with the inhabitants of the country in which they live. Only the right to adhere to their own form of religion has been claimed. Otherwise they have been eager to become indistinguishable from their fellow-citizens, and to devote themselves and sacrifice themselves to the interests and the development of the country of their adoption. If in spite of this their absorption has proved impossible, the only reason for it must lie in their religion, and in the symbol of it, their persistent refusal to intermarry with other races. Religion—at least Jewish religion—must, then, be a powerful and effective thing, by no means negligible or merely formal and ideal. On its positive side it has maintained the distinctness and community of a people scattered throughout the world, for nearly two thousand years, without any help from organization, leadership or territory. The community of the Jews has been maintained by religion alone. This in itself proves that human community is not created or maintained by

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common attachment to the soil, nor by common devotion to a leader, nor by economic or political organization, nor by a complex of cultural traditions of a secular kind. The Jews have proved the truth of Jesus' understanding of the nature of Man. No dualist religion has succeeded in this; only the Jewish religion; and, in part, the Christian religion in virtue of its Jewish origin and substance. But the Jews have thus refuted, experimentally, the conception that social unity fundamentally depends upon organization and leadership—that is to say, upon dualism—against their will. The Jews would like to be whole-heartedly German in Germany, Englishmen in England, American in America. But they cannot; because they are Jews. They belong to a religious community that cuts across the boundaries of nations. Individualist societies can appear to solve the Jewish problem by the grant of equal citizenship. But they can only do this because citizenship is itself a formal and legal matter. The ideal and formal equality, freedom and common humanity of the individualist democracies provides a formal and ideal solution of the Jewish problem. But it is not a real solution. As soon as one of these societies is driven into fascism by its own development, and begins to seek an emotional unity of its people which is not merely legal and ideal, the Jewish problem is rediscovered. The Jews cannot be part of a real national unity. They may be German citizens but they cannot be Germans. Hitler is right when he claims that he had to suppress the Jews if he was to unify Germany. The only real community in which the Jewish problem could be solved would be the community of humanity in which race was no longer a principle of unity. The disappearance of the problem in Russia rests, as we saw,

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on the acceptance of the intention by communism to create such a universal community.

This brings us back to the beginning of Christianity and the Jewish rejection of Christianity. Throughout European history the Jewish rejection of Christianity has remained practically complete. The rejection of the various European versions of Christianity—of the various religions of Europe—was inevitable. They are, as our discussion has shown, fundamentally unreligious in all their conscious forms, and they are in opposition to the Jewish religious consciousness which is their source. But under cover of the rejection of these "Christianities", there lies hidden the rejection of the real Christianity which is essentially Jewish. And this rejection is the Jewish self-negation. What matters alone is the Jewish rejection of Jesus as a Jew, not of the misrepresentation of him in the European religions. Now we need only recall the grounds of the original rejection of Jesus by the Jewish people of his own time to understand the bearing of this upon the contemporary situation in Europe. The crucial issue was the demand which Jesus made for the conscious rejection of Hebrew nationalism and the idea of a Jewish imperialism. His own people rejected the intention which he discovered as the significance of their history; they refused to become consciously the means for the achievement of a universal community in which race was no longer the basis of human relationship. Instead they clung to their racial distinctness and insisted upon their racial superiority. By this refusal of their own reality and the assertion of their will to power they achieved, as Jesus said they would, the opposite of their intention. It is the exclusive racialism of the Jewish people which is their real rejection of the substance of Christianity:

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and by this rejection they are self-isolated from the community of mankind.

With this in mind we can turn to our final task—to understand the self-frustration of fascist society in terms of the fascist rejection of the Jews. The contradiction involved must, by the law of self-frustration, achieve what it is seeking to prevent. We shall expect, therefore, that the emotional concentration upon the Jewish consciousness will have the effect of achieving the triumph of the Jewish consciousness, and in the form which it takes in the Jewish people through the Jewish rejection of its own Christianity. That this is what is happening in Germany is already clear. The German consciousness is becoming Jewish in form and is destroying the traditional form of the European consciousness. Fascism is destroying the European conception of nationality as the basis of political unity, and supplanting it by a *racial* basis. And the racial conception of society is essentially Jewish and non-Aryan; while it is in practice incompatible with nationalism. It is based, moreover, upon the sense of racial superiority. The situation with which Europe is faced is this. At its very centre its most highly organized nation has suddenly turned on the Jews and said, "You are not the chosen race. *We* are the chosen race. It is to us, and not to you, that the lords of the isles shall bring tribute. It is you who shall be hewers of wood and drawers of water for us." It has substituted itself for the Jews, and in consequence it has annexed the essential form of Jewish consciousness. Hitler himself in his speeches seems to be more and more explicitly conscious that he has a divine mission to lead the true chosen people of God into the promised land. He is clearly "fascinated" by the Jews, and the violence of his expressed

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loathing for the Jewish race is clearly the expression of an "inferiority complex" in face of it. This in itself would be of little consequence; but what is momentous for the history of the world is the response of the German unconscious to his leadership. It shows how fully the leaven of the Jewish spirit has done its work; and reveals in an almost naked manner that the conscious resistance to Judaism is merely the complementary opposite of its unconscious absorption.

Judaism, in its rejection of Christianity, is an exclusive racial community. It can continue to be so precisely because it is not a nation. The race has no inherent relation to territory, while the nation has. In idea a modern nation is a spiritual unity based on common culture, language and traditions. In practice it is a human group organized in relation to defined territorial limits. Apart from this material basis no human group can be organized either economically or politically as an exclusive group, or as an independent sovereign state. The effort of a highly industrialized European power to unite the ideal and the material aspects of nationhood in an isolated "racial nationality" based at once on blood and soil, cannot possibly achieve its aim. It is patently impossible in practice. It could only be done by dividing the surface of the earth into rigidly separated areas, each of which was exclusively inhabited by one race, isolated from all the others. But if this could be done by agreement, there would be no impulse to attempt it. A world which could agree to a peaceful redistribution of material wealth would already have accepted the very principle of human community of which racialism is the negation. But we must not be deluded by our own dualism into thinking that the patent absurdity of the attempt means that racialism is

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a "mere theory" which would never work in practice. In Germany, and in the growing opposition to Germany, which necessarily has its form dictated by Germany, the racialism which is succeeding nationalism is not a "mere theory". It is not a theory in the proper sense at all. It is a passion; an eruption of the unconscious which defies rational control. It is true that it can never work in practice. But this merely means that the intention with which it moves into action can never be achieved. It does not mean that it will make no difference—but only that it must achieve not its own will but the will of God. Already it has destroyed the nationality of Austria without any resistance which was more than formal and ideal. It is breaking up the organized nationality of Czechoslovakia before our eyes. It is destroying Spain in its efforts to prevent the spread of socialism. And in the process it is mobilizing the unconscious of the other European powers against it, yet in the form of its own new spirit.

Fascism is the point at which the Western opposition of theory and practice turns from theory to practice. In order to act it has to stop thinking. And in doing this it throws rationality overboard and with it all the formal expressions of modern rationality, of which the most important is the ideal rationality of law. To the formal procedures of social relationship which are based upon reason it opposes the cunning of the blind impulses which reason has suppressed and thwarted. To the cold white spirituality of the mind it opposes the hot impulses of the blood. So action is achieved. But it is anti-rational action, which is destructive of reason and of all its expressions and achievements. This is no inexplicable madness which has fallen upon Germany. It is the logical and inevitable

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end of the development of Western European society. For, as we have seen, the form of our Western life has rested upon the acceptance in the "spiritual" field of the root principles of rationality—equality, freedom and universal community—and their refusal in the practical field of material life. We have rationalized this refusal in a philosophy and a theology which prove, by demonstration or by "revelation", that it is the ideal which is the real, that it is the other world of pure spirit alone that matters, and that practice in this world is *necessarily* opposed to the demands of theory, since it is governed by irresistible laws which we cannot alter and which have no relation to the ideals of the human spirit. They are purely material because man is purely mental. Of course we know that this is not true—we only will that it should be true—and all the proofs and demonstrations of theology and metaphysics are wish fulfilments. The reality of human life is action, not thought. All life is behaviour, and all personal life is behaviour illuminated and integrated by reflection as intentional action. By limiting rationality to ideas and forms we have handed action over to the control of blind instincts struggling against reason. So, because whatever we think or say or "will", reality is reality, and *our* reality is action, it is action that has the last word. We have not succeeded in our intention of isolating pure reason in a heaven of its own, because that is impossible. We have merely become dependent upon reason for everything that is really human in our lives, and yet incapable of using it except to destroy our own humanity. We can debate and scheme and organize and plan for peace; but we can only act for war. By our own will we have created a world-wide automatism of material life, which is "external" to

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our minds and which our reason cannot control. And the automatism of the structure is reflected in the automatism of the impulses which control our actions. So the more urgently we plan for peace and seek to secure peace by "reasonable" methods—by agreements and persuasion, and diplomacy and debate and resolutions and analysis and proposals, by all the forms of talking and writing which are the limits of pure spirit—the more we produce an automatic inevitability of war. To anyone who has discovered the full rationality of the religious consciousness there is no paradox or unreason in this necessity. He will find the clearest proof of the drive to war in the rapid growth of the pacifist movements. In fascism Western Europe has achieved its inevitable end. It has succeeded in making the world of the spirit—the world of freedom, equality and humanity, of ideals and religion and culture—another world; and *this* world has become in consequence a world of dark unconscious forces of destruction. It has insisted that the realization of humanity shall be postponed to another life, and so has made inhumanity the automatic law of this life. It has decided that the kingdom of God shall be a kingdom in heaven, and delivered this world over to the powers of darkness. "Truly," as Jesus said with bitter insight, "they have their reward."

Fascism is stronger than modern democracy. The leadership of Europe has passed into the hands of the fascist powers. Hitler and Mussolini—Hitler increasingly alone—are the leaders, not of Germany and Italy, but of Western Europe. They dictate the action of all other countries because they are free of the restrictions which the forms of rationality impose. Action cannot be countered by discussion. Reason is no match for

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passion in the practical field. Forms cannot determine substance. Where reason is in opposition to action, reason is weaker than action. The fascist powers can force the democracies into action, but only into blind destructive action. Their leaders are blind agents, but they *are* agents, and they *do* lead. They must lead Europe into self-destruction, blindly, against the conscious will of everyone, including themselves. The will to power is self-destroying. "If the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch."

"But the end is not yet." This achievement of the destruction of civilization by fascism is itself unreal. It is not civilization that is being destroyed but only the modern form of Western society and its dualist consciousness. For fascism is a purely negative will, and its power to act negatively and destructively is borrowed from the very positive forces which it negates. It cannot triumph. It can only destroy itself and create its opposite. It depends upon the Jewish consciousness which it opposes, and it develops in the world, through its own negativity, the negative form of the Jewish consciousness, in its rejection of its own Christian substance. But by securing the triumph of this Jewish consciousness it universalizes it; and in its development it must negate the negation and achieve in the world as a whole the triumph of the positive reality of the Jewish consciousness, which is Christianity. It is the inevitable destiny of fascism to create what it intends to prevent—the socialist commonwealth of the world. The fundamental law of human nature cannot be broken. "He that saveth his life shall lose it." The will to power is self-frustrating. It is the meek who will inherit the earth.

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